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LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY

Slowly growing or stunted?

How delivery of electoral, political, and economic goods impacts support for democracy in Uganda

By Francis Kibirige

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Introduction

After nearly a decade of growth, popular demand for democracy in Africa has shown signs of weakening (Mattes & Bratton, 2016; Lührmann et al., 2017; Cheeseman, 2017)). In Uganda, recent Afrobarometer survey data show that although citizens' preference for democracy consistently outstrips their perception of how much democracy they're actually getting, satisfaction with the way their democracy works is on a decade-long slide.

In survey responses, Ugandans' preference for democracy fluctuates around election years, increasing before and decreasing after general elections. At the same time, the disparity between popular preference for and satisfaction with democracy, defined in this paper as the "democracy satisfaction gap," is growing, from 5 percentage points in 2000 to 34 percentage points in 2017.

These patterns pose a number of questions, including what causes popular preference for democracy to fluctuate around election years and whether indeed Ugandans understand and appreciate democracy.

Survey data suggest that Ugandans have grown in their knowledge of democracy with the passage of time (Mattes, Kibirige, & Sentamu, 2010). Similarly, the proportion of Ugandans who are "committed democrats" – meaning they prefer democracy over any other form of government and consistently reject authoritarian rule – has increased sharply, although women, less educated citizens, and rural residents lag behind in this group.

Our analysis suggests that a preference for democracy is stronger among citizens who perceive the quality of Uganda's elections as poor, those who are dissatisfied with the government's delivery of political or economic goods, those who believe strongly in democratic values, and those who are more cognitively engaged in civic and political life.


Afrobarometer survey

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in Africa. Six rounds of surveys were completed between 1999 and 2015, and Round 7 surveys (2016/2018) are currently underway. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples.

The Afrobarometer team in Uganda, led by Hatchile Consult, interviewed 1,200 adult Ugandans in December 2016 and January 2017. A sample of this size yields country-level results with a margin of error of +/-3% at a 95% confidence level. Previous surveys have been conducted in Uganda in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015.

Key findings

- **Fluctuating support for democracy:** Since the year 2000, the proportion of Ugandans who prefer democracy over any other system of government has been increasing but non-uniformly, with each increase before and during a general election period being followed by a decrease after the election cycle.
- **Steadily declining satisfaction:** During the period 2000-2017, popular satisfaction with the way democracy works in Uganda steadily declined, from 62% to 46%.
- **Widening "democracy satisfaction gap":** Ugandans are consistently more likely to prefer democracy than they are to be satisfied with the way democracy is actually working. The 5-percentage-point gap between preference and satisfaction recorded before the 2001 general elections grew to 34 points after the 2016 elections.

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- **Declining democratic values:** Corresponding to this democracy satisfaction gap, we see a drop in support for democratic values such as support for the rule of law, freedom of the press, parliamentary oversight, multipartyism, and freedom of assembly and association.
 - **Declining assessments of election quality:** A corresponding drop is observed in the perceived quality of elections, especially declining trust in the electoral commission, perceived freedom and fairness of the last national election, and freedom of association, along with increases in fear of election-related violence and in having to be careful about what one says and how one votes.

Multiparty democracy in Uganda

Uganda's democratic experience over the past three decades has been hugely influenced by the Movement ideology, under which the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which took power in a 1986 military coup, was envisaged as best equipped to “foster and protect democracy and stability” in Uganda (Odoki, 2005, p. 210). Political parties were tightly restricted and barred from running candidates for election, with the justification that multiparty competition would rekindle religious, cultural, and political divisions that had fueled the 1981-1986 civil war (Rakner, Makara, & Svasand, 2007; Museveni, 2000).

Proponents of the Movement system argued that due to the NRM's “broad-based nature,” all Ugandans were members, could work together for inclusive development, and could contest for political office based on “individual merit” rather than party affiliation (Mutibwa, 1992, p. 182; Rakner et al., 2007). However, there was consensus that the Movement was not a permanent fix (Mutibwa, 1992; Rakner et al., 2007), and the post-civil war constitution called for two referenda to let citizens decide whether to continue under the Movement or return to a multiparty political system (Odoki, 2005).

Although a 2000 referendum endorsed the Movement system, a return to multipartyism won the blessing of the NRM, the opposition, and a majority of voters in a second referendum in 2005, presenting political parties with a constitutional sanction to freely mobilize membership and compete for political office (Rakner et al., 2007; Perrot, Lafargue, Aude, & Makara, 2011).

This background makes it particularly interesting to see how citizen attitudes toward democracy have changed over the past decade and a half.

Support for democracy

Ugandans have clearly rediscovered their appetite for multiparty politics, as the proportion of citizens who feel close to a political party has more than doubled since 2000, from 29% to 67%. Public support for choosing leaders through regular, open, and honest elections has averaged 85% between 2002 and 2017, while the proportion of Ugandans who prefer democracy to all other political systems has increased from 67% in 2000 to 81% in 2017 (Figure 1).

But while support for democracy has been on the increase, satisfaction with how democracy works in Uganda has steadily declined; as Mattes et al. (2010) noted, Ugandans remain ambivalent about the extent of democracy in the country. Fewer than half (46%) of Ugandans now say they feel “fairly satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their democracy, down from 62% in 2000.

The undulating trend in preference for democracy is perhaps masking underlying relationships that drive these fluctuations, especially as preference for democracy appears to rise before and during a general election and fall in years after the election.

The difference between citizens' preference for democracy and their satisfaction with democracy – which we have called the “democracy satisfaction gap” – follows a similar pattern (Figure 2). For instance, the 5-percentage-point gap recorded in 2000 grew to 15

points after the 2001 elections; the 10-point difference in 2005 grew to 25 points after the 2006 elections; and the 14-point gap in 2015 grew to 34 points after the 2016 elections. Overall, this gap has been growing, from 5 percentage points in 2000 to 34 percentage points in 2017.






Figure 1: Support for and satisfaction with democracy | Uganda | 2000-2017




Respondents were asked:

- Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
 Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
 Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
 Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.
 (% who choose Statement 1)
- Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Uganda? (% who say "fairly satisfied" or "very satisfied")

Figure 2: Democracy satisfaction gap and election-year cycle (percentage points) | Uganda | 2000-2017



Graph shows the growing gap, in percentage points, between the proportion of Ugandans who prefer democracy and the proportion who are fairly/fully satisfied with the way democracy is working. Uganda's last four election years are plotted to illustrate the fluctuating nature of the growing gap with the election year.



This paper examines factors that might influence the rise and fall of the popular preference for democracy and the democracy satisfaction gap, including citizens' views on the quality of elections, their cognitive engagement in civic and political life, their beliefs in democratic values, and the government's delivery of political and economic goods, as well as a range of demographic factors such as gender, age, educational attainment, and urban vs. rural residence.

But first we look at whether Ugandans indeed understand and appreciate democracy.

Ugandans' views on the meaning of democracy

Bratton and Mattes (2001) note that "democracy" is a disputed term and that multiple definitions abound in the literature, from a minimalist focus on election procedures to a broader conception encompassing requirements for socioeconomic equality. The meaning of democracy thus spurs debate among scholars and ordinary citizens alike. In surveys conducted in 2000, 2005, and 2015, Afrobarometer asked respondents what, if anything, democracy means to them.

Ugandan citizens' understanding of democracy appears to have grown with time, as the proportion of citizens who could offer three meanings of democracy rose from 1% in 2000 to 25% in 2015, while the proportion who could cite only one meaning dropped by half, from 60% to 28%. However, in all three survey rounds, about three in 10 respondents said they "don't know" what democracy means.

Survey data also show that Uganda's "committed democrats," defined by Mattes et al. (2010) as respondents who prefer democracy to any other form of government and consistently reject three forms of authoritarian rule common in Africa (i.e. military, strongman, and one-party rule), outperform other respondents (35% vs. 18%) in their ability to cite three meanings of democracy.

The most common understanding of democracy in Uganda concerns "civil liberties/personal freedoms," a response category that has grown from 21% in 2000 to 36% in 2015. Other frequently cited meanings include "peace/unity/power sharing" (from 15% in 2000 to 19% in 2015) and "voting/elections/multiparty competition" (from 10% in 2000 to 15% in 2015).

Another measure of people's understanding of democracy employed in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey presented three hypothetical political regimes and asked survey respondents to indicate how democratic each regime was. The three countries were described as follows:


- **Country A:** Alfred lives in a country with many political parties and free elections. Everyone is free to speak their minds about politics and to vote for the party of their choice. Elections sometimes lead to a change of ruling party. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Alfred's country?
- **Country B:** Betty lives in a country with regular elections. It has one large political party and many small ones. People are free to express their opinions and to vote as they please. But so far, elections have not led to a change of ruling party. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Betty's country?
- **Country C:** Charles lives in a country with regular elections. It has one big political party and many small ones. People are afraid to express political opinions or to vote for the opposition. The opposition is so weak that it seems that it can never win an election. In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Charles' country?

As shown in Figure 3, most Ugandans (89% of committed democrats and 77% of other respondents) correctly identified the political regime in a country with *regular free elections, where elections sometimes lead to a change of the ruling party*, as democracy (either "a full democracy" or "a democracy with minor problems"). At the other end, only 11% of committed democrats (and 15% of other respondents) wrongly identified a country with

regular elections, one dominant political party/weak opposition, where elections are characterized by fear, as a democracy.

Both committed democrats and other respondents gave the same rating in 2008 for the extent of democracy in Uganda: 55% said the country was “a full democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems” – about the same response as in the 2017 survey (54%).

Figure 3: Extent of democracy in 3 hypothetical countries and Uganda | committed democrats vs. others | Uganda | 2008



Respondents were asked to assess the extent of democracy in three hypothetical regimes, as well as in Uganda. Chart shows % who said “a full democracy” or “a democracy with minor problems.”

Who are Uganda’s committed democrats?

In the previous section, we saw that more Ugandans have come to prefer and understand democracy, albeit with increasing dissatisfaction. And as noted by Mattes et al. (2010), a “solid majority of Ugandans may now be called committed democrats.” We find that the proportion of Ugandans who are committed democrats has increased considerably, from 34% in 2000 to a high of 63% in 2012 and, after a dip to 42% in 2015, 59% in 2017. But who are Uganda’s committed democrats? We explore this question through a demographic lens, especially focusing on gender, age, education, and residence.

Chikwanha and Masunungure (2007) found that in general, African youth are about as likely as their elders to prefer democracy, which is a cardinal prerequisite for being a committed democrat. In Uganda, we find that before the country’s return to multiparty politics in 2005, youth (aged 18-30 years) lagged behind their seniors in commitment to democracy, but post-2005, age is no longer a factor in commitment to democracy (Figure 4). In other words, young and old Ugandans are now equally committed to democracy.

However, deficits among women, the less-educated, and rural residents have persisted (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Although the proportion of women who are committed democrats dropped from 31% in 2000 to 22% in 2005 (with their male counterparts remaining almost constant at about 40%), female committed democrats have since picked up, rising to 54% in 2017 – although still 12 percentage points below men.

The proportion of Ugandans who are committed democrats has grown substantially across all levels of educational attainment while generally maintaining a gap of 20 percentage points or more between the least- and most-educated (Figure 5).

Figure 4: Committed democrats by gender and age | Uganda | 2000-2017





Figure 5: Committed democrats by education and location | Uganda | 2000-2017




“Committed democrats” are respondents who prefer democracy over any other system of government and consistently reject one-man, military, and one-party rule.

It is worth noting that in all these demographic groups, the proportion of committed democrats saw a boost after the 2005 return to multiparty politics. Among women and youth, the proportions who are committed democrats doubled between 2005 and 2008.

The fluctuating democracy satisfaction gap


To try to understand the fluctuations in the democracy satisfaction gap around election years, this paper compares the overall effect of a set of predictors at two time points, before and after the 2016 elections. The purpose is to examine the nature, direction, and magnitude of the relationship between the democracy satisfaction gap and a set of predictors at a time when preference for democracy is low (in 2015) and again when preference is high (in 2017).



In their assessment of demand for democracy, Bratton and Mattes (2001) found that among Africans, support for democracy is more intrinsic (i.e. due to appreciation of what democracy embodies, such as freedom, equality, etc.) than instrumental (i.e. due to collective benefits derived from democratic experiences, such as improved living standards). In this analysis, we attempt to explain observed fluctuations in the democracy satisfaction gap by using demand-side attitudes toward democracy to infer intrinsic valuations of democracy, as in citizens' belief in a set of democratic values, and supply-side attitudes to infer instrumental valuations of democracy, as in citizens' views on government delivery of a basket of political and economic goods as well as on the quality of Uganda's elections.

The analysis makes use of six additive indices of citizen belief in *democratic values*, assessments of the *quality of elections*, *cognitive engagement* in civic and political life, count of *most important problems*, and views on *delivery of political goods* and *economic goods* (see Appendix for question items used to construct these indices). In addition, we examine demographic factors (gender, age, educational attainment, and urban/rural residence). The indices of *democratic values* and *cognitive engagement* are taken as measures of intrinsic valuation of democracy, while *quality of elections*, *most important problems*, *political goods*, and *economic goods* are taken as instrumental valuations of democracy. Below, we briefly look at how each index was estimated.

- **Democratic values:** We postulate that any fluctuation in the democracy satisfaction gap would also be reflected in a change, on the demand side, in citizen support for democratic values. Thus, the *democratic values* index is estimated from responses regarding support for respect for democratic authority, parliamentary oversight, the rule of law, limited presidential tenure, multipartyism, accountability, and freedoms of the press and of association.
- **Quality of elections:** The fact that preference for democracy fluctuates around elections years signals the possible importance of general elections to the democracy satisfaction gap. Thus the *quality of elections* index is estimated using survey responses about trust in the electoral commission, participation in the election, free speech and vote choice during elections, absence of fear of political intimidation/violence, and government handling of political violence and the opposition during elections.
- **Cognitive engagement:** Mattes and Bratton (2016) report that the intrinsic understanding of democracy among Africans is "concentrated among persons with cognitive skills acquired through formal education, exposure to news media and engagement with the political process" (p. 18). Following Mattes et al. (2010), who observed that "support for democracy in Africa hinges heavily on levels of cognitive sophistication" (p. 23), we estimate the *cognitive engagement* index from formal educational attainment, interest in politics, access to political news media, and frequency of discussing politics with family and friends.
- **Political goods:** We postulate that an instrumental valuation of democracy should take into account the performance of the democratic system in the delivery of political goods. Thus, this index is estimated from perceived corruption in public institutions; assessments of government handling of fighting corruption, government performance in reducing crime, and job performance of the president; and trust in a number of state institutions.
- **Economic goods:** As with *political goods*, we postulate that support for democracy should take into account the performance of the democratic system in the delivery of goods that would result in improved livelihoods. Thus, we estimate the *economic goods* index from views on the country's and personal economic conditions, lived poverty, and views on government performance in managing the economy, creating jobs, and improving living standards.
- **Most important problems:** Further examining instrumental valuations of democracy, we sought to create a measure of the citizen development agenda, based on how



many problems (with a maximum of three) respondents cited as urgent priorities for government action. We expect that citizens who identify more problems that require government's immediate attention tend to be more particular in their instrumental valuation of democracy than those who cite fewer problems.

- **Demographic factors:** Age, gender, and residence locale have been strong factors in Uganda's political and electoral preferences (Mattes et al., 2010). We use youth (aged 18-30 years), women, and rural residents as reference categories. In addition, we examine educational contrasts (with three categories ranging from "attained primary school or below" to "attained high school or above") and regional contrasts comparing North, East, Central, and Kampala sub-regions to the Western region, which until recently has lagged behind on demand for democracy (Mattes et al., 2010) and is the strongest NRM power base.

All variables were evaluated for scale/construct reliability before being scaled into the respective indices, and each index was divided into two chunks around the midpoint to form two comparison groups. The group above the midpoint is labeled as having more of the attribute being scaled, while the group below the midpoint is labeled as having less of the attribute.

Before our multivariate analysis of scaled measures, we will take a brief qualitative look at two of these measures – citizen belief in *democratic values* and views on *election quality* – to gain insight into how they changed around the 2016 elections.

Shift in democratic values

Data from the 2017 survey show that support for a range of democratic values is generally high, including support for elections (83%), for presidential term limits (81%), for multipartyism (75%), for parliamentary oversight (67%), and for media freedom (59%) (Figure 6).


To highlight the association between preference for democracy and democratic values around the 2016 election cycle, we compare preference for democracy among citizens with a "weak belief in democratic values" (i.e. who score below the midpoint on the *democratic values* index) and among citizens with a "strong belief in democratic values" (scoring above the midpoint) at two points in time: before the 2016 elections, when both preference for democracy (64%) and the democracy satisfaction gap (14 percentage points) were low, and after the 2016 elections, when both preference (81%) and the satisfaction gap (34 points) were high. As shown in Figure 7, the proportion of Ugandans who preferred democracy and had a strong belief in democratic values dropped from 65% in the 2015 survey to 58% in the 2017 survey. It is interesting to note that in 2015 this proportion is larger (65%) when preference for democracy is relatively low (64%), while in 2017 the proportion is smaller (58%) when preference for democracy is high (81%).

Similarly, the proportion of citizens who preferred democracy but whose belief in democratic values was weak increased from 35% in 2015 to 42% in 2017.

Conversely, among Ugandans who did not prefer democracy, the proportion who had a strong belief in democratic values decreased from 51% in 2015 to 35% in 2017 after the 2016 elections, and the proportion who had a weak belief in democratic values increased from 49% in 2015 to 65% in 2017, after the 2016 elections. Here the proportion who did not prefer democracy but had a strong belief in democratic values was high (51%) in 2015, when preference for democracy was low (64%), but has plummeted to 35% in 2017, when preference is high (81%).


Thus, the 2016 election is associated with eroding democratic values among both groups, those who prefer and those who do not prefer democracy. The 2016 electoral cycle could thus be classified as a bad electoral experience for democratic values in Uganda. However, there is a silver lining: This apparent eroding of citizen belief in democratic values is accompanied by a surge in citizen preference for democracy, from 64% in 2015 to 81% in 2017, after the elections.

Figure 6: Selected democratic values | Uganda | 2017



Graph shows proportion of Ugandan citizens who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with selected democratic values and attitudes. See the Appendix for full question texts.

Figure 7: Shift in democratic values | Uganda | 2015-2017




Graph shows a cross-tabulation of preference for democracy (prefer vs. don't prefer) and score on democratic values scale averaging responses on nine measures of democratic values. “Weak” is a score below midpoint of the scale, and “strong” is a score above midpoint of the scale.

Views on election quality

A similar pattern is evident with regard to popular views on election quality. Data from the 2017 survey show that respondents tend to view the quality of Ugandan elections as poor (Figure 8), with fewer than half saying they never have to be careful about what they say about politics (34%), how they vote (35%), or which political organizations they join (45%) and only 42% trusting the electoral commission “somewhat” or “a lot.”


Other measures of election quality show that only 48% say the opposition is never prevented from competing at the polls and only about half (52%) are not afraid (“a little bit” or “not at all”) of becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence during elections. Only six in 10 feel the last election was “completely free and fair” (34%) or “free and fair, but with minor problems” (26%).

Figure 8: Views on selected measures of quality of election | Uganda | 2017



Graph shows proportion of Ugandan citizens who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with selected indicators of election quality. See the Appendix for full question texts.


As shown in Figure 9, perceptions of election quality show a similar correlation with preference for democracy as was the case with citizen belief in democratic values. The proportion of Ugandans who preferred democracy and perceived good election quality (i.e. who score above the midpoint on the *election quality index*) dropped from 54% in 2015 to 47% in 2017, while the proportion who preferred democracy but perceived poor election



quality increased from 46% to 53% after the 2016 elections. Conversely, the proportion who did not prefer democracy but perceived good election quality dropped from 43% in 2015 to 40% in 2017, while those who did not prefer democracy and perceived poor election quality increased from 57% in 2015 to 60% in 2017.

Again, it is interesting to note that the proportion who preferred democracy and perceived good election quality was relatively high (54%) when preference was low (64%) and dropped to 47% in 2017 when preference is high (81%).

Figure 9: Shift in views on quality of election | Uganda | 2015-2017



Graph shows a cross-tabulation of preference for democracy (prefer vs. don't prefer) and score on quality of elections scale averaging responses on 10 measures of perceived election quality. "Poor quality" is a score below midpoint of the scale, and "good quality" is a score above midpoint of the scale.

Thus, the 2016 election is associated with an erosion of citizen views on election quality among both groups, those who prefer and those who do not prefer democracy, though again we note the accompanying surge in citizen preference for democracy from 64% in 2015 to 81% in 2017, after the elections.

Democracy satisfaction gap, democratic values, and quality of elections

The foregoing sections suggest that changes in preference for democracy (and the related changes in the democracy satisfaction gap) mirror changes in citizen belief in democratic values and citizen views on election quality.

Figures 10 and 11 further highlight these relationships. Figure 10 shows a plot of the democracy satisfaction gap alongside a simple error-bar plot of the mean score on the *democratic values* index for each of the seven Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Uganda since 2000, with the size of bars indicating the error around the expected mean with a 95% confidence interval. It indicates that while the democracy satisfaction gap grew from 5 percentage points in 2000 to 15 points in 2002 before narrowing to 10 points in 2005, citizen belief in democratic values dropped from a mean score of .641 to .442 before rising to .51 in 2005.

In effect, an increase in the democracy satisfaction gap (i.e. widening difference between preference for and satisfaction with democracy) corresponds to a drop in the mean score on the *democratic values* index. Conversely, a drop in the democracy satisfaction gap (i.e.

preference getting closer to satisfaction) corresponds to an increase in the mean score on democratic values.



Figure 10: Democracy satisfaction gap and democratic values | Uganda | 2000-2017




Figure shows a side-by-side comparison of the fluctuating trajectories of Uganda's democracy satisfaction gap (the difference between preference for and satisfaction with democracy) with election years, on the left, and of its democratic values scale scores on the right.

Figure 11: Demand for democracy and election quality | Uganda | 2000-2017




Figure shows a side-by-side comparison of trajectories of Uganda's democracy satisfaction gap (the difference between preference for and satisfaction with democracy), on the left, and the perceived quality of elections on the right.

Figure 11 shows a similar comparison of the trajectories of the democracy satisfaction gap and citizen views on the quality of elections. Scores on *quality of elections* initially improved from a mean of .488 in 2000 to .603 in 2002 following the appointment of a new electoral commission at the conclusion of the 2001 elections. As the democracy satisfaction gap narrowed from 15 percentage points in 2002 to 10 points in 2005, the mean score on *quality of elections* dropped to .311 after the 2006 elections.

Thus, while the democracy satisfaction gap grew from 2000 to 2002 and dropped in 2005 before rising ahead of the 2006 and 2011 elections, the *quality of elections* mean score initially improved from 2000 to 2002 but then dropped between 2002 and 2008 ahead of the 2006 elections.

Predictors of the democracy satisfaction gap


In order to explain the democracy satisfaction gap, we estimate seven regression models, one for each of the seven Afrobarometer surveys conducted in Uganda since 2000 (Table 1). The models make use of the predictor variables discussed above. In each model, the same set of predictors is used to explain the democracy satisfaction gap. Only statistically significant model coefficients are shown; negative values are indicated in parentheses.

Table 1: Relative strength of predictors for democracy satisfaction gap | Uganda
| 2000-2017

	Standardized multiple regression (beta) coefficients						
	2000	2002	2005	2008	2012	2015	2017
<i>Democratic values</i> index		0.189**	0.245**	0.279**	0.318**	0.304**	0.277**
<i>Cognitive engagement</i> index		0.097*			0.100*		0.099*
<i>Political goods</i> index		(0.134)**	(0.199)**	(0.123)**	(0.135)**	(0.129)**	(0.157)**
<i>Economic goods</i> index	(0.258)**	(0.199)**	(0.109)**	(0.043)*	(0.136)**	(0.133)**	(0.162)**
<i>Quality of elections</i> index		(0.127)**	(0.177)**	(0.194)**	(0.085)**		(0.104)**
Residing in Northern vs. West		0.098**	0.065*	0.076**	0.090**		(0.09*
Residing in Kampala vs. West					0.086**		
Residing in Central vs. West				0.103**	0.151**		
Residing in Eastern vs. West		0.078**	0.113**	0.047*	0.092**		
Education (primary, secondary, post-secondary)		0.062*	0.077*	0.064*		0.060*	0.088*
Gender		0.108**		0.060**			
Urban or rural residence						0.053*	
Age (18-30 vs. 31+)			0.052*				
<i>Most important problems</i>							
Adjusted R-squared	0.091	0.224	0.261	0.260	0.257	0.196	0.304

Notes: Blank fields=not statistically significant; * significant at $p < 0.05$; ** significant at $p < 0.001$

Multiple regression results indicate that citizens' belief in democratic values has been a dominant factor in predicting the democracy satisfaction gap since the 2002 survey. (In the 2000 survey, the absence of multiparty politics under the Movement system meant that citizens' views on demand for and supply of democracy were not tested.) This is line with Bratton and Mattes' (2001) finding that preference for democracy in Africa is more intrinsic than instrumental. In three of the seven surveys, cognitive engagement, another measure of intrinsic valuation of democracy, comes second. We note that these three surveys (2002,



2012, and 2017) were conducted a few months after a general election, while the surveys in 2005 and 2015 were done months before a general election. It is possible that the explosion of political news during elections increased cognitive engagement following the election (rather than before the election), and thus improved cognitive engagement in surveys after the elections more than in surveys before the elections.

In addition, results show that only cognitive engagement and belief in democratic values (i.e. the two intrinsic valuation factors in the model) are positively correlated with the democracy satisfaction gap; the instrumental valuation factors are negatively correlated. Thus, a stronger belief in democratic values and greater cognitive engagement are associated with a larger democracy satisfaction gap and greater preference for democracy.

Conversely, perceptions of poor election quality and poor delivery of political or economic goods have since 2002 been consistently associated with greater preference for democracy. The count of most important problems is statistically insignificant in all seven models.

The analysis shows that the demographic factors are significant predictors of the democracy satisfaction gap but have not been consistently strong over the seven surveys. Like the intrinsic valuation factors, they are positively correlated with the satisfaction gap (with the exception of residing in the Northern region in the 2017 survey).

Conclusion

Ugandans continue to prefer democracy over any other form of government, but they are also increasingly dissatisfied with the way their democracy is working. While preference for democracy has been increasing, the increase is characterized by non-uniformity, as each increase before and during a general election period is followed by a decrease after the election cycle.

During the period 2000-2017, popular satisfaction with the way democracy works in Uganda has steadily declined, and the gap between preference for and satisfaction with democracy has continued to grow.

This growth in the democracy satisfaction gap is related to a drop in support for democratic values such as the rule of law, freedom of the press, parliamentary oversight, multipartyism, and freedom of association. A corresponding drop is observed in perceived quality of elections, especially declining trust in the electoral commission, perceived freedom and fairness of the last national election, and freedom of association, along with increases in fear of violence and in having to be careful about what one says and how one votes.

Thus, efforts to improve civic awareness and knowledge about democratic governance should be encouraged, especially targeting women, rural residents, and citizens with lower educational attainment. In addition, stakeholders should emphasize efforts to improve the quality of Uganda's elections, especially aiming for better electoral management, increased participation, and trust in the electoral process.

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


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Appendix

Variables used to construct indices




Questions used to estimate democratic values

- a) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: It is important to obey the government in power, no matter who you voted for.
Statement 2: It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that you did not vote for. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 1)
- b) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections.
Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 1)
- c) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong.
Statement 2: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 2)
- d) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Uganda.
Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that Ugandans have real choices in who governs them. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 2)
- e) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.
Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the president can serve. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 1)
- f) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the president explains to it on a regular basis how his government spends taxpayers' money.
Statement 2: The president should be able to devote his full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 1)
- g) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.
Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 2)
- h) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.
Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 2)
- i) Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies.
Statement 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it. (% who "agree" or "agree strongly" with Statement 2)

Questions used to estimate quality of elections

- a) How well or badly would you say the current government is handling preventing political violence during election campaigns, or haven't you heard enough to say? (% who say "fairly well" or "very well")




- b) On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in 2016. Was it completely free and fair, free and fair but with minor problems, free and fair but with major problems, or not free and fair? (% who say "free and fair" or "free and fair, but with minor problems")
- c) Thinking about the last national election in 2016, did you (a) attend a campaign rally? (b) work for a candidate or party? (% who say "yes")
- d) During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? (% who say "not at all" or "a little bit")
- e) In your opinion, during this country's elections, how often are opposition candidates prevented from running for office? (% who say "never")
- f) In your opinion, how often, in this country, do people have to be careful (a) of what they say about politics? (b) of what political organizations they join? (c) about how they vote in an election (% who say "rarely" or "never")
- g) How much do you trust the Uganda Independent Electoral Commission, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% who say "somewhat" or "a lot")

Questions used to estimate political goods

- a) How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say
- The president and officials in his office
 - Members of Parliament
 - Government officials
 - District councillors
 - Police
 - Judges and magistrates
 - Business executives
 - Non-governmental organizations
- (% who say "none" or "some of them")
- b) How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: a) Fighting corruption in government? b) Reducing crime? (% who say "fairly well" or "very well")
- c) Do you approve or disapprove of the way that President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has performed his job over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% who say "approve" or "strongly approve")
- d) How much do you trust the following, or haven't you heard enough about him to say? a) The president, b) Parliament, c) The police, d) Courts of law, e) Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF). (% who say "somewhat" or "a lot")

Questions used to estimate economic goods

- a) In general, how would you describe: a) The present economic condition of this country? b) Your own present living conditions? (% who say "fairly good" or "very good")
- b) In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Ugandans? (% who say "better" or "much better")
- c) Looking back, how do you rate economic conditions in this country compared to 12 months ago? (% who say "better" or "much better")

- 
- d) Looking ahead, do you expect economic conditions in this country to be better or worse in 12 months' time? (% who say "better" or "much better")
- e) Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family:
- Gone without enough food to eat?
 - Gone without enough clean water for home use?
 - Gone without medicines or medical treatment?
 - Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?
 - Gone without a cash income?
- (% who say "never" or "just once or twice")
- f) How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say:
- Managing the economy?
 - Improving the living standards of the poor?
 - Creating jobs?
 - Keeping prices stable?
 - Narrowing the between rich and poor?
- (% who say "fairly well" or "very well")

Questions used to estimate cognitive engagement

- a) How often do you get news from the following sources?
- Radio
 - Television
 - Newspapers
 - Internet
 - Social media such as Facebook or Twitter
- (% who say "a few times a week" or "every day")
- b) What is your highest level of education? (% who have attained "post-primary school" education)
- c) When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters: Frequently? Occasionally? Never? (% who say "occasionally" or "frequently")

Question used to estimate count of most important problems

- a) In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (number of responses given, up to three)



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Francis Kibirige is the national coordinator of the Afrobarometer survey in Uganda and managing director of Hatchile Consult Ltd, the Afrobarometer national partner institution.

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Contact: fkibirige@afrobarometer.org