Indirect colonial rule and the political salience of ethnicity

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Lachlan McNamee is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. E-mail: lmcnamee@stanford.edu.

Abstract

This paper identifies indirect colonial rule as an important determinant of whether ethnicity becomes politically salient in the post-colonial context. We first demonstrate the existence of a cross-national relationship between indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. We then identify the effect of indirect colonial rule through a within-country natural experiment in Namibia. Northern Namibia was indirectly ruled by German and later South African authorities, whereas southern Namibia experienced direct rule. Whether a locality in the border zone was directly or indirectly ruled was shaped by the spatial extent of direct German colonial rule at the time of an 1897 rinderpest epidemic. Exploiting this plausibly exogenous assignment to treatment in the border zone, we show that in indirectly ruled areas, today’s party system is more ethnically divided, ethnic parties do substantially better than non-ethnic parties at securing electoral support, and individuals are more likely to identify with their ethnic group than in directly ruled areas. We explore potential causal mechanisms and find evidence for the importance of the legacy of institutionalized ethnic divisions in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia.

Acknowledgements

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Details about how to apply for the restricted data used in this project are available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-use-policy. The Online Appendix is available at https://people.stanford.edu/lmcnamee/.
1. Introduction

“The colonial world is a world divided into zones. ... [An investigative] approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized.”

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth

What leads individuals to identify and politically mobilize with co-ethnics? People have innumerable potentially salient identities, and ethnic identities are subjectively primordial and highly contingent on situational context (Foucault, 1975; Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010; Young, 1979). Of importance for scholars is to illuminate the factors that increase the likelihood that ethnicity will become a politically relevant cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Cheeseman & Ford, 2008).

Previous work in political science has tended to focus on the role that key actors such as colonial rulers or nation builders (Laitin, 1986; Wilkinson, 2006; Miguel, 2004) have played in shaping political identification whilst devoting less attention to the sources of path dependence in ethnic identification over time. Similarly, conceptualizing ethnic groups as a kind of minimum winning coalition in the political arena (Bates, 1987; Posner, 2005) may be useful in illuminating which ethnic groupings become politically important, but it struggles to account for the selection of ethnicity as a primary cleavage given that slim numerical pluralities can be formed among a great number of different political dimensions. Indeed, gender is perhaps the most efficient minimum winning coalition of all in a majoritarian voting system with two major parties – yet we rarely, if ever, see societies politically divided on the basis of gender.\(^1\) Finally, studies that emphasize the visibility of ethnic identifiers in low-information environments (Chandra, 2007), the importance of national political competition (Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010), the presence of cross-cutting cleavages (Dunning & Harrison, 2010), or the importance of electoral institutions (Huber, 2012) have difficulty in accounting for substantial within-country variation in ethnic party success. Political scientists have noted but not systematically explained why ethnicity is highly politically salient in states such as Jharkhand in India or KwâZulu-Natal in South Africa even whilst political competition is organised on an entirely different social basis in other parts of the same country (Chandra, 2007). More work therefore needs to be done to bridge rational-choice and cultural-sociological perspectives by illuminating the structural factors that affect the incentives for political actors to employ ethnic cues and for individuals to identify politically with co-ethnics.

This paper seeks to causally identify the effect of one particular such factor – indirect colonial rule – on the political salience of ethnicity in the post-colonial context. Colonies can be roughly differentiated into directly ruled or “settler” colonies that often reproduced systems of governance used in Europe and were administered in a highly centralized and bureaucratic form, and indirectly ruled colonies that outsourced local governance to “traditional” indigenous authorities. The type of colonial rule introduced in any particular area has been previously shown to be endogenous to factors such as the strength of pre-colonial states (Hariri, 2012), settler mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001), and resource endowment (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2002), and direct and indirect rule have been shown to have important effects on economic and democratic development to this day (Iyer, 2010; Hariri, 2012; Lange, 2004). This paper builds on this eminent body of literature, and contributes to long-standing debates over the factors that lead ethnicity to become a

\[^1\] There is some evidence of a growing gender cleavage in advanced Western societies. See Conover, 1988; Manza & Brooks, 1998.
politically relevant cleavage, by showing that indirect colonial rule also strengthens the political salience of ethnicity.

The paper is structured as follows: We first present empirical results demonstrating the existence of a substantively significant and robust cross-national relationship between indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity. We build on this cross-national analysis by discussing the within-country natural experimental empirical strategy we employ to identify the effect of indirect rule on the political salience of ethnicity in Namibia. We show that compared to directly ruled areas, in indirectly ruled areas the party system is more ethnically divided, ethnic parties do better at securing co-ethnic support, and individuals are more likely to subjectively identify on the basis of ethnicity. Finally, we discuss the theoretical mechanisms that could account for the effect of indirect colonial rule on the political salience of ethnicity in the post-colonial context. We find evidence in favour of the importance of two institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule – customary legal systems and traditional leadership – in strengthening the salience of ethnicity in areas of Namibia once under indirect colonial rule.

2. Cross-national relationship between indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity

To demonstrate the importance of the form of colonial rule in shaping the political salience of ethnicity, this section will illustrate the robust relationship in sub-Saharan Africa between indirect colonial rule and strength of subjective ethnic identification. To make this analysis as comparable to the existing literature as possible, we will use both the model specifications and the Afrobarometer data used by Robinson (2014). Data for the dependent variable come from the responses to the following question from Afrobarometer’s cross-national Round 4 (2008/2009) survey: “Suppose that you had to choose between being a [Namibian/Kenyan/etc.] and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to? Robinson codes responses on a dummy basis (1 = national identity, 0 = ethnic identity). Data for the indirectness of colonial rule come from Hariri (2012), who follows Lange (2004) by proxying indirect colonial rule by the number of colonially recognized customary court cases in 1955 divided by the total number of court cases. As Hariri puts it, “Under direct rule, colonial powers would not recognize customary courts but would instead implement a uniform legal system based on metropolitan laws. Under indirect rule, on the contrary, the colonial legal system would incorporate the indigenous legal structure” (p.476), and thus the proportion of court cases officially decided on a customary basis is an appropriate measure for the “indirectness” of colonial rule. These data are available for 15 of the 16 countries in the Afrobarometer sample.

Robinson (2014) models the salience of national and ethnic identity using a three-level linear probability model with random intercepts estimated at the ethnic-group and country level. We successfully replicated Robinson’s findings with the data and do-file that she has made publicly available. The new results when including a measure for the indirectness of colonial rule are reported in Table 1 below. Column 1 replicates the main model in Robinson (2014) and shows that the indirectness of colonial rule is significantly associated with a relative decrease in the strength of national identification (and thus an increase in the relative strength of ethnic identification). This result is robust to a different measure of ethnic diversity (Column 2), to employing a multilevel logistic regression (Column 3), and to using all levels of relative strength of ethnic identity instead of employing a binary measure (Column 4).  

2 Unfortunately we cannot show that the result is robust to the inclusion of Tanzania, which is the only country in Robinson’s sample for which the data on colonial court cases are not available and thus is dropped from the sample. Given that dropping Tanzania is necessary for the coefficient on British colonial rule to become
Table 1: National over ethnic identification  | 15 African countries  | 2008/2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Indirect colonial rule</td>
<td>-0.42**</td>
<td>-0.47***</td>
<td>-2.39**</td>
<td>-1.44***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ln GDP/capita 2005</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.1)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic homogeneity</td>
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<td>-0.366***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>British colony</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(-0.05)</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anticolonial war</td>
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<td>0.063*</td>
<td>0.46*</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
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<td>Ln ethnic group size</td>
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<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>Ethnic group partition</td>
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<td>0.16**</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td>Politically relevant ethnic group</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>Formal employment</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.494*</td>
<td>0.61***</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>3.247***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (4) are multilevel linear models with individuals as the unit of analysis and with country- and ethnic-group-level random intercepts. (3) is a multilevel logistic regression. Methodology from Robinson (2014).
Source: Afrobarometer

statistically significant (Robinson, 2014), we are confident that the inclusion of Tanzania would be unlikely to change the interpretation of our results.
Moreover, the effect size is substantively large; moving from having almost no customary court cases recognized by colonial authorities (as in Singapore) to having nearly all court cases decided on a customary basis (as in Nigeria) is expected to lower average national identification by 0.42 on a binary scale – sufficient to move a country such as South Africa from the highest level of average national identification in the sample to the second-lowest. Finally, all the specifications in Table 1 show that, once we control for the indirectness of colonial rule, being colonized by the British no longer exerts a significant effect on the relative salience of ethnicity, with the coefficient estimated precisely at 0. This suggests that, contrary to the findings of Robinson (2014) and Ali, Jiang, Shifa, and Fjeldstad (2015), the form of colonial rule matters more than the colonizer per se for the salience of ethnicity in the post-colonial context – a result that makes sense given the wide variation in the institutionalization of ethnicity in British colonial rule across largely directly ruled regions such as South Africa and Zimbabwe and indirectly ruled regions such as Malawi and Nigeria (Boone, 2003; Lange, 2004).

3. Natural experimental evidence for the relationship between indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity

"German administration was equipped with very scanty forces, because public opinion in Germany demanded an economical colonial policy. ... It would naturally have been more to the purpose had the administration been able from the very beginning to exert its authority throughout the entire land."

German Colonial Office (1919), p.41

Cross-national comparisons, whilst suggestive, have their limitations where treatment (i.e. the independent variable of interest) across countries is not randomly assigned. In particular, if ethnic groups with stronger pre-colonial state structures tended to experience indirect colonial rule (Hariri, 2012), then it is difficult using pooled analysis to rule out the possibility that causal factors that shaped the strength of pre-colonial state governance also shape the contemporary group salience of ethnicity. To illuminate the relationship between indirect rule and the salience of ethnicity as a political cleavage, this paper employs a research design that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in colonial rule in Namibia (see also Lechler & McNamee, 2016). The country was arbitrarily divided by its German colonial rulers in 1897 (Miescher, 2012). The more prosperous and densely populated northern region had little or no European settlement, whilst the German authorities directly ruled the central and southern regions of Namibia. This division was later formalized by the South African authorities through the Odendaal Commission of 1964, which created a number of “bantustans” (racial homelands) in the North under customary rule (Figure 1).

This division was unrelated to the productive potential of Namibian agricultural land; the southern region of Namibia actually receives significantly less rain and is largely arid (Appendix Figure A.1). Thus, the Germans (and later South Africans) did not systematically settle in the parts of Namibia best suited to large-scale commercial agriculture – indeed, quite the opposite is true (Werner & Odendaal, 2010). Rather, German colonization initially focused on central and southern Namibia because of their lower indigenous population density. Budgetary constraints precluded large-scale military expansion, and colonial authorities instead gradually expanded their territorial remit in the South by progressively playing off warring indigenous factions and co-opting and remunerating traditional leaders for lost landholdings (German Colonial Office, 1919; Ofcansky, 1981). In 1897, a rinderpest epidemic from Central Africa killed almost 95% of central and southern Namibian cattle herds. This epidemic presented both a threat to German herds and an opportunity to
consolidate the nascent German colony in central and southern Namibia by securing vast tracts of land as the more arid land in the South could not be used for crop-based agriculture and many desperate indigenous landholders were forced to sell their land at extremely low prices (Miescher, 2012; Eirola, 1992). Insulation from future epidemics from Central Africa became a first-order priority for the colony. The Germans created a veterinary cordon fence to protect the area then directly controlled by the colonial authorities and left areas beyond this veterinary fence relatively untouched by German colonial rule (Eckl, 2007).

Figure 1: Directly and indirectly ruled areas of Namibia and distribution of salient ethnic groups in 1959
The Germans were then faced with the policy question of how to administer the areas north of the veterinary fence. Applying Foucauldian conceptions of power, the classification of populations has been key to state simplifications (Scott, 1998) that shape spatial systems of property ownership, conflict resolution, and the exercise of authority. Colonial states that lacked the military capacity or willingness to govern a particular area outsourced land management to informal traditional tribal authorities whose jurisdiction extended to a subset of a simplified categorization of the population (Herbst, 2014; Mamdani, 1996).

In precisely this sense, the German and later South African authorities developed a policy of indirect colonial rule that created crudely defined racial homelands to resettle displaced indigenous populations and either constructed or co-opted local indigenous authorities to administer these homelands. These areas were henceforth ruled “indirectly” under a system in which legal rights were contingent upon membership in state-demarcated ethnic citizenships. This institutionalization of different ethnic “communities” in space reflected the dominant colonial paradigm, which viewed indigenous Africans as inherently traditional and communitarian and arguably furthered a political priority of dispersing collective resistance to white-minority colonial regimes (Patemann, 2002; Düsing, 2002). Moreover, with the partial exception of the Ovambo, there is little evidence in Namibia that the boundaries of such “homelands” were drawn in 1964 to respect the existing territorial distribution of salient ethnic groups (Figure 1). Because the internal veterinary border dividing indirectly and directly ruled areas of Namibia (commonly called the Red Line) cut through traditional ethnic territories – an illustration of the arbitrariness of African borders (McCauley & Posner, 2015) – all ethnic groups are present on both sides of the border.

After Namibian independence in 1990, formal political structures across the country were homogenized, but differences in customary legal regimes and local governance structures persist, with governance in the northern region dominated by influential traditional leaders administering areas under customary tenure whilst the southern region remains under rationalized and bureaucratic governance structures (Werner & Odendaal, 2010; Melber, 2015). Traditional leaders also exist in the South, but since they have no legal jurisdiction or authority, their role is largely symbolic (Keulder, 2000). Whilst the Red Line no longer prevents free migration between the North and South, it still exists today in the form of a veterinary border in order to prevent the spread of foot-and-mouth disease.

This analysis will focus on a study zone in a geographic buffer spanning 75km north and south from the colonial dividing line between northern and southern Namibia (Figure 2). The buffer zone is balanced on geographic characteristics, which is an indication of the continuity of unobserved pre-treatment confounders across the border (Appendix Table A.1). By examining only a small area either side of the Red Line, we can be reasonably assured that these areas are likely balanced on relevant pre-colonial social characteristics such as the salience of ethnicity among different individuals in the same ethnic group, given that assignment was shaped by the 1897 rinderpest epidemic. The directly and indirectly ruled areas in the 150km-wide study area are also balanced on contemporary education and income for the relevant co-ethnics in the study zone (Appendix Table A.1). The approximate

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3 Following local convention, we use the term “southern Namibia” to describe all those areas south of the dividing line even though the directly ruled areas in the analysis are actually located in the geographically north/central part of Namibia.

4 Etosha National Park is excluded from the analysis as it is based around the desolate Etosha salt pan and was proclaimed by the German colonial authorities at the same time the internal border was cartographically formalized in 1907.

5 Since Afrobarometer does not ask about income, we use the proxy of how frequently an individual or his/her family went without enough food to eat during the year preceding the survey. Only 40% of Nama-Damara and Herero in the sample said they “never” went without enough food, while 15% said they did so “many times” or “always.” Summary statistics are available upon request.
balance on covariates makes more credible the key identifying assumption underpinning this class of geographic natural experiments (local geographic ignorability) in which the “units within a narrow band around the border are assumed to be good counter-factuals for each other” (Keele & Titiunik, 2015). We shall undertake a comparative analysis of voting patterns and subjective political identification amongst co-ethnics in this study zone to illuminate how the form of colonial rule has had lingering effects on the success of ethnic parties and the political salience of ethnicity.

**Figure 2: Buffer zone spanning 75km north and south of the Red Line dividing indirectly and directly ruled areas of Namibia**

Source: Namibian Statistics Agency; data given to the author personally

EAs = enumeration areas
4. Data

This paper uses individual-level data from Afrobarometer survey rounds 1.5-5 (2002-2012) in Namibia, which contain information about political party support as well as demographic information about each respondent, including ethnicity, age, and education level. Party support is measured in Round 1.5 (2002) and Round 2 (2003) by responses to the questions “Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organisation? If so, which party or organisation is that?” For rounds 3 (2006), 4 (2008), and 5 (2012), we use responses to the question “If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?” which has the advantage of not providing the option to respond “Not close to any party.” The virtue of using Afrobarometer to measure spatial variation in ethnic-party success in Namibia is that each individual response contains a geocode corresponding to the enumeration area (EA) in the Namibian census, each of which contains roughly 500 households. By using a geocoded individual-level survey, we overcome the ecological fallacy (King, 1997) that often bedevils studies of ethnic-party success, and we also have the ability to compare responses across a small geographic buffer on either side of the internal colonial border. The data on colonial rule comes from the original Odendaal Report (Odendaal Commission, 1964) as digitized by Mendelsohn (2002). We follow Chandra (2011) in defining a party as ethnic or non-ethnic depending on whether it claims to exclusively represent the interests of a particular group based on shared ascriptive primordial characteristics. The Namibian party ethnic and non-ethnic codings are taken from Elischer (2013): parties not coded by Elischer are coded as ethnic if they were formed and led by a traditional leader.

5.1 Empirics

The key hypotheses to be tested are:

**H1a:** The party system is more ethnically divided in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia than in directly ruled areas.

**H1b:** Individuals in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia vote for ethnically based parties to a greater extent than individuals in directly ruled areas.

**H1c:** Individuals in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia identify on the basis of ethnicity to a greater extent than individuals in directly ruled areas.

The test of Hypothesis H1a comes from the methodology of Dowd and Driessen (2008), recently employed by Koter (2013), which proposes a nonparametric measure of association commonly used in the natural sciences, Cramer’s $V$, to calculate how closely ethnicity is associated with party support. Cramer’s $V$ is a chi-squared-based measure of association in a table with more than two rows and two columns, and in this case takes a value of 1 when a voter’s ethnicity perfectly predicts his or her political preference and a value of 0 when political-party identification cannot be predicted by ethnic identification. Our analysis includes all political parties that secured at least 1% of the vote in any National Assembly election between 1999 and 2014. Ethnic groups are coded from the Alesina et al. (2003) ethno-linguistic fractionalization index typology.\(^6\)

As Table 2 shows, the association between ethnicity and party support is stronger in almost every survey round in the indirectly ruled 75km buffer zone than in the directly ruled 75km

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\(^6\) The Nama and Damara groups are combined, reflecting the most recent Namibian census and Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-2 coding. Coloureds, San, Basters, and other small groups are denoted as “Other” and dropped from this sample due to their low national presence and to avoid spuriously increasing the Cramer’s $V$ measure by increasing the number of rows with little or no support. There are very few members of these groups in the survey, so their inclusion is unlikely to affect the results significantly (see Table 1 in the Online Appendix).
buffer zone. Moreover, when combining all five Afrobarometer rounds, ethnicity is more closely associated with party support in the indirectly ruled buffer zone regardless of the buffer distance. Applying the interpretation of effect sizes employed by Rea and Parker (1992), in most surveys there is a moderate association between ethnicity and party support in the directly ruled zone whilst there is a relatively strong association between the two in the indirectly ruled zone.

Table 2: Association between ethnicity and party support in Namibia | direct vs. indirect colonial rule | 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 1.5 (2002)</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 2 (2003)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 3 (2006)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 4 (2008)</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round 5 (2012)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1,328</td>
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In 150km buffer

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<th></th>
<th>Cramer’s V</th>
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<tr>
<td>In 100km buffer</td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 100km buffer

| In 200km buffer      | Combined   | 0.29       | 0.35       | 2,160      |

Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5

To unpack this aggregate difference in the ethnically divided nature of party support in northern and southern Namibia and to test Hypothesis H1b, we can look more closely at the varying success of political parties in directly and indirectly ruled areas. We shall examine spatial variations in the success of three ethnic parties (the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO)) and one non-ethnic party (the South-West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO)).

As context for this analysis, it is necessary to have a brief overview of the Namibian party system. Ethnicity is not the only salient cleavage in Namibian politics, or even the primary cleavage in many parts of the country. Namibian politics has been dominated by non-ethnic parties since independence in 1991. The governing party throughout this time, SWAPO, has largely refrained from making ethnic appeals, instead relying on nationalism and the legacy of its anti-colonial struggle to draw cross-ethnic support (Elischer, 2013).

SWAPO’s major historical challenger has been the DTA, an ethnic coalition established in 1977 and currently made up of sub-parties primarily representing the Damara, Herero, San, and White ethnic groups. The DTA has historically sought to exploit unease about potential Ovambo domination of SWAPO and of Namibian politics, given that the Ovambo make up almost half of the Namibian population and SWAPO began life as the Ovambo People’s

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7 This result is robust to a choice of buffer width of 100km or 200km; results available on request.
Organisation. Thus, whilst SWAPO has sought to diminish what it sees as divisive tribalism in Namibian society, the DTA has instead partnered with traditional leaders to entrench traditional leadership in governance structures and further the image of the Namibian state as an ethnic federation in which particular communities need to be politically protected against mono-ethnic domination (Düsing, 2002; Elischer, 2013).

Two other ethnic parties have gained prominence over the past 15 years: the UDF, led by Nama-Damara Chief Justus Garoeb, which has its primary base of support in the former Damaraland/Kaokoveld, and the NUDO, led until recently by Herero Chief Kuaima Riruako, with its primary base of support in the former Hereroland. These parties frequently make political appeals on the basis that SWAPO has ignored the interests of non-Ovambo ethnic groups (e.g. see Namibian, 2014b).

The Ovambo vote overwhelmingly for SWAPO, with approximately 90% supporting the ruling party in some surveys (Keulder, 2000). However, to infer the salience of ethnicity from this high level of support would be to commit the ecological fallacy (King, 1997), as aggregate levels of support in a group can be explained both on the basis of descriptive representation and on the basis of non-ethnic factors.

Voting patterns of the non-Ovambo are more revealing. The decision of whether to vote for a party supported or led by one’s traditional leader or for the SWAPO represents a distinct choice on the part of a non-Ovambo to privilege either ethnic or non-ethnic factors in voting choice. Thus, this paper focuses on determinants of spatial variation in ethnic party and SWAPO political support among the non-Ovambo and particularly among the two major non-Ovambo indigenous groups in Namibia, the Nama-Damara and the Herero.

There is evidence that the UDF does much better at securing the support of Nama-Damara individuals in indirectly ruled areas than in directly ruled areas. Across all survey rounds, only an average of approximately 5% of Nama-Damara survey respondents in the 75km directly ruled buffer identified with the UDF, compared to 17% of Nama-Damara in the indirectly ruled buffer zone (Table 3). Moreover, this result is robust to the choice of a 100km or 200km buffer (Online Appendix Table 2).

We repeat this test to illustrate the significant spatial variation in NUDO support in Afrobarometer rounds 3-5 (the only rounds in which NUDO was included as a separate party, after it left the DTA coalition in 2002). Specifically, we test to see whether its support among Herero individuals in these rounds differs across the indirectly and directly ruled buffer zones. As the number of observations is small (n=68 for the 150km buffer across all three rounds), inference that relies on asymptotic convergence results such as OLS or logistic regression is likely to be invalid. Thus we employ the method of exact logit (Zamar, McNeney, & Graham, 2007) – analogous to the Fisher exact test, but using logistic regression – and run a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation based on 15,000 iterations to derive a probability distribution for the indirect-rule coefficient under the null that does not rely on asymptotics. The p-value of 0.03 suggests that there is only a 3% chance of obtaining such a large

---

8 According to the 2011 census, the largest ethno-linguistic groups in Namibia are the Ovambo (48.9%), the Nama-Damara (11.3%), the Afrikaaners (10.4%), and the Herero (8.6%) (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2011).

9 As a further demonstration of SWAPO’s non-ethnic credentials, its current leader and president of Namibia, Hage Geingob, is a Damara, and there is actually a negative relationship between the Ovambo proportion of a particular region’s population and per capita central development funds directed to that region (details available upon request). The fact that the governing party in Namibia is a non-ethnic party suggests that it may be invalid to interpret Namibia’s land policies through an ethnic lens, e.g. as in Baldwin (2014).

10 There is no significant spatial variation in SWAPO support among the Ovambo, reflecting the fact that even Ovambo seeking to vote on the basis of ethnicity have no Ovambo-specific party to vote for (details available on request).
estimated effect of indirect rule on NUDO support among Herero individuals under the null of no effect (Table 4). This spatial variation in support is also substantively significant. Whilst approximately 30% of Herero support NUDO in directly ruled areas, 47% support it in indirectly ruled areas.

Table 3: UDF support among Nama-Damara in indirectly vs. directly ruled areas of Namibia | 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UDF support</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Rare events logistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>0.125 **</td>
<td>1.044 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>-2.141 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Notes: Column (1) is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of UDF support among the Nama-Damara on an indirect-rule dummy in survey rounds 1.5-5. It shows that the binary measure of support for the UDF is highly unbalanced in the sense that the vast majority of Nama-Damara do not support the UDF, particularly in directly ruled areas. Thus, columns (2) and (3) employ the method of rare events logistic regression, which performs better than logistic regression when the dependent variable is unbalanced (King & Zeng, 2001).
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5

11 This result is robust to a choice of buffer of 100km, but for a 200km buffer the p-value is 0.23, which is conventionally not considered significant (Online Appendix, Table 3).
12 OLS result available upon request.
Table 4: NUDO support among Herero in indirectly vs. directly ruled areas of Namibia (exact logit) | 2006-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NUDO support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect-rule coefficient</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower 95 confidence interval</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper 95 confidence interval</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monte Carlo size</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value standard error</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Exact logit conducted with a burn-in of 2000 and an alpha value set to 0.05
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5

Evidence that the ethnic DTA party has been more successful at garnering the support of Nama-Damara and Herero individuals in the indirectly relative to the directly ruled buffer zone is more mixed. When pooling across Nama-Damara and Herero respondents, the DTA secures approximately 34% of the vote in indirectly ruled areas compared to 26% in directly ruled areas – a difference in support of more than 30% (Table 5).

Table 5: DTA support among Herero and Nama-Damara in indirectly vs. directly ruled areas of Namibia | 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>Rare events logistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>0.083 **</td>
<td>0.457 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.261 ***</td>
<td>-1.686 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Notes: Column (1) is an OLS regression of DTA support among the Herero and Nama-Damara in survey rounds 1.5-5. As the dependent variable is unbalanced, columns (2) and (3) employ the method of rare events logistic regression, which performs better than logistic regression when the dependent variable is unbalanced (King & Zeng, 2001).
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5
This result is robust to the inclusion of White, Caprivi and “Other” (including the San) ethnic groups that have historically been represented in the DTA leadership, as well as to whether the 100km or 200km buffer is used (Online Appendix Table 4). However, these results are not robust to the inclusion of ethnic fixed effects. This is possibly due to the fact that, unlike the other two ethnic parties in Namibia, which draw support from a single ethnic minority, the DTA is an ethnic federation that tries to obtain support from a number of ethnic minorities, and it has experienced substantial internal conflict regarding the perceived dominance of particular sub-groups.

Nevertheless, in sum there is evidence that individuals in indirectly ruled areas are more likely than their counterparts in directly ruled areas to support parties led or supported by traditional chiefs that claim to best represent the interests of their ethnic group. This greater success of ethnically based parties in securing the support of their co-ethnics has contributed to the more ethnically divided nature of the party system in northern Namibia, as measured by the Cramer’s V coefficient in Table 2.

The flipside of this greater success of ethnic parties in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia is that the leading non-ethnic party, SWAPO, is less successful at securing broad cross-ethnic support in these areas relative to directly ruled areas. Whilst SWAPO secures a plurality (37%) of support among Nama-Damara and Herero in directly ruled areas, it gains only 22% in indirectly ruled areas, as individuals instead support ethnic parties led by their traditional leaders (Table 6). This is a substantively significant difference of more than 40%, and this result is robust to whether a 100km or 200km buffer is used and whether all non-Ovambo ethnic groups are included (Online Appendix Table 5).

Table 6: SWAPO support among Herero and Nama-Damara in indirectly vs. directly ruled areas of Namibia | 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SWAPO support</th>
<th>( OLS )</th>
<th>( Logistic )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.68***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients: * \( p<0.1 \); ** \( p<0.05 \); *** \( p<0.01 \)

Notes: Column (1) is an OLS regression of SWAPO support among the Herero and Nama-Damara in rounds 1.5-5. Columns (2), (3), and (4) are ordinary logistic regressions of SWAPO support among the Herero and Nama-Damara in rounds 1.5-5.

Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5
Finally, we can test whether this significant and sustained spatial variation in ethnic voting is matched by significantly higher subjective ethnic identification in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia as proposed by Hypothesis H1c and previously tested in this paper across sub-Saharan Africa using the methodology of Robinson (2014). There is indeed consistent evidence that individuals in the 75km indirectly ruled buffer are more likely to privilege their identity as members of an ethnic group over their identity as Namibians (Table 7). This provides confirmatory support for the core argument of this paper that ethnicity is more politically salient in indirectly ruled areas than in directly ruled areas, both in Namibia and in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.

Table 7: Relative salience of ethnic vs. national identity in indirectly vs. directly ruled areas of Namibia | 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative salience of national identity</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>−0.537* (0.277)</td>
<td>−0.261* (0.157)</td>
<td>−0.814** (0.413)</td>
<td>−0.442* (0.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Notes:
Column (1) shows results of a logistic regression of responses from all survey respondents in the 150km buffer to the following question from Afrobarometer rounds 3-5: “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Namibian and being a [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?” with response options 1 = I feel only (respondent’s ethnic group), 2 = I feel more (respondent’s ethnic group) than Namibian, 3 = I feel equally Namibian and (respondent’s ethnic group), 4 = I feel more Namibian than (respondent’s ethnic group), and 5 = I feel only Namibian. The dependent variable is coded as binary following Robinson (2014), with responses 1 and 2 = 0 and responses 4 and 5 = 1.
Column (2) shows results of an ordered logistic regression using all five possible responses. Columns (3) and (4) are replications of (1) and (2) using only responses from Nama-Damara and Herero individuals in the buffer zone.
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5

5.2 Theoretical mechanisms

What might account for the greater political salience of ethnicity in indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa and Namibia? Because indirect rule tended to be introduced in more centralized pre-colonial states (Hariri, 2012), it has been difficult to know the extent to which the greater political salience of ethnicity is driven by indirect colonial rule or pre-colonial factors. However, both national institutional and pre-colonial ethnic-group differences can be adequately controlled for in Namibia, and yet indirect rule still exerts a powerful effect on the political salience of ethnicity. The central theoretical argument of this paper for why this is the case is that indirect colonial rule left distinct and important institutional and structural legacies in northern Namibia that have affected the spatial success of ethnic-based political appeals even when we control for the influence of demographic or other institutional factors. Specifically, there is evidence that the institutionalization of ethnicity in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia through (i) systems of customary legal rights and privileges and (ii) systems of traditional leadership in local governance has increased the political salience of ethnicity in the post-colonial context.
Communal or customary legal institutions provide a latent basis of conflict between individuals from different ethnic groups because legal rights, and in particular land rights, are contingent on membership in a particular ethnic community. When customary land institutions materially advantage particular ethnic groups and these privileges come under challenge from outsiders or the state, individuals rationally mobilize with co-ethnics to protect communal land resources. In other words, in indirectly ruled areas of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, there is a powerful structural incentive for individuals to identify and politically mobilize with co-ethnics when collective legal rights come under threat by other political actors (Mamdani, 1996; Upadhayay, 2009; Boone, 2014).

There is indeed evidence for the importance of these ethnically demarcated customary rights in shaping cleavage formation across Namibia. Land policy has proven to be a key axis of political conflict between SWAPO and other political actors since independence, as land is an important asset to much of the population; more than 60% of Namibians depend on agriculture for their livelihood (Melber, 2015). The SWAPO-led government has largely maintained a pragmatic “willing buyer, willing seller” approach to the redistribution of land, instituting a process that formally allows any landless Namibian to apply for and receive a plot of land and that ultimately seeks to rationalize and individually demarcate communal land holdings (Werner & Kruger, 2007). But Namibia’s land-reform process has stalled in the face of fierce local resistance on two fronts. In line with the theoretical argument of this paper, individuals in indirectly ruled areas have sought to protect ethnically based land privileges and evict ethnic outsiders who have tried to use (for grazing) or illegally fence off communal land (Namibia Press Agency, 2013; Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2012). Moreover, traditional leaders, marginalized by the Communal Land Reform Act (2002), which aimed to set up formal land boards to control communal land, have mobilized their communities to prevent implementation of the act and protect “ancestral” land rights (New Era, 2014b) – in one case, even appealing to the United Nations on the basis that their “traditional territory is being invaded by the ruling Owambo ethnic group that controls the ruling SWAPO Party. ... We are losing our land. Our land is being fenced by outsiders” (Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2012). On the other hand, in areas once subject to direct colonial rule, leftist parties and radical SWAPO youth elements frustrated by extreme economic inequality have recently mobilized “land-hungry” Namibians in the national capital to overwhelm localities with mass applications for land, and threaten to “occupy the land wherever it is” if land redistribution does not occur more quickly (Namibian, 2015; New Era, 2015, 2014a). Thus, the ethnically privileged or ethnically blind manner in which legal institutions have structured the provision of land rights has been a major factor behind spatial variance in cleavage formation in Namibia today. In directly ruled areas of southern Namibia, political conflict has taken the form of class-based conflict between the interests of the landless masses and a bourgeois white and newly landed black elite connected to SWAPO, whereas in indirectly ruled areas of northern Namibia the legacy of ethnically demarcated “ancestral” land institutions has provided a lasting basis for inter-ethnic conflict.

A second institutional legacy of indirect colonial rule in Namibia and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, traditional leadership, has provided an important institutional means of political mobilization among co-ethnics in the post-colonial context. In a Weberian sense (Weber, 1958), the fact that the colonial state outsourced local governance in indirectly ruled areas to traditional leaders endowed such leaders with a powerful source of authority to use in popular mobilization. Barring a radical post-colonial upheaval of local governance of the form that occurred in Tanzania (Miguel, 2004), traditional chiefs, whose political legitimacy derives from the traditional authority embedded in ostensibly primordial ethnic identities, today have substantial power to regulate common resources, adjudicate disputes, and grant occupancy and land rights in indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa (Mamdani, 1996; Baldwin, 2014; Koter, 2013). In Namibia, traditional leaders allocate

13 Namibia has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world, standing at 0.743 in 2009 (Klugman, 2009).
ethnically differentiated customary land rights and informally settle legal disputes among co-ethnics to a greater extent in indirectly ruled areas than in directly ruled areas (Appendix Table A.2). The greater role that traditional leaders play in society in indirectly ruled areas is also reflected in greater levels of citizen engagement with, trust in, and support for traditional leaders in such areas. Moreover, citizens are more likely to support a greater governance role for traditional leaders in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia. It is precisely this customary institutional authority and latent base of political support among their co-ethnics that traditional leaders in indirectly ruled areas have been able to leverage in running for elected office in Namibia and mobilizing support for the NUDO, the DTA, and the UDF.

The great institutional influence of traditional leaders in the post-colonial context is not limited to Namibia; indirectly ruled areas of sub-Saharan Africa more generally have inherited local governance institutions with ethnically demarcated sources of traditional authority, and the elite beneficiaries of this system – traditional leaders – have been highly active in making use of traditional sources of legitimacy to mobilize co-ethnics and preserve these political privileges (Lijphart, 1993). Moreover, the status of these traditional leaders has often proven a highly contested aspect of the political process. In Namibia, the DTA has historically partnered with traditional leaders to try to formally recognize the institution of traditional leadership in local governance structures, whereas SWAPO regularly rails against the “tribalism” of its political opponents, even placing restrictions on the eligibility of traditional leaders to run for political office (Namibian, 2014a; Düsing, 2002) and successfully enshrining a constitutional duty that the Cabinet and National Assembly must “remain vigilant and vigorous for the purposes of ensuring that the scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia.” This explicit linkage between colonialism and tribalism in the Namibian Constitution reflects the argument of this paper that “obstructive chieftainships” (Coleman, 1954) set up by colonial authorities to divide the indigenous population have had lingering effects on the political salience of ethnicity. Thus, ethnic mobilization in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia can best be characterized as a process through which the indigenous elite beneficiaries of indirect colonial rule have bargained with the state to protect ethnically demarcated systems of governance and which, depending on the orientation of the post-colonial state to such leaders, can manifest latent inter-ethnic bases of conflict (Düsing, 2002). These specific institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule – customary legal rights and traditional leadership – have thereby provided the two key elements necessary for ethnic cleavage formation in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia: latent conflict of material interests across non-co-ethnics, and the means to organize co-ethnics around a particular axis of ethnic difference at the electoral level (Gramsci, 1971; Alt & Gilligan, 1994; Koter, 2013; Boone, 2014).

5.3 Alternative causal mechanisms and discussion

Which other factors might explain the greater political salience of ethnicity in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia? Neither strategic voting nor clientelism is a confounding factor in Namibia. Since the entire country is treated as a single constituency for the purposes of electing the president and (via proportional representation) the National Assembly, the optimal minimum ethnic winning coalition in presidential and National Assembly elections is the same in northern and southern Namibia. According to the instrumentalist paradigm of Posner (2005), we therefore should not expect to find the illustrated within-ethnic spatial divergence in

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14 Koter (2013) makes a compelling argument that traditional leaders can also ethnically fragment the electoral sphere if many ethnically different traditional leaders are used to channel the provision of goods and services for a clientelistic party. Hence, the theoretical argument of this paper is most applicable to a context (such as Namibia) in which a governing party is seeking to rationalize governance structures and reduce the privileges of traditional leaders.
support for ethnic parties in Namibia. Moreover, given that non-Ovambo make up a near-majority of the Namibian population and SWAPO has dominated the political scene for 25 years, one would expect that politically salient ethnic identities among the non-Ovambo would be redefined in order to better challenge Ovambo political dominance. Yet this has not happened; in the spirit of Laitin (1986), politically salient ethnic identities and social boundaries in Namibia as constructed by colonial authorities have instead persisted to the current day.

Nor are elections in Namibia conducted on a clientelistic basis (Keulder, 2000). Whilst traditional leaders are important electoral intermediaries elsewhere (de Kadt & Larreguy, 2014; Koter, 2013), they do not play a clientelistic role in Namibia. Corroborating observations in the field, in 2012 less than 1% of Namibians reported receiving a gift at the most recent election in exchange for electoral support. Indeed, there is no significant difference between Nama-Damara and Herero individuals in the 150km buffer on any measure of clientelism, including freedom to support a political party without pressure or fear that powerful individuals may be able to find out one’s vote choice; if anything, individuals in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia are less likely to receive material goods in exchange for votes (Online Appendix Table 6). Moreover, since Namibia is highly centralized fiscally and SWAPO controls the national government, it would make little sense to vote for a non-SWAPO councillor with little influence over the direction of central government funds in order to better secure local goods and services. Thus, although it may be an important factor in the success of ethnic parties elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, “voting with the chief” in order to secure better public goods (Baldwin, 2013) is not a plausible explanation for ethnic party support in Namibia.

Selective sorting would be an important confounding factor if individuals with less (more) salient ethnic identities systematically migrated to southern (northern) Namibia between 1964 and the present day, in which case a comparison of voting behaviour between individuals in the same ethnic group across Namibia would not identify the effect of indirect colonial rule on ethnic cleavage formation. Non-compliance and attrition are thus often major issues in studies that try to leverage variation across African borders (McCauley & Posner, 2015). However, there was little to no permanent migration across the Red Line during the colonial era (Moorsom, 1977; Melber, 1996; Odendaal Commission, 1964), and post-independence migration has been largely intra-regional (i.e. not across the internal colonial border). Moreover, measures of individual propensity to migrate across regional borders (age and education) as well as the proportion of inter-regional migrants in one’s community are largely insignificant as predictors of party support, and their inclusion does not change the significance of the coefficient on indirect rule (Online Appendix Table 7). As in all historically oriented work, and particularly studies that try to leverage quasi-random variation across borders, we cannot rule out all potential confounders. Nonetheless, the evidence provided above is strongly suggestive of a causal relationship between indirect colonial rule and the political salience of ethnicity in Namibia.

It is also possible that greater investment in human capital by colonial authorities in southern Namibia has left a legacy of greater national integration there. Modernization theorists predicted that as non-European populations gained access to schooling in a common national language and higher incomes, sub-national and parochial tribal ties would gradually be broken (Durkheim, 1893; Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 2006). Thus, we may still expect that as Herero and Nama-Damara have slightly higher living standards and more years of schooling in directly ruled areas, these individuals may be less receptive to the parochial appeals of ethnic parties. Yet there is no evidence that higher-income or more educated Namibians are more likely to support SWAPO; when education and a proxy for income are included controls in the regressions for UDF, DTA, and SWAPO support, the effects of indirect colonial rule still remain significant (Table 8). This suggests that the greater success of ethnic parties in northern relative to southern Namibia cannot be only due to different living standards and levels of education provision and that, contrary to the predictions of
classic theorists, the lingering political appeal of sub-national ties can entirely resist the homogenizing effects of modernization.

Table 8: Party support among the Nama-Damara and Herero in indirectly and directly ruled areas of Namibia | 2002-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UDF</th>
<th>DTA</th>
<th>SWAPO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rare events logistic</td>
<td>Logistic</td>
<td>Logistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>0.97**</td>
<td>0.64**</td>
<td>−0.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Nama-Damara</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>−0.13</td>
<td>−1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Herero</td>
<td>−0.88</td>
<td>−0.95*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 194 383 383
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic fixed effects Yes No Yes

Coefficients: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Notes: Column (1) is a replication of Table 3 Column 3; Column (2) is a replication of Table 5 Column 3; and Column (3) is a replication of Table 6 Column 4 – all with age, education, and a proxy for income linearly entering the regression. Education is measured by responses to the question “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” Age is measured by responses to the question “How old were you at your last birthday?” Income is proxied by responses to the question “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough food to eat?” with responses options ranging from 0 = Never to 4 = Always. % Herero and % Nama-Damara refer to the population proportion of the constituency of the respondent.
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5

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Finally, although northern Namibia is less ethnically heterogeneous than southern Namibia (Online Appendix Table 1), it is also more ethnically segregated, as co-ethnics tend to cluster in former ethnic homelands. It could be that ethnicity is more salient where co-ethnics tend to live in close proximity, and thus we should expect ethnicity to be more salient in northern Namibia regardless of the effects of indirect colonial rule. Yet segregation and homogeneity struggle as explanatory factors for the salience of ethnicity in Namibia, for two reasons. First, theories of ethnic salience motivated by the post-independence African experience posit that ethnicity should become more salient as individuals interact with diverse ethnic others and compete for scarce resources (Melson & Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1987), yet ethnicity is less politically salient in southern Namibia and non-ethnic parties do better there despite its higher level of daily inter-ethnic interaction.

Second, ethnic heterogeneity is itself endogenous to the highly political process of ethnic boundary formation in the colonial experience. The critical historical moment at which ethnic sub-groups became amalgamated and previously “heterogenous” regions of Namibia became “homogenous” was precisely when the colonial state imposed simplified ethnic categorizations (Tilly, 2004) and institutionalized such categorizations in the governance systems of indirect colonial rule. Ethnic homogeneity, heterogeneity, and degrees of ethnic segregation are themselves products of ongoing institutions that have prioritized and solidified certain forms of social boundaries over others (Alba, 2005), so ethnic segregation is in this sense a potential causal mechanism of indirect rule, and to control for ethnic-group proportions would be to introduce post-treatment bias. In any case, Table 8 controls for the proportion of an individual’s co-ethnics in the 105 constituencies of Namibia. There is only weak evidence that the proportion of Nama-Damara and Herero in a constituency matters for the voting decisions of their co-ethnics, and controlling for both still leaves the significance of the coefficient on indirect rule unchanged.15

6. Conclusions

Taken together, the findings presented in this paper provide consistent evidence that the form of colonial rule is an important factor affecting the political salience of ethnicity in post-colonial Namibia and in sub-Saharan Africa more generally. There is little evidence that the relationship between indirect colonial rule and the political salience of ethnicity in Namibia is being driven by differences in ethnic segregation, strategic voting, clientelism, or modernization. Rather, this paper provides evidence that the institutionalization of state-created ethnic identities is an important explanatory factor for spatial variation in the political salience of ethnicity. The role of authorities in historically generating social boundaries has been well documented (e.g. Laitin, 1986; Tilly, 2004), yet ethnicity is more than a purely ideational force constructed by elites in the past; in areas with ethnically demarcated institutions, one’s ethnic identity is essential for securing and maintaining access to scarce resources (Mamdani, 1996; Boone, 2014). Ethnically demarcated legal institutions provide a functional basis for inter-ethnic conflict, and in sub-Saharan Africa, traditional chiefs have been endowed with the authority and the incentive to politically mobilize their co-ethnics in defense of existing institutional privileges. In this sense, the results of this paper confirm the insight that the ethnically demarcated customary institutions set up by colonial authorities to govern subject indigenous populations are likely an important explanatory factor behind the ongoing salience of ethnicity as a political cleavage across many parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Coleman, 1954; Miles, 1994).

Namibia’s sub-national variation in ethnicity as a political cleavage provides a complement and a challenge to theories of ethnic salience in political science that emphasize national-

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15 There is also no significant interaction effect between indirect rule and percentage of Nama-Damara and Herero; results available upon request.
level factors such as nation builders or ethnic group proportions. For example, our results suggest that in accounting for Tanzania’s anomalously low political salience of ethnicity, greater emphasis should likely be attached to a lack of ethnically demarcated “tribal” institutions rather than to the socialist or nation-building ideology of its post-independence leaders (Miguel, 2004), which is a factor it shares with nearby countries such as Zambia and Uganda, where ethnicity is highly salient (Boone, 2014). Similarly, the fact that smaller ethnic groups have consistently failed to reorganize in Namibia to form potential electoral minimum winning coalitions suggests that ethnicity should be seen not only as a latent individual characteristic periodically activated in the electoral sphere by opportunist elites (e.g. Posner, 2005) but also as a highly contested and sticky juridical status that governs the allocation of resources in the sub-electoral sphere. This broader institutional view of ethnicity allows us to potentially escape the tendency in comparative politics to bracket the operation of ethnic politics in the global North and the global South (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2007). Assuming similar motivations and goals among all social actors, there is little reason to believe, without further justification, that the forces that cause ethnicity to become a salient political cleavage differ between highly developed and less developed countries. In the broader institutional view of ethnicity advanced in this paper, it is unsurprising that ethnicity also functions as a highly salient cleavage in areas of the global North, such as the United States and Northern Ireland, where institutions historically allocated and continue to allocate scarce resources on the basis of ethnicity; co-ethnics would be predicted to rationally mobilize in such areas to protect institutional privileges. Hence, whilst this paper has provided evidence for the importance of the institutional legacies of indirect colonial rule in entrenching social boundaries and causing ethnic cleavage formation in sub-Saharan Africa, the broader theoretical perspective it advances also suggests that there is potential for different institutional configurations to account for previously unexplained variation in the nature and incidence of political conflict around the world.

16 For example, in justifying a case selection that focuses exclusively on ethnically divided societies in the global South, Horowitz writes that in the West “there is generally a more complex pattern of group loyalties than in Asia and Africa” (p.21). Notwithstanding the methodological issue that Horowitz’s canonical text fails to examine areas of the global South where ethnicity is not salient and so selects on the dependent variable, Horowitz’s case selection criterion begs the core question of why other group loyalties such as class are less salient in the global South than in the global North. Similarly, Chandra’s argument that the “visibility” of ethnicity is particularly focal in low-information environments in the global South struggles as a theory to explain why ethnicity is politically salient in many information-rich polities in the global North.
References


Appendix

Figure A.1: Mean annual rainfall (mm) in Namibia

Data source: Mendelsohn (2002)
Table A.1: Geographic and demographic balance table for indirectly and directly ruled areas in 150km buffer zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rainfall</th>
<th>Rainfall variation</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>−10.189</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>−0.173</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.760)</td>
<td>(0.563)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>420.834***</td>
<td>37.965***</td>
<td>3.511***</td>
<td>1.399***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.938)</td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients from an OLS regression with robust standard errors; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Notes:
- Table of Column (1) is mean annual rainfall by enumeration area (EA) in mm in the 150km buffer.
- Column (2) is annual rainfall variation by EA in mm in the 150km buffer. Data source: Mendelsohn (2002).
- Column (3) is a linear regression on responses of Nama-Damara and Herero respondents to the Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5 question “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” with response options ranging from 0 = No formal schooling to 9 = Post-graduate.
- Column (4) is a linear regression on responses of Nama-Damara and Herero respondents to the Afrobarometer rounds 1.5-5 question “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough food to eat?” with response options ranging from 0 = Never to 4 = Always.
- Balance on education and income also robust to including all non-Ovambo in the sample. Balance on rainfall and rainfall variation robust to 100km and 200km buffers with the exception that in the 200km buffer, rainfall is statistically significantly higher (by 18mm) in the indirectly ruled zone. Detailed results are available upon request.
Table A.2: Relationship of Namibians to traditional leaders and customary law in directly and indirectly ruled areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Customary law</th>
<th>Traditional leader engagement</th>
<th>Traditional leader influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect rule</td>
<td>2.184***</td>
<td>1.157***</td>
<td>0.744***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.796)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients:  * p<0.1;   ** p<0.05;   *** p<0.01

Notes:
- Results are based on responses from all Afrobarometer Round 4 survey respondents within a buffer spanning 100km north and south of the Red Line.
- Columns (1) and (2) are logistic regressions on the following dependent variables: “Who do you think actually has primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks? Is it the national government, the local government (your municipality or elected local authority council), traditional leaders, or members of your community? (1) Maintaining law and order? (2) Allocating land?” Both are coded on a binary basis of “traditional leader” or “not traditional leader.”
- Columns (3) and (4) are ordered logistic regressions on the following dependent variables:
  - (3) “How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Traditional leaders?” with response options ranging from 0 = Never to 3 = Always
  - (4) “During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A traditional ruler?” with response options ranging from 0 = Never to 3 = Often.
- Columns (5) and (6) are ordered logistic regressions on the following dependent variables:
  - (5) “How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community?” with response options ranging from 1 = None to 4 = A great deal.
  - (6) “Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?” with response options ranging from 1 = Decrease a lot to 5 = Increase a lot.
- Responses of “Don’t know” or “Refused to answer” were dropped from the sample. Summary statistics are available upon request.
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