

Working Paper No. 159

Does clientelism help Tanzanian MPs establish long-term electoral support?

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Abstract

The relationships between Members of Parliament (MPs) and voters in developing countries are often characterised by clientelistic exchanges of tangible goods and votes. In Tanzania, clientelism has been prominent in MP-voter relationships since the transition to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. It was enhanced in part by the legalisation of election incentives given by politicians to voters between 2000 and 2006. Against this unique background, this paper examines the way in which election incentives and electoral clientelism affected public views on MPs. Drawing on Afrobarometer survey data for 2005, 2008, and 2012 as well as data on electoral competitiveness and MPs' engagement with parliamentary discussions, this examination reveals a shifting trend in public expectations and evaluations of MPs: Tanzanian voters increasingly favoured programmatic MPs rather than clientelistic MPs. Moreover, Tanzanians who had been offered election incentives in 2010 and preferred clientelistic MPs were more likely to disapprove of the performance of MPs. These results suggest that clientelism does not necessarily help Tanzanian MPs to maintain long-term electoral support.

This paper is based on research undertaken for the author's doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Sussex in 2014 (Tsubura, 2014).





Introduction

Tanzanian Members of Parliament (MPs) and political analysts describe the primary roles of MPs with a variety of phrases: benefactors, providers, executors, social workers, saviours, multi-faceted donors, even “walking ATMs.”¹ Indeed, in Tanzania, where a majority of citizens are poor and the government lacks resources and capacity to provide sufficient social services, MPs provide various kinds of financial and material assistance to their constituents to support their lives and cultivate their electoral support. This type of exchange builds clientelistic relationships between MPs and voters, which is common in developing countries.

In Tanzania, clientelism in electoral politics was highly restricted during the one-party socialist period between the mid-1960s and the 1980s but became prominent following the transition to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. In 2000, it was enhanced in part by the legalisation of election incentives known as *takrima* (meaning “hospitality”). The legalisation of *takrima* raised public expectations that MPs would supply tangible goods and contributed to the expansion of clientelistic relationships between MPs and voters. After having been used widely in the elections of 2000 and 2005, *takrima* was banned in 2006, and it has been an illegal practice since then.

Against this unique background, this paper uses Afrobarometer survey results to examine how election incentives and electoral clientelism affected public views on MPs in Tanzania after the prohibition of *takrima* in 2006.² A central question is whether clientelism helps MPs gain long-term electoral support. To address this question, I employed an innovative approach by adding data on levels of electoral competitiveness and MPs' engagement with parliamentary discussions to Afrobarometer data sets to create original variables. A regression analysis of these data demonstrates that Tanzanians who had been offered election incentives in the elections of 2010 and had clientelistic views on the roles of MPs were less likely to approve of the performance of MPs. This suggests that clientelism is not necessarily a sustainable tool for MPs to establish long-term electoral support in Tanzania.

The paper is organised into four sections. It first reviews the literature on the concept of clientelism in electoral politics in developing countries, with a focus on the types of goods used to build MP-voter relationships. Second, the paper provides a brief overview of the history of MP-voter relationships in Tanzania, including the legalisation of *takrima*. Third, the paper presents the results of Afrobarometer survey analyses to examine the following three areas: 1) the use of election incentives, 2) public expectations of MPs, and 3) public assessments of the performance of MPs. Finally, the paper summarises main findings in the conclusion.

Clientelism in electoral politics in developing countries

Clientelism in electoral politics explains features of certain political systems, organisations (e.g. political parties), or actors (e.g. MPs). The concept of clientelism, or patron-client relationships, originated in anthropology and sociology literature describing social relationships in traditional societies. According to Scott (1972), a patron-client relationship is

a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who,

¹ Interviews with MPs and academics (2010, 2011). All interviews cited in this paper were conducted in Tanzania between October 2010 and April 2011 or between October 2011 and March 2011. “ATMs” stands for automatic teller machines.

² Five rounds of Afrobarometer surveys were conducted in Tanzania by REPOA in 2001 (with 2,198 samples), 2003 (1,223), 2005 (1,304), 2008 (1,208), and 2012 (2,400). Round 6 data has not yet been publicly released.



for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron (92).

The key elements of clientelism in the above definition and in discussions by other authors are *unequal*, *dyadic* (meaning two-person and face-to-face), and *reciprocal* exchanges between patrons and clients (Lande, 1977; Clapham, 1982; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Taylor-Robinson, 2006; Kanchan, 2007; Stokes, 2007).

In the late 1960s, political scientists studying machine politics³ adopted the concept of clientelism to discuss the characteristics of political structures in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Zolberg, 1966; Scott, 1969, 1972; Schmidt et al., 1977; Taylor-Robinson, 2006). Scott (1972) argues that there are political associations and conflicts in these regions that cannot be explained solely by existing theories based on class or primordial sentiments (e.g. ethnicity, language, religion) but can be explained by patron-client relationships.

Thereafter, the discussion on clientelism in electoral politics, particularly its influence on the relationships between politicians and voters in democratic systems, was developed by scholars in comparative politics, notably Piattoni (2001), Stokes (2007, 2013), and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). They highlight the characteristics of the goods that politicians provide to voters and the ways in which they are distributed. There is, however, no clear agreement among these scholars on what kinds of goods politicians use for clientelistic exchanges (van de Walle, 2009).⁴

Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) focus on the types of goods used for exchanges between politicians and voters and discuss two types of relationships between them: programmatic and clientelistic. A programmatic relationship is based on indirect, non-specific exchanges of collective goods and votes, and the performance of elected representatives is monitored through collective surveillance, such as independent media. For example, the processes of formulating national policies that affect all citizens in the country and the subsequent assessment of these policies by voters represent a programmatic relationship. In contrast, a clientelistic relationship is founded on politicians' provision of goods exclusively to individuals or small groups of people in their constituencies as private rewards to voters "who have already delivered or who promise to deliver their electoral support" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 10).

Programmatic and clientelistic relationships are characterised by three broad types of goods provided to voters: private, public, and club goods. Private goods are tangible goods (e.g. money, materials, jobs) provided to individual citizens. Public goods, on the other hand, are beneficial to every member in society, "regardless of whether [he or she contributes] to the production of the goods" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 11). Examples of public goods include national security, macroeconomic growth, and national taxation systems. Finally, between public and private goods there are club goods, which provide benefits to certain groups of citizens. Politicians typically seek to distribute club goods to solidify and increase the size of their electoral support.⁵ While a programmatic relationship is based on the provision of either public or club goods, a clientelistic relationship is based on either private or club goods (Buchanan, 1965; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Figure 1 below shows the two types of relationships between MPs and voters, types of goods, and some examples.

³ Machine politics is a form of politics in which a political party in power exercises its control by securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it (Scott, 1969, pp. 1144-1145). The nature of the relationship between political leaders and followers in machine politics can be considered clientelism.

⁴ See Tsubura (2014: 20) for different conceptualisations by Piattoni (2001) and Stokes (2007).

⁵ Lindberg (2010b) adds another type of goods between public and club goods: Collective goods are " 'impure' public goods in that they are directed towards a particular collective (such as legislative instruments providing free healthcare for expectant mothers, or general subsidies to sports clubs) but are non-divisible within that group" (p. 119). This paper treats collective goods as a subtype of club goods.

Figure 1: The nature of relationships between MPs and voters

Nature of relationships	Clientelistic		Programmatic	
Type of goods	Private	Club		Public
Examples	<i>Handouts, food, public jobs</i>	<i>Donations to projects</i>		<i>National security, macroeconomic growth</i>

Source: the author, adapted from Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007)

In this framework, it is unclear whether club goods contribute to programmatic or clientelistic relationships. Some scholars conceptualise club goods as a tool for programmatic relationships or a better form of clientelism. Lindberg (2010b), for example, distinguishes constituency service, which involves the provision of either club or private goods, from clientelism, which is limited to the provision of private goods, while recognising the difficulty in empirically separating the two. Thus, club goods do not contribute to clientelism in his view. Similar to Lindberg, Piattoni (2001) assumes that constituency service has a collective character and thus is one of the solutions to clientelism by changing particularistic politics into more acceptable forms. She argues that, while still a form of particularism, constituency service is more tractable in view of the harmonisation of particularistic interests into general interests of society. In other words, a change from private to club goods leads to a shift from a clientelistic to programmatic relationship between MPs and voters.

The distinction of the types of goods can be further analysed by the three core elements of clientelism discussed earlier. In electoral politics, clientelistic exchanges are founded on *inequality* between MPs and voters. Private goods, and some club goods, strengthen the *dyadic* dimension of the relationships, as they are meant to benefit individuals and cultivate face-to-face personal relationships between MPs and voters. Private goods, and some club goods, generate stronger obligations to *reciprocate* among the recipients of the goods than do public goods. Combining the nature of the MP-voter relationships and the types of goods used for their exchanges, what seems to be ultimately important in examining the nature of clientelism in electoral politics is the extent to which the provision of particular goods by politicians to voters generates a sense of approval of politicians and an obligation or willingness to *reciprocate* among voters in elections.⁶ This criterion can be applied to the question of whether the provision of a particular club good contributes to strengthening clientelism.

While clientelism is effective in building close ties between MPs and voters and is particularly pervasive in developing countries, some scholars argue that it is not necessarily a sustainable tool for MPs to establish long-term electoral support (Lindberg, 2010a). Clientelistic demands of voters tend to be inflated and lead to overinvestment, and politicians may choose not to rely on clientelism when the costs of clientelism exceed what politicians can afford (Scott, 1972; Müller, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). In electoral clientelism, voters have bargaining power by holding votes as their political resource, which is a major difference from clientelism in traditional societies. With this logic in mind, this paper examines the nature of clientelism in electoral politics in Tanzania by analysing Afrobarometer survey results. Specifically, the paper analyses the use of election incentives as one type of private goods to cultivate

⁶ Stokes et al. (2013) provide an alternative conceptualisation of distributive politics and clientelism. They distinguish between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution of resources based on whether there are public and binding rules. If there are formalised and public criteria for distribution (public rules) in place and these criteria shape actual distribution of resources (binding rules), the mode of distribution of resources is called programmatic distribution.

clientelistic MP-voter relationships, the scale of clientelism demonstrated in public expectations of MPs, and the level of public satisfaction with the performance of MPs to answer the question of whether clientelism is a sustainable tool for Tanzanian MPs to establish long-term electoral support.

MP-voter relationships and *takrima* in Tanzania

Tanzanian politics has been characterised by the enduring dominance of the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, the “Party of Revolution”). Even after a multiparty system was reintroduced in 1992, the CCM continued to gain more than 60% of votes in winning the presidency and more than 77% of the parliamentary seats in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa). The main opposition parties are Civic United Front (CUF), with a strong support base in Zanzibar, and Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA, the “Party of Democracy and Development”), which increased its share of parliamentary seats elected from constituencies from five to 23 in the 2010 elections. In Afrobarometer surveys, the support rate for the CCM increased during the first Kikwete presidential administration (2005–2010) but dropped below 60% in 2012 (Table 1).⁷

Table 1: Public support for political parties | Tanzania | 2005-2012

Parties	2005	2008	2012
CCM	69%	71%	58%
CUF	4%	5%	6%
CHADEMA	1%	3%	17%
One of the other parties	1%	1%	1%
Did not choose	25%	20%	19%

Source: Afrobarometer

The relationships between MPs and voters have been changing in Tanzania. During the one-party socialist period, the nomination process of candidates for parliamentary seats was centrally controlled by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and its successor, the CCM (Hyden & Leys, 1972; Yeager, 1989; Kiondo, 1994, cited in Yoon, 2008). The government covered all election expenses, and candidates were not allowed to raise campaign funds or to use private money to influence voters. The role of MPs in their constituencies was also tightly limited, as party leaders regarded entrepreneurial activities by MPs, such as the initiation of self-help development projects in their constituencies, as incompatible with the government’s socialist policy aimed at achieving equality across the country. The limitations on the constituency service role of MPs were reinforced by the adoption of the TANU leadership code in 1967, which prohibited public officials from accumulating personal wealth (Tanganyika African National Union, 1971; Barkan, 1984).

As decision-making and resource allocation were monopolised by the TANU/CCM and the government, MPs were messengers of the party who communicated government policies to people at the grassroots level. Elections were the opportunity to confer on MPs the right to engage in lobbying and other entrepreneurial activities through which they could extract resources and services from the centre for their constituencies (Hyden & Leys, 1972; Barkan, 1984). As a result, establishing clientelistic relationships with voters was less important for MPs than securing central approval (Kelsall, 2002).

Tanzania shifted to a liberal economy in the mid-1980s and adopted multiparty politics in 1992. In 1995, the Elections Act was amended to allow MPs to make financial contributions to

⁷ Survey respondents were asked, “Do you feel close to any particular political party?” (Q89A), and if they said yes, they were asked, “Which party is that?” (Q89A).

community development before the election campaign period.⁸ The political and economic changes resulted in an increase in politicians' engagement with economic activities and in their use of money in building their relationships with voters by financially contributing to communities and buying votes (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008; Liviga, 2011). Political and economic liberalisation also allowed business people to gain power over politics and policy-making processes, sometimes leaving aside the interests of the wider public (Liviga, 2011). MPs had to raise funds for their constituencies outside the party structure and the government budget, and the growing significance of the benefactor role of MPs increasingly placed pressure on them and created a political environment conducive to clientelism.

As part of the increasing use of personal funds by politicians as leverage to enhance their chances of election, the informal practice of candidates or their parties offering food, drinks, money, clothes, or other material goods to voters in exchange for their electoral support, widely known as *takrima* (meaning "hospitality"), became widespread in Tanzania (Heilman & Ndumbaro, 2002; Makulilo & Raphael, 2010; Sansa, 2010).⁹ The *takrima* practice by parliamentary candidates was legalised by the amendment of the Elections Act in April 2000, six months before elections, with the view that it was different from corruption (Babeiya, 2011).¹⁰ Underpinned by a traditional culture of gift-giving and reciprocity, *takrima* was widely used as a campaign strategy in the 2000 and 2005 elections (Kelsall, 2003; Bryan & Baer, 2005; Phillips, 2009). The campaign period became known as the "harvesting season" for "exchanging votes for gifts of money, beer, meals, and party apparel referred to colloquially as 'food,' 'soda,' 'sugar,' or 'tea' " (Phillips, 2010, p. 123).

In April 2006, four months after the 2005 elections, Tanzania's High Court declared that the amendment of the Elections Act to allow *takrima* was unconstitutional on the grounds that the *takrima* provisions not only discriminated against lower-income candidates but also legalised corruption in the electoral process, thus violating the constitutional guarantee of the right to vote in free and fair elections (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006; Legal and Human Rights Centre & Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation, 2010; Babeiya, 2011). While *takrima* did not always benefit wealthy politicians, as they tend to generate higher expectations from voters than other politicians, the legalisation of *takrima* certainly gave electoral advantage to the candidates who were able to distribute goods to voters.¹¹

Although the Tanzanian government made an effort to show its commitment to curb electoral corruption, the use of *takrima* continued in the 2010 elections. In March 2010, the Election Expenses Act was passed to hold candidates and political parties more accountable for their campaign finances (National Democratic Institute, 2010; United Republic of Tanzania, 2010; Babeiya, 2011). Expenses for promotional art groups at campaign rallies were also clarified in the Election Expenses Act to prohibit *takrima*.¹²

⁸ Section 97(4) of the Elections (Amendment) Act 1995 stipulates that "an act or transaction shall not be deemed to constitute bribery if it is proved to have been designed to advance the interests of community fund raising, self-help, self-reliance or social welfare projects within the constituency and to have been done before the campaign period" (United Republic of Tanzania 1995, p. 8).

⁹ The lexical meaning of *takrima* is "generosity by one person to another for the purpose of helping him/her" (translated by the author, from Baraza la Kiswahili la Zanzibar (Zanzibar Swahili Council), 2010, p. 385).

¹⁰ In 2000, two clauses, known as the *takrima* provisions, were added to the Elections Act. Section 98(2) of the act states that "anything done in good faith as an act of normal or traditional hospitality shall be deemed not to be treating [meaning vote-buying]" (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000, p 10), and Section 98(3) states that "[n]ormal or ordinary expenses spent in good faith in the election campaign or in the ordinary cause of election process shall be deemed not to be treating, bribery or illegal practice" (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000, p. 10).

¹¹ Interviews with a CCM MP and a representative of a civil society organisation (2010, 2011).


¹² Section 7(2) of the Election Expenses Act 2010 stipulates that "[a]ll funds used for promotional art groups for purposes of presentation of a candidate to voters including the cost of providing food, drinks, accommodation or transportation which has been reasonably incurred by a candidate for members of his campaign team shall

However, according to Views of the People 2012,¹³ a perceptions survey conducted by REPOA (the research institution that also implements Afrobarometer surveys in Tanzania), more than half of the respondents (54%) said that vote-buying by politicians was becoming more common, while 20% offered the opposite view (Tanzania Development Research Group, 2013). At a minimum, this result indicates the endurance of the practice (Babeiya, 2011; Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee, 2011). Some Tanzanian political analysts also note that it does not significantly matter whether *takrima* is legal or illegal when it comes to the actual interactions between politicians and voters.¹⁴ As such, *takrima* remained instrumental in clientelistic relationships between MPs and voters in Tanzania in 2010.

The use of election incentives

This analysis begins by focusing on the characteristics of voters who were likely to receive election incentives. Although legally prohibited, election incentives are one type of private goods used by politicians and political parties in Tanzania. In the Afrobarometer surveys in 2005 and 2012, respondents were asked how often, if ever, a candidate or someone from a political party offered them something such as food, a gift, or money in return for their votes in the 2000 and 2010 elections, respectively. A large majority of respondents said that they did not experience any offers of election incentives. However, the ratio of respondents who acknowledged receiving incentives increased by 7 percentage points, from 6% in the 2000 elections (reported in the 2005 survey) to 13% in the 2010 elections (reported in the 2012 survey) (Figure 2). Thus, as suggested in the Views of the People 2012 results, the legal changes during the first Kikwete administration (2005–2010) (i.e. the prohibition of *takrima* in 2006 and the enactment of the Election Expenses Act in 2010) do not seem to have curbed vote-buying practices.

Figure 2: Election incentives offered by a candidate or political party | 2005–2012



Source: Afrobarometer

be deemed to constitute election expenses” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2010b, p. 7), and Section 22 of the same act prohibits the provision of “food, drink, entertainment ... to or for any person, for the purpose of influencing that person, or any other person, to vote or to refrain from voting” (pp.17-18).

¹³ In a sample of 10 mainland regions, 5,136 Tanzanians aged 18 and above were asked about their experience of recent social and economic change and their views on key policies (Tanzania Development Research Group, 2013).

¹⁴ Interviews with an academic, a representative of a civil society organisation, and two opposition MPs (2010, 2011).



Since the question concerned an illegal vote-buying practice, there is a possibility of misreporting (Weghorst & Lindberg, 2013); some respondents might have tried to give “correct” answers instead of describing their actual experience. Although each respondent was told at the beginning of the interview that the surveys were being conducted independently from the government and political parties,¹⁵ a number of respondents believed that the surveys were being conducted by the government. In 2012, 66% of respondents said they believed that the interviewers were sent by the government, political parties, or politicians.¹⁶ Indeed, these respondents were slightly less likely to report that they were offered election incentives than those who believed that the survey was being conducted by a non-governmental agency (Kendall's tau-b = -0.05, $p = 0.01$). This suggests a slight possibility of underreporting on respondents' vote-buying experience. If respondents who believed that the surveys were being conducted by the government, political parties, or politicians are excluded, the proportion who said they were offered election incentives increases by 12 percentage points, from 4% in 2005 to 16% in 2012. Thus, it is fair to interpret that the use of election incentives expanded over the years or that Tanzanians became more honest about their vote-buying experience, irrespective of their perception of the survey sponsor.

The next step is to explore who was more likely to be targeted by candidates or political parties to influence their votes by using incentives. To answer this question, binary logistic regression models were adapted from Kramon (2009), who examines the effects of election incentives on voter turnout in the 2002 elections in Kenya. Since there was no question on election incentives in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, the logistic regression was run only for the 2005 and 2012 surveys.

The first model examines demographic characteristics of the respondents: gender, age, and residence location (urban or rural). The second model tests the socioeconomic background of respondents by creating: 1) a dummy variable from an Afrobarometer survey question on how often, if ever, the respondent or a family member went without a cash income in the 12 months preceding the survey; 2) a dummy variable from a survey question on the frequency of doing without food in the previous 12 months; and 3) an interval variable on the respondent's level of education (see Appendix A for the list of Afrobarometer variables and questions used for the analysis). The variables on cash income and food represent two levels of respondents' economic condition; the former demonstrates economic instability (i.e. those who went without cash income are economically unstable), and the latter indicates extreme poverty. It is expected that there are a number of Tanzanians who are economically unstable but not extremely poor.

The hypotheses for the model on socioeconomic conditions are that “[p]oorer voters may be more susceptible to vote-buying because even small transfers are valuable to them” (Kramon, 2009, p. 7) and that less educated voters may be more likely to be targeted by politicians or political parties due to their lack of understanding of the legal and ethical problems inherent in election incentives (Lindberg, 2010b).

The third model examines the nature and level of respondents' political engagement. Following Kramon's (2009) approach, this model includes whether the respondents supported the CCM or opposition parties. It is widely known that *takrima* was used mainly by CCM politicians in the elections in 2000 and 2005. Opposition parties were against the legalisation of *takrima*. If Cox and McCubbins' (1986) argument that risk-averse candidates are more likely to redistribute welfare to core supporters is right, CCM supporters would be expected to have been offered election incentives more often than opposition supporters.

¹⁵ Interviewers were trained to state the following as part of the introduction to each interview: “I am from the Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), an independent research organization. I do not represent the government or any political party.”

¹⁶ The question was: “Who do you think sent us to do this interview?” See Appendix A for response options.

Alternatively, if Dixit and Londregan's (1996) argument that politicians often target resources at swing voters is right, CCM politicians might have targeted swing voters or even opposition supporters.

Whereas Kramon (2009) examined only political parties, this study includes four variables on political engagement from the survey data, speculating that more politically engaged respondents are more likely to be offered election incentives because it is easier for candidates or political parties to approach politically active citizens to offer incentives and influence their votes. The first indicator of the level of political engagement is whether they voted in the elections. Voter turnout had generally been high in Tanzania but declined dramatically, from 72% in 2005 to 43% in the 2010 elections (Legal and Human Rights Centre & Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation, 2010). Yet 81% of respondents in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey said they voted in the 2010 elections. As Table 3 below shows, whether respondents voted or not made no difference in the regression analysis on election incentives; thus, I did not further examine the gap between official and reported turnout.

In the 2012 survey (but not the 2005 survey), there are three other variables relating to political engagement during election campaigns: 1) attendance at a campaign meeting or rally; 2) persuasion of others to vote for a certain presidential or legislative candidate or party; and 3) work for a candidate or party. (See Appendix A for details on the variables.) Three-fourths (72%) of respondents said they attended campaign meetings or rallies, 25% persuaded others to vote for a certain candidate or political party, and 14% worked for a candidate or a political party.


The level of electoral competition might also have influenced the use of election incentives. The more competitive the elections, the more likely voters are to be perceived as pivotal to winning and to be offered election incentives (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Lindberg & Minion, 2008). Under the assumption that "voters can estimate how close an upcoming election might be" (Kramon, 2009, p. 8), the vote margins of the 2010 elections were calculated and added to the Afrobarometer data set and to the model on political engagement (see Appendix B for the calculations of vote margins).¹⁷

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the logistic regression analyses of the 2005 and 2012 surveys, respectively. Since opposition supporters were more likely to claim they were offered election incentives than CCM supporters in 2012 (Model 3 and Model 5), two models (Model 4 and Model 6) were added by creating dummy variables on CUF supporters and CHADEMA supporters in order to examine which opposition supporters were more likely to say they were offered incentives. The sample size of opposition supporters in 2005 was too small to test this.

Since a majority of voters were not offered election incentives, the improvements in the correct classification of Model 4 in 2005 and Model 6 in 2012 are as low as less than 0.01 percentage points.¹⁸ In 2005, male voters in rural areas were more likely to say they were offered election incentives (Model 1 of 2005). A large majority (92%) of respondents who selected a party were CCM supporters, and they were less likely to claim they were offered election incentives (Model 4 of 2005). In 2012, poor CHADEMA supporters in rural areas who attended campaign rallies and persuaded others to vote for certain candidates or parties were slightly more likely to say that they were offered incentives. Their youth and the level of

¹⁷ Since the CCM's dominant power in politics has not been challenged by any party in Tanzania Mainland since independence, the CCM primaries have often been more competitive than the general elections, and election incentives may have been used more often during the party primaries. However, due to a lack of information on party primaries, only the vote margins of the general elections were tested in this analysis.

¹⁸ The improvement in correct classification demonstrates how much more accurately we can predict the result. It is a gap between the baseline prediction (%) and the model prediction (%). The more accurate we are in the first place (i.e. the baseline prediction is high), the harder it is to improve it (i.e. to achieve a high level of improvement in correct classification). In this case, since a majority of voters were not offered election incentives, the baseline prediction is high, and it is hard to greatly improve the rate of correct classification.



electoral competition in the constituencies also show a significant but very weak relationship. Working for candidates or parties did not make a significant difference.

Table 2: Logistic regression analysis of election incentives | 2005


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Demographic	Socio-economic	Political engagement	All
Male	0.502* (0.25)			0.416 (0.29)
Age	- 0.005 (0.01)			- 0.003 (0.01)
Urban	- 0.605+ (0.33)			- 0.513 (0.38)
Gone without cash income		- 0.069 (0.33)		- 0.263 (0.36)
Gone without food		0.377 (0.25)		0.112 (0.30)
Education		0.191 (0.22)		0.161 (0.28)
CCM supporters			- 1.142** (0.35)	- 1.238*** (0.36)
Voted in the last elections			0.463 (0.42)	0.487 (0.48)
Constant	- 2.737*** (0.38)	- 3.209*** (0.52)	- 2.095*** (0.47)	- 2.257** (0.82)
N	1248	1267	962	935
Pseudo-R ²	0.0137	0.0047	0.022	0.0388

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent was offered an election incentive (e.g. food, gift, money) by a candidate or someone from a political party in the last elections (0=No, 1=Yes).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

**Table 3: Logistic regression analysis of election incentives | 2012**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Demographic	Socio-economic	Political engagement (CCM supporters)	Political engagement (opposition supporters)	All (CCM supporters)	All (opposition supporters)
Male	0.132 (0.12)				0.158 (0.16)	0.142 (0.16)
Age	-0.009+ (0.00)				-0.015* (0.01)	-0.014* (0.01)
Urban	-0.202 (0.13)				-0.497** (0.19)	-0.527** (0.19)
Gone without cash income		0.487* (0.24)			0.683* (0.33)	0.656* (0.33)
Gone without food		0.519*** (0.13)			0.424* (0.17)	0.433** (0.17)
Education		0.048 (0.11)			0.006 (0.15)	-0.018 (0.15)
CCM supporters			-0.326* (0.16)		-0.301+ (0.17)	
CUF supporters				0.015 (0.32)		0.024 (0.32)
CHADEMA supporters				0.498** (0.18)		0.503** (0.19)
Voted in the last elections			0.197 (0.24)	0.217 (0.24)	0.308 (0.25)	0.325 (0.25)
Attended a campaign rally			0.643** (0.23)	0.639** (0.23)	0.563* (0.23)	0.554* (0.23)
Persuaded others			0.342+ (0.20)	0.351+ (0.20)	0.332+ (0.20)	0.341+ (0.20)
Worked for a candidate/party			0.061 (0.23)	0.077 (0.23)	0.140 (0.23)	0.161 (0.23)
Vote margin <=80			0.007* (0.00)	0.007* (0.00)	0.008* (0.00)	0.008* (0.00)
Constant	-1.550*** (0.18)	-2.711*** (0.32)	-2.611*** (0.30)	-2.981*** (0.29)	-2.957*** (0.58)	-3.257*** (0.58)
N	2388	2388	1418	1418	1417	1417
Pseudo-R ²	0.0036	0.0145	0.0256	0.0288	0.0525	0.0559

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent was offered an election incentive (e.g. food, gift, money) by a candidate or someone from a political party in the last elections (0=No, 1=Yes).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

The results suggest that CHADEMA supporters in rural areas were slightly more likely to be targeted for election incentives in the 2010 elections than CCM or CUF supporters. There is no information on which candidate or party offered incentives to them. If the incentives were offered by CCM politicians, it might be that the CCM perceived CHADEMA supporters as swing voters, in line with Dixit and Londregan's (1996) argument. If incentives were offered by CHADEMA politicians to motivate their supporters to go to the polls, this would support Cox and McCubbins' (1986) argument on the use of incentives for core supporters.

There is, however, a caveat regarding potential misreporting. CHADEMA supporters may have been more honest about their experience of election incentives than CCM or CUF supporters. Under the assumption that respondents knew that vote-buying was illegal, they may have been more open about vote-buying by politicians and parties they opposed and tried to hide the practice by politicians and parties they supported. There were reports that CHADEMA supporters received money at CCM campaign rallies and used it for CHADEMA

election campaigns.¹⁹ These CHADEMA supporters were probably critical of the prevalence of vote-buying by CCM and its candidates and might have been more honest about their experience of being offered incentives by the CCM.²⁰ Yet this cannot be concluded without further studies.

In summary, the Afrobarometer surveys show that the use of election incentives expanded, or at least it continued, in the 2010 elections and that the practice began to involve not only CCM supporters but also CHADEMA supporters.

Public expectations of MPs

Given that the provision of private goods in the form of election incentives persisted in the 2010 elections, what kinds of expectations do Tanzanians have of MPs? Do they expect MPs to provide programmatic, club, or private goods? What shapes their expectations? In the Afrobarometer survey in 2008, respondents were asked to select the most important responsibility of MPs among four core functions: 1) listen to constituents and represent their needs; 2) deliver jobs and development to people; 3) make laws for the good of the country; and 4) monitor the performance of the president and his government. A majority of respondents consider that representation is the most important responsibility of MPs, followed by constituency service²¹ (Table 4).

Table 4: Most important responsibility of MPs | Afrobarometer | 2008

Responsibility	%
Representation (listen to constituents and represent their needs)	67
Constituency service (deliver jobs and development to people)	20
Law-making (make laws for the good of the country)	9
Oversight (monitor the performance of the president and his government)	3
None of these / Don't know	1

Source: Afrobarometer

¹⁹ Interview with an informant (2010).

²⁰ In the 2012 survey, there were two additional questions about election incentives. One is a repetition of the above question with a slightly different wording (Q83B-TAN), and the other is a question about whether respondents' neighbours were offered election incentives (Q83C-TAN). The proportion of respondents who said they were offered incentives increased from 13% to 17% when the question was asked for the second time, perhaps because some respondents became more open at the later stage of the interview. As expected, more respondents (27%) said their neighbours were offered incentives during the 2010 elections. Model 5 and Model 6 of the 2012 analysis were tested for election incentives to neighbours, and the results are similar to those for election incentives to respondents themselves, except that urban-rural areas, food, CCM supporters, and vote margins became insignificant. Interestingly, CUF supporters were less likely to report that their neighbours were offered incentives (coefficient = - 0.81, $p < 0.05$), while CHADEMA supporters were more likely to report on incentives offered to neighbours.

²¹ There is a caveat about interpreting the second option as constituency service. Although this option in the original questionnaire in English is "Deliver jobs or development to your constituency" (underline added by the author), it was translated to "*Kuwapatia watu kazi na maendeleo* (to deliver jobs and development to people)" (underline added by the author) in the Swahili questionnaire, which made the option less specifically related to constituency service.



A similar result was found in the Views of the People 2012 survey (Table 5).

Table 5: Main responsibility of MPs | Views of the People 2012

Responsibility	%
Representation (represent the interests of constituents)	65
Constituency service (bring benefits to their constituencies)	19
Law-making (passing laws)	8
Oversight (supervising government)	5

Source: Tanzania Development Research Group (2013, p. 43)

These results are in line with the existing literature on the expected roles of African MPs (Barkan, 2009; Lindberg, 2010b). A large majority of Tanzanians expect MPs to serve their constituencies before contributing to national affairs. In other words, MPs are expected to bring club or private goods to their constituents rather than public goods to the whole country.

This tendency is evident in a similar question in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey. Respondents were asked whether they preferred to vote for “a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in this community” or “a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in [the] country.”²² A majority (65%) of respondents preferred service-oriented MPs, while 35% preferred policy-oriented MPs. In the 2012 survey, respondents were asked to choose between “a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in [his or her] constituency alone” and “a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in [the] country.” The former option refers to constituency-oriented MPs who deliver club or private goods, while the latter refers to policy-oriented MPs who deliver public goods. In contrast to the Afrobarometer and Views of the People results in Tables 4 and 5, only 14% preferred constituency-oriented MPs, while a large majority (86 %) preferred policy-oriented MPs.²³

It should be noted that respondents who preferred service-oriented MPs in 2008 or constituency-oriented MPs in 2012 are not necessarily clientelistic voters. Clientelistic relationships are characterised by the provision of club or private goods by MPs in exchange for electoral support, while programmatic relationships are characterised by public or club goods. As discussed earlier, while public and private goods are relatively easy to identify, there is a wide range of club goods that can serve for either clientelistic or programmatic exchanges. For example, if an MP makes a contribution to the rehabilitation of a bridge, which benefits everyone in his or her constituency, the bridge can be considered a club good or even a public good. This type of constituency service is less clientelistic than a bridge that benefits a limited number of residents in the constituency. Thus, the

²² The wordings of this question are different in the English and Swahili questionnaires. In the Swahili questionnaire, the first option is “*mbunge mwenye uwezo wa kuwaletea wananchi huduma bora*” (an MP with capacity to bring citizens good services), and the second option is “*mbunge ambaye ataleta sera zitakazomnufaisha kila mwananchi*” (an MP who will bring policies that benefit every citizen). As such, there are no words referring to “this community” in the first Swahili option. While there is some overlap between the two options in Swahili, the first option places greater weight on the role of MPs in delivering tangible goods to citizens than the second option, which highlights their role in delivering public goods through policymaking.


²³ One potential explanation for the low rate of support for constituency-oriented MPs in 2012 is the influence of a “leading question” (Johnson, 2001, p. 322). The first option in the original questionnaire in English was “a candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in [his or her] constituency” (Afrobarometer, 2012, p. 44), but the word “*pekee*” (alone) was added in the Swahili version. The word “alone” sounds exclusive of MPs’ activities at the national level, and respondents may have avoided this option. Thus, respondents who selected constituency-oriented MPs in 2012 have an immensely parochial view of the role of MPs.

Afrobarometer questions on service- or constituency-oriented MPs are indicative of a tendency toward clientelism but should be considered with caution.

There is also a set of questions on public views on favouritism by MPs in the Afrobarometer surveys in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2012. The question wordings vary slightly by year. In 2003, respondents were asked to choose between the following statements: 1) "Since everyone is equal under the law, [leaders] should not favour their own family or group" and 2) "Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community." In the 2005 and 2008 surveys, the first option was "Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own family or group," and the second option was the same as in 2003. In 2012, the options were: 1) "Once in office, elected leaders are obliged to help their home community or group first" and 2) "Since elected leaders should represent everyone, they should not do anything that favours their own group over others." Although the question is not specifically about MPs but about (elected) leaders in general, this paper treats it as a variable on public preferences regarding favouritism by MPs.

The proportion of respondents who supported favouritism by leaders increased in 2008 and declined in 2012 (Figure 3), perhaps because the favouritism option in 2012 became more rigid when "first" was added to the phrase "their own family or group."

Figure 3: Public preferences regarding favouritism by leaders in Tanzania | 2003-2012



Source: Afrobarometer

In comparison, the proportion of respondents supporting favouritism by leaders also declined in 2012 in some other African countries, such as Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, although it increased slightly in Uganda (Table 6). Tanzania shows the smallest proportion of support for favouritism among these five countries.²⁴

²⁴ As on the questions on election incentives discussed earlier, respondents who believed that the survey was being conducted by the government might have tried to give what they perceived as correct answers instead of their actual preferences. However, chi-square tests show that in 2012, respondents who believed that the survey was being conducted by the government were slightly more likely to prefer constituency-oriented MPs (Kendall's tau-b = 0.10, p=0.00) and favouritism by MPs (Kendall's tau-b = 0.07, p=0.00). Thus, there is no issue of misreporting on these two questions derived from their perception of the survey sponsor.




Table 6: Public preferences regarding favouritism by leaders | selected African countries | 2008-2012

Country	c.2008	2012
Kenya	32%	25%
Tanzania	36%	16%
Uganda	29%	33%
Zambia	41%	17%
Ghana	45%	26%


Source: Afrobarometer

Respondents who chose policy-oriented MPs and were against favouritism by leaders can be considered programmatic voters, who expect MPs to primarily provide public goods. The proportion of programmatic voters in Tanzania quadrupled, from 22% to 89%, between 2008 and 2012. Although this increase cannot be taken at face value because the question wordings were different, it at least suggests that Tanzanians were increasingly in favour of programmatic MPs capable of contributing to national policymaking.

As a next step, the characteristics of respondents who preferred service/constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism by leaders in 2008 and 2012 were analysed by logistic regression (Table 7 and Table 8). The models for election incentives discussed above were employed in these analyses. A variable on whether respondents made contact with MPs during the previous 12 months was added to the model on political engagement (see Appendix A for the questions on contact with MPs). For the 2012 analysis, the variable on vote margins was removed from the model on political engagement because it was specifically related to the question on election incentives. As the variable on CCM supporters was not significant in any of these analyses, the difference between CUF and CHADEMA supporters was not tested either. The variable on election incentives was added with the hypothesis that those who were offered election incentives were more likely to be clientelistic, i.e. supportive of constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism by leaders (Model 4).

In 2008, there is almost no improvement in correct classification of Model 4 (less than 0.01 percentage points). Neither demographic nor socioeconomic conditions have a significant influence on public preferences regarding MPs types. Respondents' party support does not matter, either. The analysis shows only that respondents who contacted MPs were less likely to prefer service-oriented MPs.

In 2012, since a large majority of respondents (86%) preferred policy-oriented MPs, there was marginal improvement in correct classification for Model 5 (0.41 percentage points). Despite the low level of improvement in prediction, Model 5 suggests that less educated voters who did not attend campaign rallies but were offered election incentives and voted in 2010 are more likely to prefer constituency-oriented MPs. They are more likely to have contacted MPs after the elections. This result indicates that the political engagement of voters who prefer constituency-oriented MPs was limited to direct and personal interactions with MPs.

**Table 7: Logistic regression analysis of service-oriented MPs | 2008**


	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 All
Male	- 0.060 (0.12)			- 0.077 (0.14)
Age	0.003 (0.00)			0.004 (0.01)
Urban	0.042 (0.14)			0.223 (0.17)
Gone without cash income		- 0.172 (0.18)		- 0.188 (0.20)
Gone without food		0.111 (0.13)		0.146 (0.15)
Education		- 0.140 (0.11)		- 0.127 (0.14)
CCM supporters			- 0.140 (0.23)	- 0.124 (0.23)
Voted in the last elections			- 0.135 (0.19)	- 0.146 (0.20)
Contacted the MP			- 0.284 (0.18)	- 0.311+ (0.18)
Constant	0.544** (0.18)	0.969*** (0.28)	0.890*** (0.27)	1.038* (0.46)
N	1182	1190	952	936
Pseudo-R ²	0.0004	0.0019	0.0029	0.0074

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefers an MP who will deliver policies that benefit every citizen or an MP with the capacity to bring citizens good services (0=policy, 1=service).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

**Table 8: Logistic regression analysis of constituency-oriented MPs | 2012**


	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 Election incentives	Model 5 All
Male	- 0.245* (0.12)				- 0.106 (0.14)
Age	0.003 (0.00)				- 0.008 (0.01)
Urban	- 0.025 (0.13)				0.240 (0.15)
Gone without cash income		- 0.282 (0.19)			- 0.509* (0.21)
Gone without food		0.272* (0.13)			0.202 (0.15)
Education		- 0.489*** (0.11)			- 0.489*** (0.13)
CCM supporters			0.091 (0.15)		0.168 (0.16)
Voted in the last elections			0.549** (0.21)		0.617** (0.22)
Attended a campaign rally			- 0.454** (0.17)		- 0.462** (0.17)
Persuaded others			0.192 (0.18)		0.196 (0.18)
Worked for a candidate/party			- 0.119 (0.21)		- 0.131 (0.22)
Contacted the MP			1.081*** (0.14)		0.904*** (0.15)
Election incentives				1.154*** (0.14)	0.972*** (0.17)
Constant	- 1.809*** (0.18)	- 0.814** (0.27)	- 2.377*** (0.23)	- 2.014*** (0.07)	- 1.077* (0.43)
N	2378	2378	1927	2371	1919
Pseudo-R ²	0.0023	0.0153	0.0441	0.0314	0.0785

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent prefers a candidate who can deliver benefits to the whole country or the constituency alone (0=country, 1=constituency alone).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer



Tables 9 and 10 show the results for public preferences regarding favouritism by leaders in 2008 and 2012, respectively.

Table 9: Logistic regression analysis of favouritism of leaders | 2008


	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 All
Male	- 0.020 (0.12)			- 0.077 (0.14)
Age	0.000 (0.00)			0.004 (0.01)
Urban	- 0.034 (0.14)			0.067 (0.17)
Gone without cash income		- 0.153 (0.18)		- 0.210 (0.20)
Gone without food		0.371** (0.13)		0.493** (0.15)
Education		- 0.031 (0.11)		0.231 (0.14)
CCM supporters			0.202 (0.23)	0.120 (0.23)
Voted in the last elections			- 0.212 (0.19)	- 0.283 (0.20)
Contacted the MP			0.571** (0.18)	0.547** (0.18)
Constant	- 0.581** (0.18)	- 0.597* (0.28)	- 0.674* (0.27)	- 1.221** (0.47)
N	1174	1182	944	929
Pseudo-R ²	0.0001	0.0056	0.0092	0.0197

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent thinks that, once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community (0=No, 1=Yes).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

**Table 10: Logistic regression analysis of favouritism of leaders | 2012**

	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 Election incentives	Model 5 All
Male	- 0.129 (0.11)				- 0.132 (0.13)
Age	- 0.005 (0.00)				- 0.010+ (0.01)
Urban	- 0.146 (0.12)				- 0.001 (0.15)
Gone without cash income		0.128 (0.19)			- 0.030 (0.22)
Gone without food		0.272* (0.12)			0.148 (0.14)
Education		- 0.241* (0.10)			- 0.320** (0.12)
CCM supporters			- 0.025 (0.14)		0.024 (0.15)
Voted in the last elections			- 0.155 (0.17)		- 0.071 (0.19)
Attended a campaign rally			- 0.131 (0.16)		- 0.131 (0.17)
Persuaded others			0.223 (0.17)		0.187 (0.17)
Worked for a candidate/party			0.076 (0.20)		0.132 (0.20)
Contacted the MP			1.062*** (0.13)		0.868*** (0.14)
Election incentives				1.240*** (0.13)	1.034*** (0.16)
Constant	- 1.321*** (0.17)	- 1.453*** (0.27)	- 1.793*** (0.19)	- 1.863*** (0.06)	- 1.053* (0.41)
N	2384	2384	1933	2376	1924
Pseudo-R ²	0.0024	0.0075	0.0417	0.0367	0.0756

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent thinks that elected leaders should help their home community/group first (0=No, 1=Yes).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

The improvement in correct classification was again marginal (0.32 percentage points for Model 4 in 2008 and 0.57 percentage points for Model 5 in 2012). Not surprisingly, in 2008, extremely poor Tanzanians who contacted their MPs were slightly more likely to prefer favouritism by leaders. In 2012, the result is similar to that regarding public preference for constituency-oriented MPs. Less educated voters who contacted MPs and were offered election incentives were more likely to support favouritism by leaders. Gender, residential area, economic status, political party, and political engagement (except for contacting MPs) do not make a significant difference.

The results of the above analyses suggest that while a large majority of Tanzanians expressed their preference for MPs who would treat everyone equally, and most did not have direct interactions with MPs, there are groups of voters who established direct personal relationships with MPs regardless of their party affiliation. MPs or political parties were more likely to target these voters in using election incentives, and these voters were likely to make contact with




MPs after the elections. This seems to represent a typical clientelistic relationship between MPs and voters.

Public views on the performance of MPs

The analyses so far demonstrate that there are clientelistic voters who are likely to have dyadic interactions with MPs and are prone to participate in vote-buying. The final step is to examine how voters evaluate the performance of MPs in Tanzania. Do the types of goods offered by MPs matter in the public's assessment of their performance? Is clientelism a sustainable tool to establish electoral support?

The 2005, 2008, and 2012 surveys asked respondents whether they approved or disapproved of the performance of MPs over the previous 12 months. The results show that Tanzanians became increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of MPs, as the disapproval rate increased by 9 percentage points from 29% in 2005 to 38% in 2012 (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Public views on the performance of MPs | Tanzania | 2005-2012



Source: Afrobarometer

While MPs are expected to represent their constituencies in Parliament, to make policies by crafting laws, and to oversee the executive, African legislatures have long been ineffective institutions in policymaking (Barkan, 2009). Against this background, Twaweza, a Tanzanian civil society organisation, published a ranking of MPs' participation in Parliament based on a comparison of the number of their interventions (i.e. basic questions, supplementary questions, and contributions) in the Ninth Parliament (2005-2010) (Twaweza, 2010a). Although the ranking does not explain the quality or effectiveness of the interventions, it can be treated as a proxy for the level of engagement of MPs in Parliament or, possibly, their commitment to programmatic roles. This supposes that the more actively MPs participate in parliamentary discussions, the more they can contribute to the provision of public goods to citizens, or of club goods when they raise constituency matters in Parliament. Based on the ranking and 2010 election results, Twaweza (2010b) argues that more active backbenchers were more likely to be re-elected in 2010 than their less active colleagues; the average number of interventions by 65 re-elected MPs (out of 187 MPs in the Ninth Parliament) was 92,

while that by 122 non-returning MPs was 81. This indicates that the more active MPs are in Parliament, the more likely their performance would be approved of by their voters.

With the assumption that voters have some idea of how their MPs are engaged with Parliament through the media, meetings with MPs, or word of mouth, the Twaweza ranking was added to the Afrobarometer data set to test whether the level of engagement of MPs in Parliament affected public views on the performance of MPs. Since ministers and deputy ministers represent the government and participate in Parliament differently from backbenchers, respondents whose representatives were cabinet members between 2005 and 2010 were removed from the analysis. (See Appendix C for the scatterplot of the MPs' interventions in Parliament and the public assessment of the performance of MPs).

To analyse factors that might determine public views on the performance of MPs, a logistic regression was run for the 2005, 2008, and 2012 survey data, applying the models used for the previous questions to public expectations of the roles of MPs. As discussed above, interventions by MPs in Parliament represent their main programmatic role to produce public or club goods, while election incentives are one (extreme) type of private goods to cultivate clientelism. While MPs' interventions in Parliament and election incentives are only two examples of the goods provided by MPs to voters, they were added to the regression analysis as one model (Model 4) to examine the types of goods in 2012. Public preferences for service/constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism by leaders were also added as a model for the expected roles of MPs. The results are presented in tables 11, 12, and 13 below.

Table 11: Logistic regression analysis of the performance of MPs | 2005

	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 Types of goods	Model 5 Expected roles of MPs	Model 6 All
Male	- 0.410** (0.13)					- 0.265 (0.17)
Age	0.001 (0.00)					- 0.016* (0.01)
Urban	0.296+ (0.16)					0.683** (0.21)
Gone without cash income		- 0.082 (0.18)				0.024 (0.23)
Gone without food		- 0.211 (0.13)				- 0.105 (0.17)
Education		- 0.422*** (0.12)				- 0.607*** (0.17)
CCM supporters			0.794** (0.25)			0.861** (0.27)
Voted in the last elections			- 0.094 (0.20)			0.035 (0.25)
Contacted the MP			0.763*** (0.21)			0.811*** (0.23)
Election incentives				- 0.747** (0.24)		- 0.933** (0.31)
Favouritism of leaders					- 0.006 (0.17)	- 0.096 (0.20)
Constant	1.015*** (0.20)	1.834*** (0.29)	0.164 (0.28)	0.925*** (0.07)	0.865*** (0.07)	1.832*** (0.53)
N	1210	1230	945	1213	1167	853
Pseudo-R ²	0.0094	0.0096	0.0221	0.0066	0.0000	0.0624

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the performance of his/her MP over the previous 12 months (disapprove=0, approve=1).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

**Table 12: Logistic regression analysis of the performance of MPs | 2008**


	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 Expected roles of MPs	Model 5 All
Male	- 0.259* (0.13)				- 0.177 (0.15)
Age	0.005 (0.00)				- 0.005 (0.01)
Urban	- 0.266+ (0.14)				- 0.184 (0.17)
Gone without cash income		- 0.126 (0.18)			- 0.212 (0.21)
Gone without food		- 0.237+ (0.13)			- 0.185 (0.16)
Education		- 0.190 (0.12)			- 0.273+ (0.15)
CCM supporters			0.348 (0.22)		0.336 (0.23)
Voted in the last elections			- 0.149 (0.20)		- 0.033 (0.22)
Contacted the MP			1.128*** (0.24)		1.192*** (0.25)
Service-oriented MPs				- 0.224+ (0.13)	- 0.022 (0.15)
Favouritism of MPs				0.391** (0.13)	0.302+ (0.16)
Constant	0.659*** (0.18)	1.266*** (0.29)	0.423 (0.27)	0.691*** (0.12)	1.339** (0.50)
N	1171	1178	946	1156	910
Pseudo-R ²	0.0056	0.0043	0.0246	0.0082	0.0369

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the performance of his/her MP over the previous 12 months (disapprove=0, approve=1).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

**Table 13: Logistic regression analysis of the performance of MPs | 2012**

	Model 1 Demographic	Model 2 Socio- economic	Model 3 Political engagement	Model 4 Types of goods	Model 5 Expected roles of MPs	Model 6 All
Male	-0.325*** (0.09)					-0.301* (0.13)
Age	0.010** (0.00)					0.006 (0.01)
Urban	-0.151+ (0.09)					0.166 (0.14)
Gone without cash income		0.034 (0.13)				0.082 (0.20)
Gone without food		-0.069 (0.09)				0.113 (0.13)
Education		-0.117 (0.07)				-0.025 (0.12)
CCM supporters			0.750*** (0.10)			0.736*** (0.14)
Voted in the last elections			-0.007 (0.14)			-0.066 (0.18)
Attended a campaign rally			-0.194 (0.12)			-0.000 (0.16)
Persuaded others			-0.454*** (0.13)			-0.350* (0.17)
Worked for a candidate/party			0.032 (0.16)			0.038 (0.21)
Contacted the MP			-0.339** (0.11)			-0.147 (0.16)
MPs' interventions in Parliament (except cabinet members)				0.001 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)
Election incentives				-0.868*** (0.16)		-0.600** (0.19)
Constituency-oriented MPs					-0.452*** (0.13)	-0.465* (0.20)
Favouritism of leaders					-0.501*** (0.12)	-0.339+ (0.18)
Constant	0.327* (0.13)	0.721*** (0.20)	0.420** (0.15)	0.519*** (0.10)	0.640*** (0.05)	0.107 (0.41)
N	2380	2380	1931	1477	2357	1179
Pseudo-R ²	0.0074	0.0009	0.0348	0.0163	0.0143	0.0572

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Dependent variable: Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent approved or disapproved of the performance of his/her MP over the previous 12 months (disapprove=0, approve=1).

Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

Improvements in correct classification for the 2005 and 2008 surveys were 1.28 percentage points (Model 6) and 0.66 percentage points (Model 5), respectively. In 2005, female voters in urban areas and less educated voters were more likely to approve of the performance of MPs (Model 1 and Model 2). While CCM supporters who contacted MPs were more likely to approve of their performance (Model 3), those who were offered election incentives were less likely to approve of it (Model 4). Their preference for favouritism by leaders did not have significant influence (Model 5).

In 2008, female voters in rural areas were more likely to approve of the performance of MPs (Model 1), while extremely poor voters were more likely to disapprove of it (Model 2). Similar to the 2005 survey, voters who contacted MPs were more likely to approve of their performance, while voters' party preference did not have a significant effect (Model 3). The results also show an interesting association with public expectations: Voters who expected



MPs to contribute to national policymaking and favour their home communities were more likely to approve of the performance of MPs (Model 4). Less educated voters who contacted MPs and preferred favouritism were slightly more likely to approve of MP performance (Model 5).

In 2012, Model 6 shows a higher level of improvement in correct classification (3.82 percentage points) than previous years. Again, the results suggest that female CCM supporters were more likely to approve of the performance of MPs (Model 5). Those who persuaded others to vote for certain candidates or political parties were more likely to disapprove of MP performance (Model 3 and Model 6). This implies that they might have supported the candidates who lost the election in 2010. Similar to the 2005 results, respondents who were offered election incentives were more likely to disapprove of the performance of MPs. However, in contrast to the 2008 results, respondents who supported constituency-oriented MPs and favouritism were more likely to disapprove of MP performance. These results explain why MPs feel pressure to serve their constituencies, as clientelistic voters who were not satisfied with the performance of MPs may persuade others not to vote for them.

Despite high public expectations of programmatic MPs, the level of MPs' engagement with Parliament did not affect public views on the performance of MPs in 2012. This raises a question about the earlier assumption that voters have some idea about how their representatives are engaged with Parliament. They may not have access to information on parliamentary debates or may not be interested in them. At least it suggests that this is not what voters really care about.

Two findings can be drawn from these analyses. First, as the 2005 and 2012 survey results demonstrate, the provision of private goods in the form of election incentives did not particularly help MPs gain long-term support from voters in Tanzania. The analysis illustrates the negative effects that *takrima* may have had on public views of MPs; *takrima* may have helped some MPs win elections, but it made voters become more critical of the performance of MPs after the elections. Second, in 2012, there was a small group of clientelistic voters who preferred constituency-oriented MPs and supported favouritism. They were more likely to have been targeted for vote-buying in the 2010 elections and to have sought assistance from MPs to solve their individual or community problems after the elections. However, due to their high expectation of MPs to deliver locally, they became less satisfied with the performance of MPs than non-clientelistic voters. This implies that it became difficult for MPs to keep satisfying their clientelistic supporters after the elections.

Conclusion

This paper has established several findings to demonstrate a shifting trend in public expectations and evaluations of MPs in Tanzania. First, despite efforts by the Kikwete administration to control the use of election incentives before the 2010 elections, more Tanzanians said they were offered election incentives in 2010 than in the 2005 elections. In particular, CHADEMA supporters were more likely to claim that they had been offered incentives than CCM or CUF supporters, regardless of the level of competitiveness between parliamentary candidates in their constituencies. While there is potential misreporting in the survey results, the offering of election incentives increased or at least remained in 2010.

Second, while a large majority of Tanzanians consistently expected MPs to prioritise their roles in representation and constituency service, Tanzanians were increasingly in favour of programmatic MPs who could contribute to national policymaking or bring public goods to citizens across the country. The proportion of clientelistic voters who expected MPs to focus on constituency service and favour their home communities decreased dramatically in 2012.

Finally, 2012 survey results show that voters who were offered election incentives and/or preferred clientelistic MPs were more likely to be dissatisfied with the performance of MPs. This indicates that it was becoming difficult for MPs to continue providing private or club goods to meet the expectations of clientelistic voters. This finding supports arguments in the literature

that clientelistic demands of voters tend to be inflated over time. The current analysis demonstrates that the provision of private goods in the form of electoral incentives does not help MPs maintain long-term electoral support and that clientelism is not necessarily a sustainable mode of MP-voter relationships in Tanzania.






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
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Appendix A

Supplementary notes on variables

Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 below provide details on the variables created from the Afrobarometer surveys for the regression analyses in this paper.


Table A.1: Variables from Afrobarometer | 2005

Variable	Variable name and question in Afrobarometer survey	Removed value
Sponsor	"Sponsor" (dummy) from Q100*	
Male	"Gender" (dummy) from Q101	
Age	Q1 (interval)	999 (Don't know)
Urban	"Urbrur" (dummy) from URBRUR	
Gone without cash income	"Cash" (dummy) from Q8E	9 (Don't know)
Gone without enough food to eat	"Food" (dummy) from Q8A	9 (Don't know)
Education	"Education" (ordinal/interval) from Q90**	99 (Don't know)
CCM supporters	"CCMsupport" (dummy) from Q86	997 (Would not vote), 998 (Refused to answer), 999 (Don't know)
Contacted the MP	"Contact" (dummy) from Q32B	-1 (Missing), 9 (Don't know)
Voted in the elections	"Voted" (dummy) from Q30	9 (Don't know/Can't remember)
Election incentives	"Incentives" (dummy) from Q57F	9 (Don't know)
Favouritism of leaders	"Favouritism" (dummy) from Q21	6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Approve of MP's performance	"Perform" (dummy) from Q68B	-1 (Missing), 9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)

Notes:

* The following values in Q100 were treated as "the government" in the dummy variable "Sponsor": Government (general), national/union government, provincial/regional government, local government, president's/prime minister's office, Parliament, government census/National Bureau of Statistics, National Intelligence/Secret Service, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, other government department/ministry, Constitutional Commission, National Electoral Commission, National Planning Commission, political party/politicians, Government of Zanzibar (SMZ), and Human Rights Commission. Other values, including "Refused to answer" and "Don't know," were treated as non-government.

** Taking into account that there were not many respondents with post-secondary school education, three values were created from Q89: 1) primary school uncompleted (including those who have some primary schooling), 2) primary school completed (including those who have some secondary schooling), and 3) secondary school completed (including those who have post-secondary qualifications from colleges or university). Although it is an ordinal variable, it was treated as an interval variable in the regression analysis.

**Table A.2: Variables from Afrobarometer | 2008**

Variable	Variable name and question in Afrobarometer survey	Removed value
Male	"Gender" (dummy) from q101	
Age	q1 (interval)	
Urban	"Urbrur" (dummy) from URBRUR	
Gone without cash income	"Cash" (dummy) from q8e	9 (Don't know)
Gone without enough food to eat	"Food" (dummy) from q8a	9 (Don't know)
Education	"Education" (ordinal/interval) from q89*	
CCM supporters	"CCMsupport" (dummy) from q86	997 (Not applicable), 998 (Refused to answer), 999 (Don't know)
Contacted the MP	"Contact" (dummy) from q25b	9 (Don't know)
Voted in the elections	"Voted" (dummy) from q23D	9 (Don't know/Can't remember)
Service-oriented MPs	"Service" (dummy) from q55	5 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Favouritism of leaders	"Favouritism" (dummy) from q17	6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Approve of MP's performance	"Perform" (dummy) from q70b	9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)

Note: * The same "Education" values as in Table A.1 were created.

**Table A.3: Variables from Afrobarometer | 2012**

Variable	Variable name and question in Afrobarometer survey	Removed value
Sponsor	"Sponsor" (dummy) from Q100*	
Male	"Gender" (dummy) from Q101	
Age	Q1 (interval)	999 (Don't know)
Urban	"Urbrur" (dummy) from URBRUR	
Gone without cash income	"Cash" (dummy) from Q8E	9 (Don't know)
Gone without enough food to eat	"Food" (dummy) from Q8A	9 (Don't know)
Education	"Education" (ordinal/interval) from Q97**	
CCM supporters	"CCMsupport" (dummy) from Q89B	9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused to answer), 9999
CUF supporters	"CUFsupport" (dummy) from Q89B	9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused to answer), 9999
CHADEMA supporters	"CHADEMAsupport" (dummy) from Q89B	9997 (Not applicable), 9998 (Refused to answer), 9999
Voted in the elections	"Voted" (dummy) from Q27	9 (Don't know/Can't remember)
Attended a campaign rally	Q29A (dummy)	9 (Don't know)
Persuaded others	Q29B (dummy)	9 (Don't know)
Worked for a candidate or party	Q29C (dummy)	9 (Don't know)
Contacted the MP	"Contact" (dummy) from Q30B	9 (Don't know)
Election incentives	"Incentives" (dummy) from Q61F	9 (Don't know)
Vote margin	"Margin" (interval) added to the Afrobarometer data set	100 (Uncontested), 999 (Not available)
MPs' interventions in Parliament	"Intervention" (interval) added to the Afrobarometer data set	888 (New constituency), 999 (Not available)
Cabinet members	"Cabinet" (dummy) added to the Afrobarometer data set ***	8 (New constituency), 9 (Not available)
Constituency-oriented MPs	"Constituency" (dummy) from Q79A_TAN	5 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Favouritism of leaders	"Favouritism" (dummy) from Q18	6 (Agree with neither), 9 (Don't know)
Approve of MP's performance	"Perform" (dummy) from Q71B	9 (Don't know/Haven't heard enough)

Notes:

* The following values in Q100 were treated as "the government" in the dummy variable "Sponsor": Government (general), national/union government, provincial/regional government, local government, president's/prime minister's office, Parliament, government census/National Bureau of Statistics, National Intelligence/Secret Service, Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, other government department/ministry, Constitutional Commission, National Electoral Commission, National Planning Commission, and political party/politicians. The remaining values, including "Refused to answer" and "Don't know," were treated



as non-government.

** The same values as "Education" in tables A.1 and A.2 were created.

*** The cabinet was reshuffled in February 2008. Cabinet members from both before and after the reshuffle were included.




Appendix B

Supplementary notes on vote margins

Vote margins were calculated based on the difference between the percentages of votes won by the winner and by the runner-up. While the Afrobarometer surveys do not ask about respondents' constituencies, the constituencies of 1,870 samples were identified with information on wards in the Afrobarometer data set and the postcode list published by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (United Republic of Tanzania, 2012).

There is no significant relationship between vote margins and election incentives ($r=0.02$, $p=0.36$). However, as Figure B.1 shows, there are some samples that have large vote margins and are remotely located in the scatterplot, which can be considered outliers.

Figure B.1: Scatterplot of election incentives and vote margins (in percentage points)




Note: Election incentives offered: 0=never, 1=once or twice, 2=a few times, 3=often.
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

Thus, samples whose vote margins are above 80 percentage points were removed. When the vote margins are 80 percentage points or below, the relationship becomes statistically significant, but there is no correlation ($r=0.04$, $p=0.09$) (Figure B.2).



Figure B.2: Scatterplot of election incentives and vote margins (excluding margins over 80 percentage points)



Note: Election incentives offered: 0=never, 1=once or twice, 2=a few times, 3=often.
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer

This result shows that the level of electoral competitiveness had no influence on the likelihood of voters to be offered election incentives in the 2012 elections.




Appendix C

MPs' interventions in Parliament and public views on their performance

Despite high public expectation of MPs to contribute to the whole country, as expressed in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, there seems to be no significant relationship between the levels of engagement of MPs in parliamentary discussions and public views on their performance ($r=0.03$, $p=0.25$) (Figure C.1).

Figure C.1: Scatterplot of the ranking of MPs' interventions in Parliament and MP performance (excluding cabinet members)



Note: MP performance: 1=strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove, 3=approve, 4=strongly approve
Source: the author, based on Afrobarometer and Twaweza (2010a)



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