

Working Paper No. 158

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
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Abstract

Face-to-face interviews constitute a social interaction between interviewer and respondent, yet research employing African survey data typically fails to account for the effect of shared ethnicity on survey responses. We find that respondents give systematically different answers to coethnic and non-coethnic interviewers across surveys in 14 African countries, but with significant variation in the degree of bias across question types and countries, with the largest effects for explicitly ethnic questions and in countries where ethnicity is salient. In South Africa, we show further variation across interviewer-respondent dyad type: Coracial effects are larger than coethnic effects – a pattern consistent with the salience of racial legacies in South Africa – and differences in the direction, size, and significance of these effects concord with dyad-specific social desirability. Our findings have practical implications for consumers of African survey data and underscore the context dependence of the social interaction that constitutes the survey experience.



Introduction

A recent survey in South Africa asked respondents whether they thought the African National Congress (ANC) government had succeeded in uniting the country following the collapse of apartheid. Whereas 69% of black respondents said that the government had done well in uniting South Africa, just 45% of whites agreed. However, among white respondents interviewed by black interviewers, the share jumped to 65%. In the same survey, respondents were asked if they thought life was better today than under apartheid. When interviewed by a black interviewer, 45% of whites agreed, but when interviewed by a white interviewer, this number dropped to 17%. Something about the nature of the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee – combined, no doubt, with the sensitive political implications of the questions – dramatically altered the responses recorded in the survey.

Similar patterns emerge in other African surveys. In Uganda, when survey respondents were asked to choose between identifying themselves as Ugandan or as a member of their ethnic group – a loaded question in a country where emphasizing one's tribal identity is thought to be retrogressive – the answers people gave were systematically different when the person asking the question was a fellow group member. Whereas 17% said they felt more strongly attached to their ethnicity when being interviewed by a non-coethnic, 23% expressed this view when the interviewer was a coethnic. Kenyan survey respondents were similarly sensitive to who was conducting the interview. When asked how much they trusted Kenyans from other ethnic groups – a question that triggers strong social norms against openly admitting discriminatory sentiments – 35% of those interviewed by a non-coethnic said they trusted non-coethnics, but when the interviewer was a coethnic, this dropped to 26%.¹

These discrepancies, which accord with findings from research on race-of-interviewer effects in the United States (e.g. Berinsky, 2004; Campbell, 1981; Conover, 1984; Converse & Schuman, 1974; Cotter, Cohen, & Coulter, 1982; Holbrook, Green, & Krosnick, 2003; Sanders, 1995; Weeks & Moore, 1981), underscore the extent to which opinions ventured in surveys in Africa may vary with the ethnic match between the respondent and the person administering the survey. Few studies using African survey data, however, take account of such interviewer coethnicity effects.² Given the large and growing body of research in Africa that relies on data drawn from attitudinal surveys, it is critical that we investigate the extent of this phenomenon and understand its implications for interpreting the findings of African public opinion research.

We propose that the ethnic match between a survey interviewer and her respondent will affect the answers provided in African survey data because the norms that govern coethnic interactions are different from those that govern non-coethnic interactions. We thus expect a systematic effect of interviewer-respondent coethnicity in African survey data. At the same time, because this argument in its most generic form masks important differences in the ways and extent to which coethnicity affects the survey experience, a secondary goal of this paper is to identify the conditions under which the effects of interviewer-respondent coethnicity emerge most strongly. We speculate that response bias due to interviewer-respondent coethnicity should be largest for questions that explicitly address ethnicity, and in countries or contexts where ethnicity is politically salient.³

We use data from Afrobarometer to estimate coethnic interviewer effects (defined as the difference in response patterns across interviews conducted by coethnics and non-coethnics) first in a cross-section of 14 African countries and then in an in-depth case study of

¹ The results summarized in both of these paragraphs are drawn from Afrobarometer survey rounds 3 and 4 (www.afrobarometer.org).

² Many studies control only for interviewer ethnicity (often via interviewer fixed effects) rather than for the ethnic *match* between the respondent and the interviewer (exceptions are discussed below).

³ We use “interviewer-respondent coethnicity” and “interviewer-respondent non-coethnicity” interchangeably, since both refer to the same difference between matched and mismatched pairings. Empirically, we estimate this difference as the effect of non-coethnic interviewers.

South Africa.⁴ Our investigation, which is made possible by the collection of original data on the ethnic identities of more than 1,200 Afrobarometer survey interviewers, proceeds in two stages.⁵ First, since survey interviewers are not randomly assigned to respondents, we model the interviewer assignment process. Then, controlling for factors that determine interviewer assignment, we estimate the effect of being interviewed by a non-coethnic on responses to a range of survey questions, including questions explicitly concerning ethnicity, measures of political attitudes and behaviour, questions about socioeconomic status, and interviewer perceptions of respondent cooperation.

We find modest but systematic effects in the sample of 14 African countries. Confirming our first expectation, respondents who were interviewed by coethnics gave systematically different and less socially desirable answers to many explicitly ethnic questions. For example, respondents interviewed by a coethnic were less likely to prioritize their national identity over their ethnic one, but were more likely to say that their ethnic group was economically and politically disadvantaged. We also find systematic effects on political attitudes and behaviours, with non-coethnic interviewers eliciting higher rates of approval for the incumbent and greater trust in government. Furthermore, we even find effects for seemingly objective reports about personal economic welfare: non-coethnic interviewers reduce reports of having gone without food, cash income, or clean water. Finally, respondents were perceived to be more hostile and suspicious when interviewed by a non-coethnic. These findings point to systematic effects of interviewer coethnicity across a range of question topics. The cross-national analysis also reveals substantial heterogeneity across countries in the size and direction of interviewer effects, which partly explains the small average treatment effects in the pooled sample. Consistent with expectations, we find that the degree of response bias in a country across explicitly ethnic questions is positively correlated with indicators of a country's level of ethnic diversity and salience.

We further explore variation in interviewer effects through the lens of South Africa. Focusing on a single case allows us to drill down to specific dyads and to explore how political and historical context – here, the political dominance of a party associated with a particular racial group and long-term socioeconomic inequalities that reinforce racial divides – shapes interviewer effects. South Africa provides an advantageous focus case because it contains both racial and ethnic differences, which vary in political salience, permitting us to study how political salience shapes interviewer effects while holding constant national context.

We find that ethnic interviewer effects in South Africa generally echo the effects we unveiled in the broader cross-national sample, with similar variation across question type. However, racial interviewer effects swamp ethnic interviewer effects in both size and breadth, reflecting the greater salience of race over ethnicity in South Africa. Even more interestingly, whites and blacks respond very differently to non-coethnic interviewers. These differences, while not anticipated, make sense in the economic and political context of South Africa, where wealth and status are racial issues and the ruling party, and democracy more generally, are strongly associated with one particular racial group (blacks). When white South Africans answered questions about the economic situation of their group or the political performance of the president, socially desirable responses inversely mirrored those for blacks: Whites responding to black interviewers were more positive about the (black) government and less positive about the status of their own group. The analysis of white and

⁴ Afrobarometer (www.afrobarometer.org) conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in Africa. Five rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2013, and Round 6 surveys are currently under way (2014-2015). This paper draws on data from Round 3 (2005-2006) and Round 4 (2008-2009). Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples of between 1,200 and 2,400 adults.

⁵ The standard Afrobarometer survey instrument collects information only on the interviewer's home language, which is an imperfect proxy for ethnicity: 36% of Afrobarometer survey respondents speak a home language other than the one associated with their ethnic group.

black survey dyads in South Africa therefore reveals interesting insights into the nature of social desirability bias in a divided society. It also highlights the difficulty of interpreting average treatment effects that span heterogeneous dyads, providing further reason to suspect that the results from the pooled African sample understate the true impact of interviewer ethnicity.

Taken together, these findings reinforce the view that survey data collection constitutes a social interaction (Berinsky, 2004). As a result, the same social norms that govern everyday conversations, such as the concern to present an admirable public impression, affect the responses generated in surveys. Our findings underline the importance of being attuned to the ways in which such concerns shape how people answer survey questions – and, in the African context, to the ways in which the ethnic or racial group memberships of interviewers and survey respondents help to define the nature of that social interaction. On the one hand, our results highlight the need for survey researchers in Africa to control for interviewer coethnicity so as to reduce the potential bias caused by these effects and thus get their measures of public opinion “right.” On the other, they also suggest that there really is no such thing as an objective opinion or attitude (or even a report of one’s own socioeconomic circumstances) apart from the social context in which it is expressed, and that in an African setting – or, as the heterogeneity in the country-, dyad-, and question-level results make clear, in some social interactions in some African settings – that social context is strongly shaped by ethnicity. Seen in this light, ethnicity becomes not something to control for but a critical causal input into how Africans perceive and answer questions regarding their views about the world.

Who’s asking: When and why ethnicity matters in African surveys

Political scientists have relied on scientific surveys since the 1940s to gather observations about the political world, and these have proven to be a powerful research tool (Brady, 2000). Yet surveys also present a number of challenges, chief among them the difficulty of knowing whether respondents have provided truthful and accurate information. A vast literature on “response bias” attempts to identify the conditions under which self-reported attitudes and opinions may diverge from privately held views. In the U.S. context, a key emphasis in this literature is on race-of-interviewer effects. In one of its earliest demonstrations, black respondents in Memphis were found to express more patriotic feelings when the interviewer was white than when the interviewer was black (Hyman, Cobb, Feldman, Hart, & Stember, 1954). Similarly, white survey respondents expressed more support for interracial marriage and the racial integration of schools when interviewed by black interviewers (Hatchett & Schuman, 1975). More recently, Davis (1997) found that responses in more than 60% of the attitudinal questions in the 1984 National Black Election Study correlated significantly with an interviewer’s race.

Notwithstanding the salience of social identity in other (particularly developing country) settings, there has, until recently, been surprisingly little research into ethnicity-of-interviewer effects in a comparative context. Four recent papers may signal the beginning of a change in this trend. Relying on a randomized survey experiment in Egypt, Blaydes and Gillum (2013) found that female Muslim interviewers wearing Islamic headscarves elicited greater expressions of personal piety from survey respondents than the same interviewers dressed in secular garb. Dionne (2014) found that interviewer coethnicity affected respondents’ willingness to answer sensitive questions related to sexual behaviour in Malawi. In Burundi, Samii (2013) used different non-response rates across coethnic and non-coethnic interviewer-respondent dyads as a measure of ethnic prejudice. And in a study on the impact of local diversity on interethnic trust in Kenya, Kasara (2013) used respondent-interviewer coethnicity to rule out the possibility that social desirability bias underlay her result. While the attention these papers pay to ethnicity-of-interviewer effects in developing country settings is welcome, they all focus on single-question topics (religiosity, sexual behaviour, interethnic trust) or a particular form of non-cooperation (refusals to answer) and draw on samples from within single countries. It is therefore not clear whether the patterns they identify can be

generalized to the full breadth of topics likely to be affected by non-coethnic interviewers or whether the reported findings hold up in a broader set of contexts.

We address this gap in understanding through a systematic study of ethnicity-of-interviewer effects across sub-Saharan Africa and then in a more detailed analysis of the case of South Africa. Scholars of African politics have long recognized the social salience of ethnicity. Some trace this back to the continent's experience with the slave trade, where inter-village competition and trade with European powers provided individuals an incentive to sell prisoners of war (or even their own kin) into slavery (Piot, 1996). This competition weakened inter-village ties and increased social fragmentation, with direct implications for ethnic diversity in Africa (Nunn, 2008). Others point instead to disruptive colonial policies, which simultaneously consolidated diverse tribes into single ethnic groups and partitioned others across national borders (Asiwaju, 1985; Englebert, Tarango, & Carter, 2002; Robinson, 2014). Furthermore, Europeans governed and administered their colonial territories by reifying ethnic boundaries, setting the stage for an enduring legacy of ethnic-based politics long after independence (Bates, 1983; Laitin, 1986; Posner, 2005). As a result, research has shown that ethnicity affects instability (Jackman, 1978), taxation (Kasara, 2007; Lieberman, 2003), access to education and health care (Franck & Rainer, 2010), and voting (Adida, 2015; Carlson, 2015; Conroy-Krutz, 2013; Eifert, Miguel, & Posner, 2010; Ferree, 2006, 2011; Ferree, Gibson, & Long, 2014; Ferree & Horowitz, 2010; Long & Hoffman, 2013; Ndegwa, 1997; Posner, 2005). We draw from this rich literature to argue that ethnicity is also likely to matter during a face-to-face survey interaction.⁶

At the same time, not all sub-Saharan African countries experience similar levels of ethnic salience. Some countries, such as Nigeria and Kenya, are characterized by significant political and economic competition along ethnic lines, but in other countries, such as Senegal or Mali, ethnicity has a much more muted effect on political and economic landscapes (Dunning & Harrison, 2010; Posner, 2004; Villalón, 2006). Similarly, not all survey questions are equally sensitive to coethnicity response bias. Questions that mention ethnicity explicitly, such as whether a respondent identifies primarily in terms of her national identity vs. her ethnic one, will more easily prime respondents to the norms that govern coethnic vs. non-coethnic interactions than will questions that are ostensibly more objective in nature, such as whether the respondent has gone without food over the past year. Beyond identifying a blanket effect of interviewer-respondent coethnicity on survey responses, we also investigate a set of conditions under which we are likely to see greater response bias. We expect to see a greater effect in countries or contexts where ethnicity is politically salient, and for questions explicitly focused on ethnicity.

Assignment of interviewers to respondents

Before estimating the impact of coethnic interviewers on survey responses, we first investigate the process by which interviewers are assigned to coethnic or non-coethnic respondents in Afrobarometer surveys. If the assignment of interviewers to respondents had been done at random, then the estimation of ethnicity-of-interviewer effects would be straightforward: We could simply compare the responses of individuals interviewed by a coethnic interviewer to those of individuals interviewed by someone of a different ethnicity and conduct a difference-in-means test. However, the data suggests that interviewer-respondent assignment was far from random. For example, in South Africa, 82% of Xhosas and 65% of Zulus were interviewed by coethnics, whereas under random assignment of interviewers to respondents these percentages should both be below 5% (see Table A1 of the appendix for similar statistics on other ethnic groups).

Such departures from random assignment stem from the practical complexities of fielding survey teams in multiethnic settings. Afrobarometer interviewers deploy in teams, with each team assigned to specific geographic regions and interviewers assigned to teams so as to maximize the number of interviews that can be conducted in the respondents' home

⁶ All interviews in Afrobarometer rounds 3 and 4 were conducted face to face.

languages. This implies that respondents from large or regionally dominant groups, or from groups with unique or difficult languages, will experience a larger share of coethnic interviews than will respondents from smaller groups or living in more diverse (for example, urban) communities. Afrobarometer country directors also strive to minimize the number of interview dyads containing groups with historically contentious relationships, so these are likely to be underrepresented in the sample.

The fact that interviewer assignment is not random compels us to identify and control for the factors that underlie the assignment process so that we can separate out the treatment effect of being interviewed by a coethnic interviewer from the selection effect of being assigned a coethnic interviewer. We estimate the determinants of being assigned a non-coethnic interviewer in the pooled sample of 14 Afrobarometer countries for which we were able to collect information about the ethnic identity of survey interviewers: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. To relate survey responses to the ethnic match between interviewer and respondent, we combine information from Afrobarometer on the ethnicity of the respondent with original data that we collected on the race and ethnicity of the interviewers.⁷

Our model of treatment assignment includes both individual characteristics of the respondent (gender, age, education) and several factors that our qualitative understanding of the assignment process suggests may be relevant, such as the size of the respondent's ethnic group, the size of the interviewer's ethnic group, the respondent's urban/rural location, and the administrative region in which the survey is conducted. This last factor may be important insofar as regions vary in their ethnic demography and are assigned interviewer teams with different ethnic compositions, hence altering the likelihood of being assigned a non-coethnic interviewer. We also include a dummy for the Afrobarometer survey round, since both interviewer teams and, at least potentially, the country organisers' commitment to matching respondents and interviewers from the same groups may vary across rounds. We estimate multiple versions of the model, varying the combinations of regional, respondent ethnic group, and interviewer ethnic group fixed effects that we include. The results are reported in Table 1.

⁷ We asked the country director of every Afrobarometer country in our sample to code the racial and ethnic backgrounds of the interviewers employed for the third and fourth Afrobarometer survey rounds. We are grateful to Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan, two Afrobarometer principal investigators, for providing us with the names of interviewers and contact information for country directors, and to the country directors themselves who generously responded to our inquiries. Due to changes in country directors across survey rounds, we were only able to obtain ethnic codings for Round 4 in Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. In Zambia, where we did not receive any response from the Afrobarometer country director, we relied on country experts to code the interviewers' ethnic affiliations based on their names. Finally, we excluded Botswana given the lack of response from the country director and the country expert's high degree of uncertainty in coding the interviewers' ethnic affiliations.

Table 1: Assignment of a non-coethnic interviewer in 14 African countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Male	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Education	0.01 (0.00)***	0.00** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Round 4	-0.06 (0.01)***	-0.07 (0.01)***	-0.06 (0.00)***	-0.05 (0.00)***	-0.05 (0.00)***
Urban	0.04 (0.01)***	0.06 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.01)***
Respondent ethnic group size		-0.98 (0.02)***	-1.24 (0.02)***		
Interviewer ethnic group size		-1.72 (0.07)***	-2.00 (0.08)***	-1.85 (0.08)***	
Interviewer ethnic group size sqr		1.69 (0.14)***	1.88 (0.16)***	1.56 (0.17)***	
Constant	0.74 (0.02)***	1.14 (0.02)***	1.23 (0.11)***	1.65 (0.11)***	0.69 (2251.76)***
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Region FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent ethnic group FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Interviewer ethnic group FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	32911	32900	32900	32900	32900
R-squared	0.06	0.21	0.34	0.44	0.50

*Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$*

We find strong effects of urban location, respondent ethnic group size, interviewer ethnic group size, and interviewer ethnic group size squared (suggesting that interviewers from both the smallest and largest groups are more likely to interview non-coethnics). We also find evidence that interviewers and respondents were matched more systematically along ethnic lines in Round 4 than in Round 3. Individual-level variables (except education) largely wash out once we control for group variables. The fact that the addition of each set of fixed effects pushes up the R-squared value for the model confirms the importance of unobserved regional and group factors in the assignment process – and of the need to include them as controls in our estimates of the effects of being interviewed by a non-coethnic.

Ethnicity-of-interviewer effects in 14 African countries

We can now estimate the effects of being interviewed by a non-coethnic interviewer in our pooled cross-national sample, controlling for the correlates of treatment assignment identified above. We focus on four types of questions that deal with potentially sensitive topics or for which social norms may generate pressure for certain types of responses, with particular focus on questions used frequently by researchers. First, we consider eight explicitly ethnic questions, including national vs. ethnic self-identification, degree of trust in non-coethnics, and perceptions of ethnic discrimination. Second, we examine 13 questions about political attitudes and behaviour, including support for the head of state and ruling party, preferences for democracy, and political engagement. Third, we consider six questions about the respondent's own socioeconomic conditions and experience with poverty. Such

questions might appear to involve little more than the reporting of basic facts, but because such self-reports have implications for one's social status, they may also be sensitive to who is asking (see, e.g., Davis & Silver, 2003). Finally, we examine four outcomes based on the interviewer's rating of the respondent's demeanour. Question wording and response options for all questions are available in Table A2 of the appendix.


The estimated effects of a non-coethnic interviewer are presented graphically for all 28 outcomes in Figure 1a.⁸ Because we present results for many outcome variables with differing underlying scaling and variability, we standardize all outcomes by country so that effect sizes are in country-specific standard deviation units.⁹ Thus, a coefficient of 0.5 indicates that being interviewed by a non-coethnic rather than a coethnic correlates with a half standard deviation change in a particular outcome.

Figure 1a illustrates statistically significant effects for a wide range of questions. Respondents interviewed by non-coethnics were more likely to say they privilege national over ethnic affiliation and to be more positive about their group's comparative economic conditions, political influence, and treatment by the government. They were more likely to express preference for democracy, approve of the president's performance, say they trust the ruling party, and provide a positive assessment of the country's economic conditions. They were, however, less likely to know their member of Parliament's name. While such knowledge seems factual, it may be that non-coethnic interviewers are less able to elicit effort from respondents, including the cognitive effort required for factual recall (Krosnick & Alwin, 1987; Weinreb, 2006). Respondents interviewed by non-coethnics were also less likely to say that they had gone without enough food, cash income, or clean water, or had feared crime in their own home. None of these effects are substantively very large (0.03-0.10 standard deviations), but in every case, being interviewed by a non-coethnic generates survey responses that, in the local context, would be viewed as more politically correct or socially desirable.¹⁰

⁸ Table A3 of the appendix reports estimates resulting from four models, ranging from a simple bivariate model with country fixed effects to a model including factors we identified earlier as affecting the likelihood of a coethnic interviewer as well as fixed effects for country, region, respondent ethnic group, and interviewer ethnic group. The estimates reported in Figure 1a correspond with Model 4, the most restrictive model.

⁹ We de-mean each variable by country and divide by its country-specific standard deviation.

¹⁰ These results are robust to controlling for the language used in the interview (results not shown), which is correlated with interviewer-respondent coethnicity. This is important given recent findings from the United States on language-of-the-interview effects (Pérez, 2009; Lee & Pérez, 2014).


Figure 1: Impacts of a non-coethnic interviewer on survey responses**(1a) In a pooled sample of 14 African countries****(1b) In South Africa**

Given the frequency with which Afrobarometer data are used to make generalizations about Africa writ large, estimating the general effects of having a non-coethnic interviewer across multiple countries is a reasonable starting point. However, the attempt risks drawing attention away from what may be the more important story, which is the variation in patterns across contexts. As a first step in exploring this variation, Figure 2 summarizes cross-country variation in the average effect of a non-coethnic interviewer on the social desirability of responses to the four types of questions we study.¹¹ The results make clear two important

¹¹ The average degree of social desirability bias due to non-coethnic interviewers by question type was calculated in the following way. First, the impact of a non-coethnic interviewer was estimated in standard

patterns. First, whether or not an interview is conducted by a non-coethnic matters for the way people answer survey questions in some countries but not at all in others. For example, for questions relating to individual status, the median effect of a non-coethnic interviewer is positive, meaning that non-coethnic interviewers elicit more positive assessments of one's own status. However, effects vary significantly across countries, with Uganda being an extreme positive outlier and several other countries, including Namibia, Malawi, and Ghana, demonstrating a negative effect. Second, as anticipated, the effect of a non-coethnic interviewer is strongest, on average, and most consistent for questions that are explicitly ethnic.


Figure 2: Variation in average response bias across 14 African countries | by question topic



What drives the variation in the size of response bias across these 14 countries? In Figure 3, we offer a simple illustration of the relationship between the degree of response bias to explicitly ethnic questions and various indicators of ethnic diversity and ethnic salience, including the classic ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (Fearon, 2003), the politically relevant ethnic groups fractionalization index (Posner, 2004), and a measure of ethnic-based voting (Huber, 2012). In all three cases, the relationship is upward sloping ($r=0.2$, 0.4 , and 0.2 , respectively), suggesting that countries with greater ethnic diversity, or where ethnicity is politically salient, are countries that experience greater response bias on ethnicity questions due to non-coethnic interviewers.

deviation units for each question separately for each country in the sample. Estimates that were not statistically distinguishable from zero were set equal to zero, and the direction of statistically significant estimates were reversed, if necessary, such that more positive values reflected a bias in the direction of more socially desirable responses. Second, for each country, the average size of the coefficient was calculated across all questions of each type, resulting in four measures of average bias for each country, one for each question category.

Figure 3: Relationship between average response bias and indicators of ethnic diversity and salience across 14 African countries



These cross-national correlations are consistent with our expectation that response bias is most severe for questions related to ethnicity, and especially so in countries where ethnicity is politically salient. The practical implication for consumers of African survey data is to be mindful of the potential for large interviewer bias in some survey contexts, even when the average effect on response patterns across all contexts is small. There is a deeper theoretical implication as well: If non-coethnic interviewer effects underscore the context dependence of the social interaction that constitutes the survey interview, then the results in Figure 3 remind us that the impact of being interviewed by a non-coethnic is itself context dependent. Context operates at multiple levels, and the answers that respondents provide are potentially affected by all of them.

Race- and ethnicity-of-interviewer effects in South Africa

Because cross-national analysis obscures country-level heterogeneity, we turn next to a case study of South Africa. One benefit of focusing on South Africa involves the nature of its identity divisions. Like most African countries, it has ethnic divisions (Zulus, Xhosa, Afrikaners, etc.), but unlike most other African countries, it also has a broader set of racial divisions within which these ethnic divisions nest. Both ethnic and racial divisions are salient, but racial divisions are more so. Therefore, we can study the effects of differing levels of salience within a single national context. Additionally, by honing in on a single case, we can investigate heterogeneity in response bias within a single country while holding the identity dimension constant. In South Africa, for example, a black interviewer will likely elicit different biases from a white respondent than will a white interviewer from a black respondent. An in-depth look into the South African case allows us to explore these dynamics in greater detail.

Race and ethnicity in South Africa

South African racial divisions have deep historical roots. Almost from the arrival of Europeans and the formation of the Cape Colony in the 17th century, policies of racial segregation structured political, economic, and social relationships. Apartheid, a comprehensive set of policies initiated in 1948 by the National Party, codified and institutionalized race even more deeply. The state categorized all South Africans into one of four groups – white, black African, Coloured, and Indian – and recorded this categorization on all identity documents, making it virtually inescapable.¹² Race determined access to essential goods and services such as education, employment, public amenities, housing, and legal justice.¹³

Even after the end of apartheid and the rise to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in democratic elections in 1994, the deep imprint of centuries of racially prejudicial policies persists in South African social life. A modest black middle class has emerged and flourished post-apartheid, yet deep economic inequalities persist between racial groups (Leibbrandt, Finn, & Woolard, 2012; Seekings & Nattrass, 2002). Voting in elections continues to separate South Africans along racial lines. Although the ANC includes members of all groups and boasts a multiracial leadership, blacks make up all but a tiny portion of its support base while the primary opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), attracts mostly non-black voters (Ferree, 2011). Social relations across racial lines have loosened in 20 years of ANC rule, particularly for younger people, but many South Africans continue to find that racism plays a significant role in their society (Mangcu, 2003; Masombuka, 2014).

South Africa also contains numerous ethnolinguistic groups, and the divisions among them provide a second, if weaker, axis of social differentiation and communal conflict. Divisions between white Afrikaans speakers and white English speakers drove South African politics for at least two centuries (Thompson, 1990; O'Meara, 1996). Among black Africans, there are nine different ethnolinguistic groups – Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, Sotho, Pedi, Ndebele, Swazi, Venda, and Shangaan – each with a distinct language, cultural tradition, and history. While

¹² We use interchangeably the terms “black Africans” and “blacks.”

¹³ For comprehensive histories of South Africa, see Thompson (1990) and Beinart (2001).

the apartheid state focused most of its efforts on reinforcing racial divisions, it also accentuated ethnolinguistic differences by forcing black Africans to maintain domiciles and citizenship in a specific ethnically defined “homeland” (Butler, Rotberg, & Adams, 1977). Today, most black Africans speak an African language as their first language, and many – even those who live most of their lives in a large city – retain strong connections to an ethnically homogeneous rural area. South Africa’s various ethnic groups thus share common features with ethnic groups in other parts of Africa and were formed in a similar way out of the combined forces of pre-colonial history, colonial policy and boundaries, economic development, and post-colonial political competition.

While salient in some contexts, ethnicity in South Africa lacks the deep divisiveness of race. Apartheid eased income differences and competition between white groups while uniformly suppressing opportunities for blacks regardless of ethnicity (Thompson, 1990). Perhaps as a result, ethnicity plays a less overt role than race in South African politics today. The DA wins support from both Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking whites. The ANC, although sometimes characterized as a Xhosa party (the first two ANC presidents, Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, were both Xhosa), has recruited and promoted candidates of all ethnicities and draws support across all black African groups. The selection in 2007 of Jacob Zuma, a Zulu, to lead the party (and, through that selection, to become the third president of South Africa two years later) further mitigated concerns about Xhosa dominance of the party. It also corresponded with a collapse of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the sole example of an ethnic party in South Africa that succeeded, at least for a time, in capturing majority support from its titular Zulu ethnic group (Ferree, 2011).

South Africa thus contains both a highly salient racial cleavage and a more moderately salient ethnic one. The racial cleavage provides a natural analogy to American politics, while the ethnic cleavage generalizes more easily to other African countries. Given the greater salience of race, the long history of racialized politics, and the remaining deep socioeconomic chasms that separate racial groups, we would expect the effect of being interviewed by a non-coracial interviewer to be stronger than the effect of being interviewed by a non-coethnic interviewer.

The effect of being interviewed by a non-coethnic interviewer in South Africa

We begin by replicating our cross-national analysis of ethnic interviewer effects for just South Africa. As in the earlier pooled analyses, we control for the factors that are associated with assignment of a non-coethnic interviewer. To guard against interpreting non-coracial effects as non-coethnic effects, all analyses include a dummy for whether or not the dyad is coracial. As before, we standardize all outcomes as z-scores, which can be interpreted as standard deviation units. The results are presented in Figure 1b and in Table A4 of the appendix.¹⁴

We find substantial concordance between the South African and the cross-national results. Respondents questioned by interviewers from other ethnic groups were more likely to say they identified as South African and to play down their own ethnic group’s unfair treatment by government. They were more likely to approve of the president’s performance and to profess trust in the ruling party. They were also systematically less likely to say that they had gone without cash income or clean water or that they feared crime in their home. Although the size of these effects is modest – usually less than a quarter of a standard deviation – their consistency across multiple types of questions underscores the extent to which the ethnic match between the survey respondent and the interviewer matters for the way people answer survey questions in South Africa, just as it does in the broader African sample.

¹⁴ The estimates reported in Figure 1b correspond with Model 4 of Table A4, the most restrictive model.

The effect of being interviewed by a non-coracial interviewer in South Africa

We now turn to an analysis of race-of-interviewer effects. We focus on interviews conducted between blacks and whites, which is the most salient South African dyad given the country's history. It is also well represented in Afrobarometer data, with large enough samples of both of its configurations (whites interviewed by blacks, blacks interviewed by whites) to permit reasonable analysis. Our models control for most of the assignment covariates identified in our earlier analyses, and we again standardize all outcomes.¹⁵ We use the same 28 Afrobarometer questions employed in our analysis of ethnic interviewer effects, as well as three South Africa-specific questions (see Table A2 of the appendix).

The results are presented graphically in Figure 4 and in Table A5 of the appendix. In Figure 4, the black circles show the effect of being interviewed by a white interviewer relative to being interviewed by a black interviewer for black respondents, and the white circles show the effect of being interviewed by a black interviewer for white respondents. We find large, systematic effects (up to a full standard deviation) across both dyad configurations. These effects are substantially larger across the board than the effects of coethnicity discussed in the previous section.


The racial match between interviewer and respondent clearly matters for explicitly racial questions. Whites interviewed by blacks were substantially more negative about their group's comparative economic conditions, political influence, and treatment by the government than whites interviewed by white interviewers. They were more likely to say they identified with South Africa over their own group, to believe their South African identity should trump group identity, and to disagree with the notion of leaders helping their own community first. Several of these effects are more than a half standard deviation in size – comparable to the size of race-of-interviewer effects in the United States (Schaeffer, 1980). Blacks interviewed by whites were also sensitive to racial match for many of these questions, but often in the opposite direction: Blacks were generally more positive about their group's relative position and treatment by the government when interviewed by a white interviewer and less likely to identify in national vs. ethnic terms.

We also find similarly large effects for many political questions. White assessments of ruling party and president performance, trust in the ruling party, preference for democracy, perceptions about life post-apartheid, and evaluations of the country's current economic conditions all were highly sensitive to interviewer race. In all cases, whites provided more negative responses to these politically sensitive questions when interviewed by another white than when interviewed by a black. Whites also increased reports of political participation and engagement when interviewed by blacks. Black respondents displayed similar sensitivity to this set of political questions, but, as with the racial questions, moved in the opposite direction of white respondents. When interviewed by whites, blacks were more critical of presidential and ruling party performance, less trusting of the ruling party, and less likely to say life is better today than under apartheid. They were also less likely to report participation in elections, public affairs, and community meetings.

Although fewer outcomes in the socioeconomic category were significantly affected by being interviewed by a non-coracial, several results surprised us. Black respondents, for example, were more likely to tell a white interviewer that they had gone without enough food or a cash income and more likely to say they feared crime in their own home. Perhaps admitting to these outcomes to an outsider is easier than admitting them to a member of one's own group, or black respondents may have wished to remind whites that socioeconomic disparities persist post-apartheid. Similarly surprising is the fact that white respondents were more likely to tell black interviewers than white interviewers that they had

¹⁵ We do not control for group fixed effects for either interviewer or respondent because we examine only one group for each. We have no reason to believe that assignment covariates differ for racial vs. ethnic groups.

Figure 4: Impacts of a non-coracial interviewer on survey responses in South Africa





known someone who had died of AIDS. It may be that white respondents were trying to demonstrate sympathy for what they viewed as an “African disease.”¹⁶

Finally, we find that interviewers evaluate co-racial respondents differently than non-coracials. Blacks interviewed by whites were seen as more hostile, uncooperative, impatient, and suspicious than when interviewed by black interviewers, while whites interviewed by blacks were seen to be less patient than whites interviewed by white interviewers. Being interviewed by a co-racial thus affected not just the content of responses, but also the tone of the interview in general.

Overall, the effects of being interviewed by a non-coracial interviewer are present and strong for both white and black respondents; but in many cases, these effects run in opposite directions. Where sensitivity to a non-coracial interviewer for black respondents means playing up the group's economic status, for white respondents it means playing it down. Where sensitivity to a non-coracial interviewer for black respondents means displaying a more critical view of the incumbent government and its performance, for white respondents it means showing higher levels of approval.

Explaining these differing effects requires an understanding of the local and historical context of South Africa. In a previous section, we briefly outlined South Africa's history of racial apartheid and its persisting implications for socioeconomic inequality today. The salience of wealth disparities across racial groups and the long history of conflict generated by these disparities may induce whites interviewed by blacks to downplay group status, while producing the opposite effect for blacks interviewed by whites. The opposing effects on the political questions are also not surprising when we realize that most South African whites view the ANC as a black party (Ferree, 2011). Whites may therefore interpret questions about the ruling party, presidential performance, life post-apartheid, and economic performance through a racial lens, as being an evaluation of black rule in general. Even the question about democratic government could reflect this dynamic: Democracy has been synonymous with ANC rule. Similarly, reports of greater political participation by white respondents to black interviewers (relative to white interviewers) – a surprising result given the seemingly “factual” nature of these questions – may reflect an enhanced desire to appear to blacks to be engaged in democratic politics, or to buy into the current system of majority rule.

In sum, the race of the interviewer has powerful, wide-ranging, and complex effects on the way white and black South Africans answer survey questions, especially those dealing with sensitive issues such as race and the performance of the president and ruling party. These effects even extend to questions that involve (ostensibly purely factual) reports of one's political participation and socioeconomic conditions – a finding that has important implications for survey work in other fields, such as public health and economics. Moreover, whites and blacks responded to many questions in opposite directions, highlighting the sensitivity of interviewer effects to context and their variability over different dyads, even holding constant the salience of the identity division. Socially correct responses for one group may be diametrically opposed to socially correct responses for a different group. Only by drilling down to specific dyads were we able to uncover these sensitivities. The context-specificity of interviewer effects points to likely attenuation in the larger cross-national sample, and even in the South African sample we used to examine these ethnic enumerator effects in greater depth. By pooling dyads of varying salience, and which elicit differing patterns of socially favourable responses, pooled analyses are likely to understate the full effects of interviewer-respondent coethnicity. Our case study thus demonstrates the power as well as the nuance of interviewer-respondent coethnicity effects for social inquiry.

¹⁶ See Lieberman (2009) for a discussion of how AIDS in South Africa is associated with particular racial and ethnic communities.



Conclusion

Ethnic group attachments are thought to affect the way people interact with one another in Africa. Combining data from Afrobarometer with original data we have collected on the ethnic identity of Afrobarometer interviewers, we have shown that these effects extend to the interaction between interviewers and respondents during the course of administering public opinion surveys. In a sample of 14 African countries, we confirm that being interviewed by a non-coethnic is associated with statistically significant differences in the way people respond to survey questions. We find similar but stronger effects when we focus on ethnicity in South Africa and stronger effects still when we narrow our analysis to two configurations of a particularly salient racial dyad, whites and blacks in South Africa. As this analysis makes clear, being interviewed by a member of a different racial community leads to large, systematic changes in the way people answer survey questions across a range of issues – always in the direction of the more politically correct or socially desirable answer. These findings accord strongly with (and are of the same magnitude as those found in) research on race-of-interviewer effects in the United States and can thus be viewed as an out-of-sample validation of that literature.

A secondary goal of this paper was to begin an investigation into the sources of variation in ethnic response bias. We proposed that response bias should be stronger for questions that explicitly mention the respondent's ethnic or racial group. We find support for this claim, but we also uncover significant sensitivity to political questions (which may connect to group considerations via the identity of the president or the ethnic credentials of the party in power). We even find evidence of response bias in questions about political participation and personal socioeconomic conditions. Our findings have important implications for survey work in Africa, where public opinion research is abundant and growing and where dominant social cleavages tend to revolve around ethnicity. The findings are particularly troubling given that one of the most common solutions to social desirability bias generated by interviewer effects in developed countries – the use of self-administered surveys (Krysan, 1998) – is often not feasible in Africa, where low rates of literacy necessitate the use of face-to-face interviews.

Additionally, we proposed that the response bias generated by interviewer-respondent coethnicity is likely to be stronger in countries where ethnicity is more politically salient. Our cross-national results indeed suggest that countries that are more ethnically fractionalized and countries where ethnicity is more politically salient are more likely to suffer from this type of response bias. Our analysis of racial dyads in South Africa adds further support to this conjecture.


As social interactions, surveys are sensitive to the context in which they are administered. Our findings underscore the importance of ethnicity – and in particular the dyadic relationship between the ethnicity of the interviewer and that of the interviewee – as one of the characteristics that define that context in the African setting. Although our tests are necessarily limited to the way people respond to survey questions, our findings are strongly suggestive of the impact of shared (or divergent) ethnicity on beliefs, perceptions, and understandings of the world more broadly.

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Appendix


Table A1: Interviewer/respondent dyads by ethnic group in South Africa

		Respondent ethnicity														Total
Interviewer ethnicity		Afrikaner/ Boer	Ndebele	Xhosa	Pedi/ North Sotho	Sesotho / South Sotho	Setswana / Tswana	Shangaan	Swazi	Venda	Zulu	White/ European	Coloured	Indian	English	
Interviewer ethnicity	Afrikaner/Boer	213	0	7	5	6	32	1	3	0	3	6	27	4	35	342
	Ndebele	8	8	0	17	0	8	7	1	1	11	0	3	0	2	66
	Xhosa	81	7	591	16	66	69	10	3	15	118	6	58	17	34	1,091
	Pedi/North Sotho	8	12	7	148	19	20	42	4	9	12	0	5	4	4	294
	Sesotho/South Sotho	18	7	29	20	103	73	38	15	12	41	1	15	2	4	378
	Setswana/Tswana	43	18	25	32	67	190	21	41	17	57	0	24	5	5	545
	Shangaan	4	0	0	8	5	0	19	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	56
	Swazi	3	3	0	10	2	0	10	33	0	10	0	5	2	2	80
	Venda	1	0	0	21	0	3	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	30
	Zulu	68	17	37	28	85	33	16	34	15	520	4	14	57	33	961
	Coloured	36	0	10	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	8	117	12	27	211
	English	21	0	18	0	1	12	0	1	0	28	14	51	53	39	238
	Total	504	72	724	305	354	440	169	135	90	800	39	319	156	185	4,292
% of interviews conducted by a coethnic interviewer		42	11	82	49	29	43	11	24	1	65	0	37	0	21	46
Probability of a coethnic dyad with random assignment in this interviewer/respondent pool		< 0.01	< 0.001	< 0.05	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.05	< 0.001	< 0.01	< 0.001	< 0.01	


Table A2: Afrobarometer questions used in the analysis

	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
Explicitly ethnic questions			
Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [citizen of your country] and being a [member of your identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?	1. I feel only [group] 2. I feel more [group] than [country] 3. I feel equally [group] and [country] 4. I feel more [country] than [group] 5. I feel only [country]		Q82, Q83
Which of the following statements is closest to your view?			
A: Since leaders represent everyone, leaders should not favour their own family or group.	1. Agree very strongly with A 2. Agree with A 3. Agree with B 4. Agree very strongly with B 5. Agree with Neither	0. Agree with A 1. Agree with B	Q21, Q17
B: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.			
How much do you trust people from your own ethnic group? [ROUND 3 ONLY]	0. Not at all 1. Just a little 2. I trust them somewhat 3. I trust them a lot		Q84C
How much do you trust [co-nationals] from other ethnic groups? [ROUND 3 ONLY]	0. Not at all 1. Just a little 2. I trust them somewhat 3. I trust them a lot		Q84D


	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
Think of the condition of [your identity group]. Are their economic conditions worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Much better 2. Better 3. Same 4. Worse 5. Much worse 		Q80A, Q80
Think of the condition of [your identity group]. Do they have less than, the same as, or more influence in politics than other groups in this country?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Much better 2. Better 3. Same 4. Worse 5. Much worse 		Q80B, Q81
How often are [your identity group] treated unfairly by the government?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Never 1. Sometimes 2. Often 3. Always 		Q81, Q82
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: People should realize we are South Africans first, and stop thinking of themselves in terms of the group they belong to. [SOUTH AFRICA ONLY]	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither 4. Agree 5. Strongly agree 		Q82D-SAF, Q83D-SAF
Political attitudes and behaviour			




	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
In general, how would you describe the present economic conditions of this country?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very bad 2. Fairly bad 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Fairly good 5. Very good 		Q4A, Q4A
How much do you trust the ruling party?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Not at all 1. Just a little 2. Somewhat 3. A lot 		Q55E, Q49E
How much do you trust opposition parties?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 0. Not at all 1. Just a little 2. Somewhat 3. A lot 		Q55F, Q49F
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling managing the economy?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very badly 2. Fairly badly 3. Fairly well 4. Very well 		Q65A, Q57A




	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
Which of these statements is closest to your opinion?			
A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.	1. Statement C	0. Statement B or C 1. Statement A	Q37, Q30
B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.	2. Statement B		
C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.	3. Statement A		
Do you approve or disapprove of the way President [XXX] has performed his job over the past 12 months?	1. Strongly disapprove 2. Disapprove 3. Approve 4. Strongly approve	0. Disapprove 1. Approve	Q68A, Q70A
During the [most recent] election, how often (if ever) did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift, in return for your vote? [ROUND 3 ONLY]	0. Never 1. Once or twice 2. A few times 3. Often 7. Not in past year	0. Never/Not in past year 1. Once or twice 2. A few times 3. Often	Q57F
With regard to the most recent [year] national elections, which statement is true for you?	1. Voted in the elections 2. Decided not to vote 3. Count not find place to register 4. Prevented from registering 5. Too young to register 6. Did not register for other reason	0. Did not vote in the last elections 1. Voted in the last elections	Q30, Q23D



	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
How interested would you say you are in public affairs?	0. Not at all interested 1. Not very interested 2. Somewhat interested 3. Very interested		Q16, Q13
Have you attended a community meeting during the past year?	1. No, would never do this 2. No, but would if had chance 3. Yes, once or twice 4. Yes, several times 5. Yes, often		Q31A, Q23A
Can you tell me the name of your member of Parliament?	1. Know but can't remember 2. Incorrect guess 3. Correct name 9. Don't know	0. Could not identify correct name 1. Could identify correct name	Q43A2, Q41A2
Is your life today better, about the same, or worse than it was under apartheid? [SOUTH AFRICA ONLY]	1. Much worse 2. Worse 3. Same 4. Better 5. Much better		Q6-SAF
How well or badly would you say the current government is uniting all South Africans into one nation? [SOUTH AFRICA ONLY]	1. Very badly 2. Fairly badly 3. Fairly well 4. Very well		Q65M-SAF, Q57Q-SAF



	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
Socioeconomic conditions			
In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?	1. Very bad 2. Fairly bad 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Fairly good 5. Very good		Q4B, Q4B
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough food to eat?	0. Never 1. Just once or twice 2. Several times 3. Many times 4. Always		Q8A, Q8A
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough clean water for home use?	0. Never 1. Just once or twice 2. Several times 3. Many times 4. Always		Q8B, Q8B
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without a cash income?	0. Never 1. Just once or twice 2. Several times 3. Many times 4. Always		Q8E, Q8E



	Original answer options	Recoded answer options (if applicable)	Afrobarometer question # (rounds 3, 4)
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family feared crime in your own home?	0. Never 1. Just once or twice 2. Several times 3. Many times 4. Always		Q9A, Q9A
Do you know a close friend or relative who has died of AIDS?	0. No 1. Yes		Q97, Q95
Respondent demeanour questions			
What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: friendly, in between, or hostile?	1. Friendly 2. In between 3. Hostile		Q108A, Q108A
What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: cooperative, in between, or uncooperative?	1. Cooperative 2. In between 3. Uncooperative		Q108C, Q108C
What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: patient, in between, or impatient?	1. Patient 2. In between 3. Impatient		Q108D, Q108D
What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview? Was he or she: at ease, in between, or suspicious?	1. At ease 2. In between 3. Suspicious		Q108E, Q108E

Table A3: Effect of a non-coethnic interviewer on survey responses in 14 African countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Explicitly ethnic questions				
National identification vs. in terms of ethnic group	0.067 (0.011)***	0.036 (0.013)***	0.035 (0.014)**	0.032 (0.015)**
Thinks leaders should help their home community	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.013)	0.003 (0.014)	0.007 (0.015)
Trust in coethnics	0.013 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.022)	0.006 (0.023)
Trust in non-coethnics	0.072 (0.016)***	0.028 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.016 (0.023)
Ethnic group's comparative economic conditions	-0.082 (0.012)***	-0.1 (0.014)***	-0.092 (0.014)***	-0.055 (0.015)***
Ethnic group's comparative political influence	0.080 (0.012)***	-0.033 (0.013)**	-0.064 (0.014)***	-0.047 (0.015)***
Ethnic group is treated unfairly by government	-0.135 (0.012)***	-0.135 (0.013)***	-0.125 (0.014)***	-0.105 (0.015)***
B. Political attitudes and behaviour				
Preference for democracy	0.019 (0.012)	0.019 (0.014)	0.032 (0.015)**	0.037 (0.015)**
Approval of president's performance	0.076 (0.011)***	0.066 (0.014)***	0.07 (0.015)***	0.055 (0.015)***
Exposure to vote buying	-0.036 (0.017)**	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.024)
Assessment of country's present economic conditions	0.087 (0.011)***	0.06 (0.013)***	0.055 (0.014)***	0.033 (0.015)**
Trust in ruling party	0.038 (0.011)***	0.059 (0.013)***	0.07 (0.014)***	0.056 (0.015)***
Trust in opposition parties	0.005 (0.012)	0.024 (0.014)*	0.019 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Assessment of government's handling of economy	0.043 (0.011)***	0.026 (0.013)**	0.016 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)
Voted in last national election	0.003 (0.011)	0.028 (0.013)**	0.032 (0.014)**	0.023 (0.015)
Interest in public affairs	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.001 (0.014)	0.008 (0.015)
Attendance at community meetings	-0.023 (0.011)**	-0.01 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)
Knows MP's name	-0.044 (0.009)***	-0.064 (0.011)***	-0.063 (0.012)***	-0.057 (0.012)***

Table A3: Effect of a non-coethnic interviewer on survey responses in 14 African countries (cont'd)

C. Socioeconomic conditions				
Assessment of own present living conditions	0.074 (0.011)***	0.031 (0.013)**	0.009 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.015)
Has gone without enough food	-0.093 (0.011)***	-0.053 (0.013)***	-0.039 (0.013)***	-0.036 (0.014)**
Has gone without cash income	-0.082 (0.011)***	-0.057 (0.012)***	-0.053 (0.013)***	-0.033 (0.014)**
Has gone without enough clean water	-0.042 (0.011)***	-0.048 (0.013)***	-0.027 (0.014)**	-0.03 (0.015)**
Has feared crime in own home	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.037 (0.013)***	-0.043 (0.014)***	-0.045 (0.015)***
Knows a friend/relative who died of AIDS	-0.036 (0.01)***	-0.023 (0.011)**	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.013)
D. Respondent demeanour				
Respondent was hostile	0.026 (0.011)**	0.04 (0.013)***	0.042 (0.014)***	0.036 (0.014)**
Respondent was uncooperative	-0.005 (0.011)	0.023 (0.013)*	0.024 (0.014)*	0.013 (0.014)
Respondent was impatient	0.028 (0.011)**	0.031 (0.013)**	0.024 (0.015)*	0.004 (0.015)
Respondent was suspicious	0.035 (0.011)***	0.072 (0.013)***	0.057 (0.014)***	0.044 (0.015)***
Country FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent ethnic group FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Interviewer ethnic group FEs	No	No	No	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Note: In addition to the fixed effects reported above, models 2-4 include the following control variables: respondent age, respondent gender, respondent education level, dummy for urban locale, and dummy for survey round. Sample sizes range from about 15,100 to about 33,300.

Table A4: Impact of a non-coethnic interviewer on survey responses in South Africa

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Explicitly ethnic questions				
Identification as South African vs. in terms of ethnic group	0.160 (0.035)***	0.097 (0.041)**	0.123 (0.042)***	0.099 (0.043)**
Thinks leaders should help their home community	-0.061 (0.036)*	-0.020 (0.042)	-0.012 (0.044)	0.002 (0.044)
Trust in coethnics	0.059 (0.048)	0.074 (0.056)	0.061 (0.062)	0.080 (0.063)
Trust in non-coethnics	0.188 (0.049)***	0.193 (0.057)***	0.185 (0.064)***	0.210 (0.064)***
Ethnic group's comparative economic conditions	-0.242 (0.035)***	-0.090 (0.040)**	-0.112 (0.041)***	-0.034 (0.041)
Ethnic group's comparative political influence	-0.067 (0.035)*	-0.043 (0.041)	-0.066 (0.042)	-0.016 (0.043)
Ethnic group is treated unfairly by government	-0.241 (0.036)***	-0.128 (0.040)***	-0.169 (0.042)***	-0.143 (0.043)***
Thinks South African identity should come before group identity	0.168 (0.036)***	0.099 (0.043)**	0.139 (0.044)***	0.079 (0.046)*
B. Political attitudes and behaviour				
Preference for democracy	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.041)	0.030 (0.043)	0.036 (0.044)
Approval of president's performance	0.220 (0.036)***	0.154 (0.041)***	0.169 (0.044)***	0.112 (0.045)**
Exposure to vote buying	-0.002 (0.048)	-0.007 (0.051)	-0.029 (0.056)	-0.026 (0.059)
Assessment of country's present economic conditions	0.182 (0.035)***	0.021 (0.039)	0.034 (0.041)	0.004 (0.043)
Trust in ruling party	0.186 (0.035)***	0.116 (0.039)***	0.149 (0.041)***	0.102 (0.042)**
Trust in opposition parties	0.072 (0.037)*	0.078 (0.043)*	0.054 (0.045)	0.012 (0.047)
Assessment of government's handling of economy	0.213 (0.035)***	0.105 (0.041)***	0.127 (0.042)***	0.056 (0.044)
Voted in last national election	0.080 (0.035)**	-0.002 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.039)	-0.005 (0.040)
Interest in public affairs	0.057 (0.036)	0.009 (0.040)	0.027 (0.041)	0.023 (0.042)
Attendance at community meetings	0.142 (0.035)***	0.062 (0.039)	0.072 (0.041)*	0.022 (0.042)
Knows MP's name	-0.030 (0.037)	-0.045 (0.045)	-0.063 (0.045)	-0.066 (0.050)
Thinks life is better today than under apartheid	0.130 (0.036)***	-0.009 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.042)	-0.039 (0.043)
Assessment of government's success in uniting South Africa	0.233 (0.035)***	0.118 (0.041)***	0.117 (0.043)***	0.043 (0.042)

Table A4: Impact of a non-coethnic interviewer on survey responses in South Africa (cont'd)

C. Socioeconomic conditions				
Assessment of own present living conditions	0.111 (0.035)***	-0.002 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.043)	-0.006 (0.044)
Has gone without enough food	-0.091 (0.035)***	-0.066 (0.039)*	-0.067 (0.041)	-0.079 (0.043)*
Has gone without cash income	-0.098 (0.035)***	-0.101 (0.041)**	-0.087 (0.042)**	-0.090 (0.044)**
Has gone without enough clean water	-0.110 (0.036)***	-0.092 (0.040)**	-0.086 (0.042)**	-0.090 (0.043)**
Has feared crime in own home	-0.145 (0.033)***	-0.192 (0.039)***	-0.183 (0.040)***	-0.20 (0.041)***
Knows a friend/relative who died of AIDS	0.049 (0.037)	0.067 (0.044)	0.069 (0.045)	0.084 (0.047)*
D. Respondent demeanour				
Respondent was hostile	0.028 (0.033)	0.034 (0.039)	0.022 (0.040)	0.034 (0.043)
Respondent was uncooperative	0.007 (0.034)	-0.026 (0.039)	-0.018 (0.042)	-0.035 (0.043)
Respondent was impatient	0.051 (0.035)	0.039 (0.041)	0.030 (0.043)	0.017 (0.045)
Respondent was suspicious	0.099 (0.036)***	0.054 (0.039)	0.063 (0.042)	0.001 (0.042)
Region FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent ethnic group FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Enumerator ethnic group FEs	No	No	No	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Note: In addition to the fixed effects reported above, all models control for whether the dyad is coracial or not. Models 2-4 include the following control variables: respondent age, respondent gender, respondent education level, dummy for urban locale, and dummy for round. Model 2 includes respondent ethnic group size and race of respondent fixed effects, and models 2 and 3 include interviewer ethnic group size and interviewer ethnic group size squared. Sample sizes range from about 2,100 to about 4,300.

Table A5: Impact of a non-racial interviewer on survey responses in South Africa

	(1) Black respondent; white interviewer	(2) White respondent; black interviewer
A. Explicitly ethnic questions		
Identification as South African vs. in terms of ethnic group	-0.198 (0.104)*	0.607 (0.094)***
Thinks leaders should help their home community	-0.020 (0.107)	-0.481 (0.091)***
Trust in coethnics	0.081 (0.140)	0.082 (0.168)
Trust in non-coethnics	-0.081 (0.140)	0.207 (0.150)
Ethnic group's comparative economic conditions	0.428 (0.101)***	-1.052 (0.088)***
Ethnic group's comparative political influence	0.226 (0.107)**	-0.717 (0.099)***
Ethnic group is treated unfairly by government	0.289 (0.117)**	-0.420 (0.089)***
Thinks South African identity should come before group identity	-0.078 (0.113)	0.624 (0.096)***
B. Political attitudes and behaviour		
Preference for democracy	-0.042 (0.111)	0.488 (0.103)***
Approval of president's performance	-0.531 (0.139)***	0.619 (0.110)***
Exposure to vote buying	-0.105 (0.111)	0.101 (0.104)
Assessment of country's present economic conditions	-0.109 (0.105)	0.489 (0.089)***
Trust in ruling party	-0.516 (0.113)***	0.712 (0.081)***
Trust in opposition parties	-0.016 (0.115)	0.148 (0.100)
Assessment of government's handling of economy	-0.202 (0.103)**	0.405 (0.092)***
Voted in last national election	-0.234 (0.109)**	0.745 (0.089)***
Interest in public affairs	-0.242 (0.118)**	0.763 (0.085)***
Attendance at community meetings	-0.196 (0.116)*	0.583 (0.084)***
Knows MP's name	0.077 (0.092)	0.032 (0.032)
Thinks life is better today than under apartheid	-0.468 (0.115)***	0.785 (0.086)***
Assessment of government's success in uniting South Africa	-0.475 (0.108)***	0.911 (0.089)***

Table A5: Impact of a non-coracial interviewer on survey responses in South Africa (cont'd)

	(1) Black respondent; white interviewer	(2) White respondent; black interviewer
C. Socioeconomic conditions		
Assessment of own present living conditions	-0.165 (0.105)	0.346 (0.087)***
Has gone without enough food	0.265 (0.117)**	0.048 (0.060)
Has gone without cash income	0.250 (0.122)**	0.042 (0.075)
Has gone without enough clean water	0.072 (0.107)	0.080 (0.049)*
Has feared crime in own home	0.302 (0.119)**	0.085 (0.078)
Knows a friend/relative who died of AIDS	0.090 (0.136)	0.391 (0.086)***
D. Respondent demeanour		
Respondent was hostile	0.750 (0.174)***	-0.012 (0.111)
Respondent was uncooperative	0.502 (0.135)***	-0.112 (0.098)
Respondent was impatient	0.390 (0.114)***	-0.232 (0.107)**
Respondent was suspicious	0.428 (0.117)***	-0.123 (0.092)
Region FEs	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Note: All models include the following control variables: respondent age, respondent gender, level of education, a dummy for urban locale, a dummy for survey round, and region fixed effects. For blacks (Column 1), sample sizes range from 1,677 to 3,064, with 4%-5% of blacks being interviewed by a white interviewer. For whites (Column 2), sample sizes range from 283 to 724, with 45%-47% of whites being interviewed by blacks.



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