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NARROWING THE LEGITIMACY GAP: THE ROLE OF TURNOVERS IN AFRICA'S EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

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The Role of Turnovers in Africa's Emerging Democracies

Abstract

Democratic consolidation depends on common perceptions of institutional legitimacy among citizens aligned with governing and opposition parties. Elections always result in winners and losers, but if they also create subservient insiders and aggrieved outsiders, the future of the democratic system will be uncertain. This paper theorizes about how various qualities of elections (turnover, peaceful, opposition party acceptance, and free and fair) should reduce winner–loser gaps in perceived institutional legitimacy. We test our hypotheses using a hierarchical two-step statistical procedure to analyze three rounds of Afrobarometer micro-level data combined with national-level data on African elections between 1989 and 2006. We find that electoral turnovers alone have a moderating effect on the citizenry. Following alternations of power, winners and losers converge in their attitudes about their institutions, thus furthering the consolidation of democracy.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades there have been major political changes throughout the world. The proliferation of multi-party elections in former authoritarian states is one of the most tangible results of this global transformation. According to Freedom House (2007), 123 nations are now "electoral" democracies, meaning that they live up to a minimum definition of "polyarchic" (Dahl 1971) democracy. In response to the electoral revolution, a wide range of academics turned their attentions to the causes and consequences of (sometimes flawed) electoral contests in Africa and elsewhere.[1] Scholars recognize that the introduction of multi-party elections does not necessarily lead to regime survival nor to democratic consolidation.

Emerging democracies face the critical task of creating widespread legitimacy for the state's institutions, such as the constitution, elections, courts, police, and tax authority. Regardless of whether consolidation is conceived of as "institutionalized uncertainty" (Linz 1990) or as "making democracy the only game in town" (Linz 1990), it requires that *all* citizens view their institutions as somewhat trustworthy, accountable, worthy of consent, representative, and satisfactory. If the political system only has opportunistic support from a ruling party's supporters it will remain fragile and unconsolidated. Thus, democratic development is facilitated by bringing 'winners', 'independents', and 'losers' of the electoral game towards a common appreciation of the legitimacy of their government institutions.[2]

There are two key aspects to the preservation and consolidation of democracy. First, boosting support for institutions among losers is crucial so that they do not disengage from formal political structures, or worse, act against the system and support military interventions or civil wars. Second, it is equally important to ensure that winners do not become so euphoric about their electoral fortunes that they ignore the performance of their government and give their leaders carte blanche to tamper with democratic rule. Subservient insiders are just as dangerous for democratic development as aggrieved outsiders. Therefore, narrowing the winner–loser gap is a crucial factor in safeguarding fledgling democracies against dramatic breakdown or gradual backsliding towards authoritarian rule.

What causes gaps between winners and losers in emerging democracies to narrow so that citizens aligned with competing parties move closer to each other in how they evaluate the legitimacy of state and government institutions? We develop theoretical arguments about why various qualities of elections (turnover, peaceful, opposition party acceptance of outcome, and free and fair) should reduce winner–loser gaps in perceived institutional legitimacy. We test our hypotheses using a hierarchical two-step statistical procedure to analyze three rounds of Afrobarometer (AB) micro-level data combined with a national-level

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[1] Without any pretence of doing justice to all contributions or being representative, a list of this new kind of research on democracy in Africa published only in the past few years, includes for example; executive, judicial and electoral systems and consociationalism (e.g. Lemarchand 2007; Lindberg 2005; Mamoudou 2006; Taylor 2006; von Doepp 2006), women and politics (e.g. Bauer and Britton *eds.* 2006; Cornwall and Goetz 2005; Hassim 2006; Lindberg 2004; Tripp 2004, Yoon and Bunwaree 2005); capitalism, development and democracy (e.g. Ayers 2006; Burgess 2004; Gazibo 2005; Koeble and LiPuma 2006) war, corruption, clientelism and democracy (e.g. Blake and Martin 2006; Ellis 2006; Kahn 2005; Lyons 2005; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Sandbakken 2006) various features and effects of party systems (e.g. Bogaards 2004; Erdman 2004; Ishiyama and Quinn 2006; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; LeBas 2006; Lindberg 2007; Manning 2005; Morrison 2006), voter and citizen attitudes (e.g. a host or Afrobarometer working papers and journal articles following them; Kagwanja 2006; Lindberg and Morrison 2006, *n.d.* 2007; Moehler 2006); and ethnicity, culture and religion and democracy (e.g. Green 2006; Hagmann 2006; Paden 2005; Pitcher 2006; Posner 2005; Soares 2006).

[2] Winners are understood here as those who feel close to the political party whose representative(s) form the government after a particular election. Independents are those who do not feel close to any party and losers feel close to a political party whose representative(s) are not in the ruling coalition. Other conceptualizations could have included individuals who actually vote for the parties in an out of government, those who did or did not benefit from policies enacted, or just the official members of ruling and opposition parties. Lack of data, however, precludes any testing of alternative definitions.

data set on elections in Africa from 1989 to 2006.[3] Time lags between independent and dependent variables facilitate causal inference. We focus on sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter referred to as Africa) in an effort to hold a number of region-specific factors relatively constant; the spread of multiparty elections is nowhere more evident than in Africa where more than 200 elections have taken place since 1989 (Lindberg 2006a), so Africa provides fertile ground for testing our hypotheses.

As expected the results show that in nearly every African country for which there is data, winners and losers have polarized perceptions of the legitimacy of their political institutions. Winners tend to view their constitutions, courts, police, and so on as more trustworthy, accountable, worthy of consent, representative, and satisfactory – in short, legitimate – while losers tend to seriously question their authority. This polarization is extremely pronounced in Africa's emerging democracies compared to more established democracies in the West, thus indicating little progress towards consolidation. More importantly, our research suggests a single plausible antidote: electoral turnovers have a significant moderating effect on the citizens as winners and losers converge in their attitudes about the legitimacy of their state and government institutions. These results give new meaning to Huntington's "two-turnover-test". Not only are turnovers indicators that elites have accepted democracy, as Huntington (1991) argued, but power alternations also appear to *generate* shared levels of legitimacy between winners and losers in the general population thus furthering democratic consolidation.

This paper is divided into five sections. We first discuss briefly the literature on elections and democracy and explain our focus on winner-loser gaps in perceived institutional legitimacy. Section two presents our theoretical arguments about how the four electoral qualities should be expected to influence popular legitimacy, and section three describes our data and measurement. The fourth section explains the multilevel model and reports on the empirical analysis and a number of robustness checks. We conclude by summarizing the findings and discussing implications of our research.

Elections, Democracy, and Legitimacy

Initial research on the third wave typically treated elections only as *indicators* of democratization. For example, O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) posited "founding" elections as the hallmark of a completed transition. Ensuing empirical work used aspects like number of elections, voter turnout, competitiveness and turnovers as measures of either the degree of democratization (e.g. Barkan 2000; Linz and Stephan 1996; van de Walle 2002), the level or quality of democracy (e.g. Altman and Linán 2002; Foweraker and Landman 2002; Vanhanen 1997), or the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Fomunyoh 2001; Diamond 1999, an approach also adopted by scholars like Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Diamond and Plattner 1993, 1999 Günther *et al*. 1995, and Valenzuela 1992).

More recently, several global as well as regional studies have come to the conclusion that elections not only signify democracy as a system of "institutionalized uncertainty" (Przeworski 1986, 57-61) but also play an important *causal* role in furthering democratization and consolidation (e.g. Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Hadenius and Torell 2007; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006a; Schedler 2002). However, this increasingly articulate literature has not successfully disentangled the causal mechanisms involved. Our inquiry seeks to advance knowledge precisely in this regard. Do certain electoral characteristics serve as missing causal links by which the repetition of elections contribute to legitimating political institutions thus furthering democratic consolidation?

The exercise of political power is generally viewed to be legitimate if and when it is in accordance with existing rules justified by *shared* beliefs; and if there is evidenced *consent* to the arrangement (e.g. Baird 2001; Beetham 1991, 16; Gibson 2004; Gibson and Caldeira 1995). We therefore use survey data on

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[3] Specifically, we evaluate the interactive effects of electoral qualities and being a winner, independent, or loser on perceived institutional legitimacy.

popular perceptions of state and government institutions to gauge their legitimacy. We acknowledge that legitimacy exists to a greater or less degree but never completely. Our inquiry asks if certain characteristics of elections facilitate shared citizen assessments of legitimacy. Our dependent variable, perceived legitimacy of state and government institutions, is multidimensional and we examine a range of five indicators: institutional trust, accountability, consent to government authority, support for the constitution, and satisfaction with the political system.[4]

Why Focus on Winner-Loser Gaps in Institutional Legitimacy?

In theory, elections are legitimating devises because they provide citizens with fair procedures for selecting leaders. In practice, however, elections typically have uneven effects and winners tend to be happier than losers with political outcomes (leaders and policies) and institutions. Winner–loser gaps have been identified across a wide range of citizen attitudes and opinions,[5] but the size of the gap varies considerably across attitude dimensions and countries (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005). While most empirical studies documenting winner–loser gaps are based on data from advanced industrial democracies, the few recent studies of emerging democracies in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia[6] suggest that gaps are particularly large in these political systems (Anderson et al., 2005: 108-09; Moehler, 2005). We are not surprised or especially concerned that winners and losers feel differently about the leaders and policies for which they did or did not vote. However, theory indicates that large gaps in the perceived legitimacy of government and state institutions are particularly troubling for developing democracies and therefore, we focus on gaps in perceived institutional legitimacy.

An alternative to our focus on how electoral qualities affect differences between winners, independents, and losers (i.e. winner-loser gaps), would be to focus on how electoral qualities affect average levels of perceived institutional legitimacy. However, there are at least three reasons why winner-loser legitimacy gaps should be the analytical focus for a study of consolidation in emerging democracies. First, polarization of attitudes between insiders and outsiders makes tolerance, compromise, and cooperation more difficult to achieve across political lines. In polarized polities, reform attempts from one group of citizens are likely to be summarily rejected and resented by citizens aligned with alternative parties. Political differences are more likely to end in stalemates or even violent clashes when the attitudes of the mass citizenry are drastically divided along party lines, especially when political splits frequently coincide with ethnic divisions as in Africa. Thus, relative differences in citizen attitudes matter more than absolute levels for democratic stability and progress.

Second, we should be concerned about the attitudes of the losers because the losers have the most reason to abandon or act against the current system (Anderson et al., 2005). In other words, losers would seem to have the least to lose and the most to gain from regime change.[7] Institutional legitimacy among losers is thus crucial for regime stability and longevity in fragile polities because it represents "a reservoir of favorable attitudes or goodwill that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their interests" (Easton, 1965: 124-5).

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[4] See discussion below and appendix for further details on the measures of legitimacy.

[5] For some recent examples, see: Anderson and Lotempio (2002); Anderson and Tverdova (2003); Anderson et al. (2005); Banducci and Karp (2003); Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005); Cho and Bratton (2005); Clarke and Acock (1989); Craig, Gainous, Martinez, and Kane (2004); Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson (1995); Listhaug and Wiberg (1995); Nadeau and Blais (1993); Nadeau, Blais, Nevitte, and Gidengil (2000); and Norris (1999).

[6] The authors of *Losers' Consent* use data from Eastern Europe in their analyses of the differences between old and new democracies (Anderson et al., 2005). Bratton and his colleagues have done some important work on this topic in Africa (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Cho and Bratton, 2005). The analysis in *Critical Citizens* includes Mexico, India, and Chile (Norris, 1999: 230-32). Anderson et al. (2005) also include Mexico in some of their analysis.

[7] While ordinary citizens usually do not take up arms against a perceived illegitimate state on their own, disgruntled citizens will not act as a buffer to elites who seek to alter the political system from within or from without.

Third, we supplement the more common concern regarding losers with an equally important interest in the winners because inflated perceptions of legitimacy among winners are arguably as dangerous to transitional or fledgling democracies as intense dissatisfaction among losers. Unconsolidated democracies are threatened not only by dramatic breakdowns instigated by outsiders, but also by the gradual erosion of government performance and democratic structures by insiders. Naïve, loyal, or complacent citizens who overestimate the quality of their political institutions are unlikely to monitor leaders and push for greater democratic reforms. The attitudes of citizens aligned with the ruling party (i.e. winners) are especially critical in this regard, both because they have closer connections with and more influence on the leaders in power, and because they typically constitute the larger portion of the population. Judicious winners – and not adoring or complacent subjects – are thus essential for democratic progress and improved government performance.

Theoretical arguments regarding the importance of a critical citizenry (e.g. Bowler and Karp, 2004; Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Citrin, 1974; Cook, Hardin, and Levi, 2005; Dalton, 2004; Hardin, 2002; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Moehler, forthcoming 2007; Norris, 1999) are reinforced by recent empirical analyses showing that African levels of institutional trust are similar to OECD levels, despite Africa's poor-performing institutions (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 229).[8] Additionally, Moehler (2005) finds that winners are less willing to defend press freedoms, judicial independence, and parliamentary elections if it means going against a government to which they feel attached. While some level of government legitimacy and citizen compliance is arguably necessary for democracy to function effectively, unconditional allegiance can be dangerous for democratic development.

In sum, legitimacy means that state and government institutions are accepted in principle, and valued regardless of outcomes in terms of who is currently in power and who is not. Citizens – winners or losers alike – who think that political institutions are only legitimate if their party wins elections and holds power, reflect opportunistic rather than institutionalized values. What is crucial for consolidation is that winners and losers successively come closer together in their assessment of the political system rather than drifting further apart into camps which unconditionally support the existing institutions regardless of democratic performance, or which unconditionally denounce them and lay the foundation for violent conflict and regime breakdown. Therefore, the attitudes of the losers relative to the winners (rather than average support) are fundamental to any assessment of legitimacy and consolidation.

Hypotheses: Electoral Qualities and Legitimacy
Which electoral qualities help narrow winner–loser gaps in perceived legitimacy and which do not? We focus in this study on four qualities of elections that are particularly likely to affect popular perceptions of legitimacy in emerging democracies: turnovers of power; peacefulness of electoral processes; opposition parties' approval of election process and outcome; and freeness and fairness of elections. Below we theorize about the plausible effects of these electoral qualities on winner-loser gaps in institutional legitimacy before we test these hypotheses using evidence from Africa.

Turnover of Power
Huntington suggested that democracy was evidently accepted by elites as the legitimate form of rule after two alternations in power, hence the "two-turnover-test" as an indicator signaling consolidation of democracy. Elections can be truly competitive without turnovers and in some democracies a single party rules over many electoral cycles (e.g. Britain, Sweden, Japan, and Italy). Yet, it is only when a peaceful turnover occurs that we have unambiguous evidence that it would be accepted (if grudgingly) by the losing

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[8] Institutional trust in Africa is also higher than in most other hybrid or new democracies. For example, the various barometer surveys indicate that the mean level of trust in the courts was 49 percent in Africa, 56 percent in East Asia, 36 percent in Latin America, and 25 percent in New Europe. Furthermore, Bratton et al. (2005: 235) also note that institutional trust is associated with support for the single party state in Africa.

incumbents. In most established democracies, today's losers were already yesterday's winners and visa versa. Citizens learn through these alternating experiences that current advantages and disadvantages are temporary and limited in scope.[9] In emerging democracies, such learning is less likely to be the result of political socialization (e.g. Jennings and Niemi, 1981) since most citizens grew up under non-democratic rule. In this vein we expect that losing gracefully and winning benevolently comes with experience of being on the other side (Anderson 2005).

We expect that turnovers affect popular legitimacy among losers and winners in opposite ways. New winners/old losers will get an extra boost in their confidence in political institutions yet are likely to still be influenced by a legacy of skepticism from their recent experience as outsiders. Old winners/new losers are likely to lose some of the unwarranted approval but can still be expected to carry with them some of their old views of institutional legitimacy despite the electoral loss. In other words, political socialization leads to moderation in views and behavior. In this way, we expect turnovers to bring winners and losers closer together in their assessment of the legitimacy of their government institutions. In contrast, we hypothesize that elections without turnovers make repeated losers perceive government as inherently unaccountable and unfair, while repeated winners come to take advantages for granted. Thus, incumbent success at the ballot box, especially if repeated, will create a marked winner-loser gap in perceptions of legitimacy.

Peaceful Electoral Process
The systematic use of violence constitutes a denial of democratic values and rights and has been found to impact negatively on opposition elites' participation (hence, losers' sense of legitimacy) in electoral processes.[10] While use of violence can be costly for all citizens, it seems plausible that electoral violence should have a greater negative impact on the attitudes of losers than on the attitudes of winners. Losers are more likely to be subject to abuse during campaigns and elections especially if the winning party was an incumbent party. Losers are also more likely to bear the brunt of state violence in the post electoral period and have less ability than winners to garner the protection of military and police. Finally, citizens who get their favored candidates as leaders (winners) are arguably less likely than losers to be concerned with whether violence affected the outcome of the election. We thus hypothesize that violence is associated with a widening winner-loser gap as the attitudes of losers decline more sharply than those of winners. We expect that peaceful elections will be more appreciated by losers than winners and thus be associated with a narrowing of the gap.

Opposition Approval of Process and Outcome
Opposition acceptance of electoral process and results are not a given in new electoral regimes. Losing parties sometimes challenge the results in order to gain political advantage from the international community, or to undermine the political rule of their rivals domestically. However, opposition parties sometimes also accept defeat even in the face of less than free and fair elections if opposition parties acknowledge they would have lost even a free and fair contest or if an election is accepted as a substantial improvement over the past and there is a perceived prospect of future advancements. Regardless of the reasons for opposition acceptance or rejection of electoral outcomes, we hypothesize that citizen followers will be influenced by the stance of their leaders. In a context of general uncertainty and low information about electoral quality, elites provide important clues to citizens and citizens are most likely to rely on statements by their favored political leaders. We hypothesize that when losing parties refuse to accept electoral outcomes, citizens who feel close to those parties will be more likely to withhold their support for

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[9] Anderson et al. (2005) found that winner–loser gaps are relatively large in countries with predominant party systems (such as Japan and Mexico) and that citizens who loose repeatedly were more dissatisfied than were citizens who lost only once. To date the most comprehensive inquiry into systematic effects of turnovers on public opinion in Africa found that alternations in power affected every measure of support for democracy positively (Bratton 2004) but that study did not inquire into the important winner–loser relationship, or institutional legitimacy.
[10] Boycotts (partial or total) characterized almost 60 percent of presidential elections where politically motivated violence was systematic and/or widespread (Lindberg 2006b).

political institutions. We expect opposition expressions of dissatisfaction to influence losers' perceptions of legitimacy much more than winners' perceptions, thus we expect to see a widening of the winner–loser gap. Approval of the electoral processes by leaders of losing parties should, conversely, have a positive impact on losers' perceptions of legitimacy, and a much smaller positive impact on winners, if any. Hence, we hypothesize that opposition parties' approval will narrow the winner-loser gap.

Free and Fair Elections
There are several reasons to expect the extent to which an election process is free and fair influences popular perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Previous research suggests that when individuals believe decision-making procedures are fair, they tend to be more accepting of the outcomes of the process even when outcomes are deemed suboptimal (Anderson et al., 2005; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, Casper, and Fisher, 1989; Tyler, 1989). Furthermore, various political institutions, from electoral commission to police and the courts, are usually involved in electoral processes; thus perceptions of deficient elections are likely to spill over into decreasing legitimacy for political institutions *writ large*.

Naturally, the more actual fraud is present, the more likely one finds perceptions of fraud among citizens. Yet, perceptions of the extent and importance of fraud are likely to be unevenly distributed among winners and losers in Africa due to imperfect information about actual electoral quality.[11] It is plausible to expect that citizens who emerged from an election victorious will tend to believe that: most irregularities were unintentional, the proper candidate won, and the system is legitimate. In contrast, losers are more likely to assume that flaws were deliberate and consequential. Thus, freeness and fairness is likely to affect the attitudes of losers more than the attitudes of winners. We hypothesize that unfree and unfair elections will be associated with wider winner-loser gaps, while free and fair elections should decrease winner-loser gaps in legitimacy.

While turnovers of power, peaceful elections, opposition approval, and free and fair elections are certainly correlated, they are empirically and analytically distinct characteristics.[12] There are several instances in Africa where genuinely unfair elections have nevertheless effectuated an opposition win: the presidential and parliamentary elections in Ivory Coast on 22 October and 10 December 2000; the executive elections of Madagascar on 16 December 2001; and the parliamentary elections in Malawi on 15 June 1999 are cases where electoral irregularities affected the results but there was still an alternation in power. There are also instances where violent contests or opposition rejection of outcomes coincided with power transitions. The 1999 elections in Nigeria led to a turnover of power even though the contest was marred by violence and the opposition refused to accept the results. Ghana's 2000 election and Senegal's 2001 election also resulted in full turnovers of power despite violent episodes surrounding the electoral contest. The above discussion also indicates that each of these four factors can be plausibly assumed to work independently of the other three. We are interested in the independent effect of each trait. Therefore, in the following empirical analysis, we will assess their respective causal effect in a multivariate analysis.

Data, Cases, and Measurement
To test the above hypotheses we would ideally track the attitudes of the same individuals over time as they experience different types of elections and compare them to similar citizens in a stable electoral environment. Since this is not possible, we have chosen to compare different individuals from a number of countries and years that recently experienced a range of election types. Although imperfect, we believe that this comparison yields insights into what would happen to citizens in a country that embarks on improvements in electoral quality. We use data from two different sources. At the individual-level of

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[11] Opinion pollsters, journalists, and election observers in Africa face numerous constraints, which prevent them from providing accurate and independent information to citizens.
[12] Turnover is only weakly correlated with peacefulness (0.12), opposition elite acceptance of the contest and outcomes (0.26) and the free and fairness of elections (0.06).

analysis, we use Afrobaromter (AB) surveys from Rounds 1, 2, and 3 administered from 1999 to 2006, in which nationally representative samples are drawn through a multi-stage, stratified, clustered sampling procedure. The use of a standardized questionnaire facilitates cross-national comparisons. We have complete data from 11, 15, and 18 countries from rounds 1, 2 and 3 respectively, so we have a total of 44 surveys (country/rounds).[13] In the two-step hierarchical model described below, we couple individual-level Afrobarometer survey results with data on the national-level elections using an updated version of Lindberg's (2006a) data set covering all elections from 1989 to 31st December 2006.[14] We use data from the most recent presidential or parliamentary elections held before the AB enumerators went out into the field in the various countries on the basis that citizens' attitudes are likely to be most influenced by the latest election. Due to the time lag between elections (which form the basis for our key independent variables) and the subsequent surveys (which measure our key dependent variables), we feel relatively confident in making plausible inferences regarding the direction of causal effects, though we can not entirely rule out reverse causation.[15]

Our sample of countries is restricted by the selection of countries included in the three consecutive rounds of AB surveys. In other words, we can use individual-level data from only 18 countries, which are not entirely representative of the continent as a whole. Countries included in the AB surveys are significantly more democratic than the African average cautioning us against too generous generalizations to all African nations.[16] Nonetheless analyzing dynamics in the emerging democracies on the continent also gives us a plausible map of what may happen in the other nations if they develop more democratic systems.

Measures of the Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, perceived legitimacy of political institutions, is a multidimensional concept that is measured in slightly different ways by different authors. We suggest that it is preferably analyzed in its various aspects. Rather than selecting a single dimension of this complex concept, which would open us up to validity questions, we examine a range of five indicators. A single index would present a host of aggregation and weighting decisions, which would affect the results and thus create additional validity issues (cf. Munck and Verkuilen 2002). All five measures are based on individual-level responses to the AB surveys and the exact wording and coding of the variables can be found in the appendix. *Institutional Trust* is an index variable that sums trust in four political institutions: the electoral commission, courts of

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[13] 12 surveys were conducted in Round 1. However, several of the questions used for both independent and dependent variables were not asked in Uganda's first round survey. Therefore all of the observations for Uganda round 1 are excluded from the analysis. The total number of survey respondents in these 44 surveys is 68,958. In most instances, respondents who did not answer all the questions used in the analyses were excluded from the analysis. Many individuals were unable to answer the question about whether the constitution represents the values and interests of the people, hence the considerably lower N in the analysis predicting constitutional support. Each first-step analysis (for each of the five measures of legitimacy) contains between 48,948 and 55,892 individual-level responses.

[14] The full data set provides data on, among other things, outcomes, boycotts, freedom and fairness, acceptance of results, and turnovers from 284 elections in Africa.

[15] Note that the data displayed in Figure 1 do not indicate reverse causation. If small winner-loser gaps lead to turnovers (rather than the other way around as we claim), then the gaps from the surveys prior to the turnovers should be lower than the gaps in subsequent surveys. However, in the two cases for which we have survey data prior to full or partial turnovers, Ghana and Mali, the gaps measured prior to the elections (round 1) were far higher than the gaps after the turnovers (rounds 2 and 3). Our argument that the causal arrow leads from turnovers to narrowing of the gap is more consistent with the evidence from the sequencing of elections and survey results overtime in Ghana and Mali.

[16] The average Freedom House rating on the political rights' scale from 7 to 1 for AB countries has improved from 3.50 to 2.89 between round 1 and round 3, while the average of all other African states has worsen from 4.83 to 5.03 in the same period. The freest of those surveyed by AB include Botswana (democratic since independence in 1966) and South Africa. At the other end of the spectrum are Uganda (with civil war and restrictions on party activity during the survey period) and Zimbabwe (where citizens are afforded only minimal political and civil rights).

law, the army and the police.[17] *Accountability* is variable gauging whether citizens feel political institutions offer possibilities to hold leaders accountable. *Consent to Government Authority* asks if the government has the right to make people abide by its decisions. *Support for Constitution* measures the degree to which citizens feel that the constitution represents the people's values and beliefs. Finally, *Satisfaction with System* measures how satisfied citizens are with the way democracy actually works.[18]

Independent variables
We use independent variables at micro (individuals) and macro (elections) levels of analysis in a two-step statistical model (see below). The key independent variable at the individual-level of analysis is winner-loser status, which takes on three different values for winners, non-partisans, and losers. Citizens who said they feel close to the parties that make up the government (winners) are coded as two. Citizens who claim they are not close to any party (non-partisans) are coded as one. Citizens who report feeling close to opposition parties in the legislature or parties that did not win seats at all (losers) are coded as zero.[19] We also include controls for gender, age, education, urban residence, poverty, media exposure, political participation, and political interest. The key independent variables at the national level are those discussed earlier: turnovers, peaceful process, opposition approval and free and fairness of elections as discussed above. The appendix contains specific information on the coding of these variables.

Testing Hypotheses on Winner-Loser Gaps and the Effects of Electoral Qualities
In order to answer questions about how the conduct and aftermath of elections influence the size of winner-loser gaps in perceived legitimacy we need to pair the micro-level survey data with macro-level data on electoral institutions and elite behavior. Scholars have employed several different strategies for analyzing cross-national public opinion data together with higher-level data.[20] The results that we present in the paper are derived from a two-step hierarchical estimate strategy that models the individual-level processes for each survey (country/round) separately and allows the intercepts and coefficients for each survey to differ arbitrarily. Two-step strategies are well suited for analyses of cross-national surveys where there are large numbers of micro-level observations (individuals per survey) and small numbers of macro-level contexts (countries or elections). We expect that there are considerable differences in the processes that generate the data in each country or survey and limited cross-survey information.[21] The two-step process allows for the relationship between variables in Mali to differ from the relationship in Zimbabwe or any other country,

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[17] We also used an index variable that excluded trust in the electoral commission to ensure that this institution alone was not responsible for the findings. The results were largely the same for the key variables.

[18] Although this question asks specifically about democracy there are good reasons to believe that responses characterize the existing system regardless of its level of democracy. Hence, what people are saying is how legitimate they find the existing political institutions *writ large*.

[19] Bratton et al. assert that the measure is valid while also acknowledging that perhaps not all citizens truthfully or accurately report their partisan attachments: "Of course, some respondents may rewrite their personal histories by reporting voting records deemed politically correct. Despite the possibility that we were sometimes intentionally misled, we still expect that being a self-proclaimed 'winner' increases one's loyalty to incumbent leaders and reduces one's willingness to criticize their performance" (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 259)

[20] Perhaps the most common strategy is to conduct separate analyses on each survey and then compare statistics (such as means, proportions) or casually contrast multivariate analysis across surveys. Another popular strategy involves pooling (or stacking) the surveys and analyzing them as a single data set, either with or without country indicators and weighting factors. Pooling strategies can lead to problematic standard errors if single observations at the macro-level are assigned to thousands of individuals and statistically treated as if they are independent observations. Recently, more scholars have employed multilevel hierarchical linear models; the approach that we adopt here (Jusko and Shively, 2005: 327-8). For a more detailed comparison of strategies for analyzing cross-national public opinion data see Jusko and Shively (2005: 327-8). They provide data on the frequency of political science articles employing each strategy (328), and describe the benefits and potential drawbacks of these strategies (330-32). See also Gelman and Hill (2007) for information on multilevel models.

[21] One-step multilevel models employ cross-sample information to estimate a general model and are thus most appropriate for situations with numerous macro samples, each with a small number of micro units.

and it also allows for different intercepts. We use the two-step procedure when presenting our results in the body of this paper. However, the key findings remain the same regardless of whether we use a one-step or a two-step procedure.[22]

Briefly, the two-step procedure is as follows. In the first step, we run 44 different ordinary least squares regressions (one for each survey) in which the measure of perceived institutional legitimacy is regressed on the individual level variables. The 44 intercepts and 44 coefficients for winner from the first-step then become the dependent variables in the second step; the independent variables in the second step come from the data on the most recent election preceding each of the 44 surveys. Because of space limitations, we have chosen to discuss in detail only a part of our full analysis of legitimacy for political institutions: the model predicting institutional trust. We will use it to explain in greater detail the statistical model and the empirical results. However, the same principle model was used for the analysis of the four other indicators of the dependent variable (accountability, consent to government authority, support for constitution, and satisfaction with system) with essentially the same results. We note in the text or footnotes where the results for the other measures of legitimacy diverge from those for institutional trust.

First Step of Model Predicting Institutional Trust
The first step of the model is to regress institutional trust on the individual-level variable of interest, winner-loser status, and the control variables. This establishes the base-line effect of being a winner on institutional trust, controlling for gender, age, education, urban residence, poverty, media exposure, political participation, and political interest. The first equation thus is

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\,winner_{ij} + \beta_{2j}\,gender_{ij} + \beta_{3j}\,education_{ij} + \beta_{4j}\,urban_{ij} + \beta_{5j}\,poverty_{ij} \qquad (1)$$
$$+ \beta_{6j}\,media_{ij} + \beta_{7j}\,participation_{ij} + \beta_{8j}\,interest_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where Y_{ij} is institutional trust for an individual i in survey j, and the parameters $\beta_{0j}, \beta_{1j}, \beta_{2j}...\beta_{8j}$ are estimated separately for each survey, using an OLS estimator.[23] β_{0j} and β_{1j} are the main quantity of interest: β_{0j} is the intercept value for each survey j and β_{1j} is the effect of winner-loser status on institutional trust for each survey j.

Before moving on to the second step, we examine the individual-level results to ensure that the model fits the process generating the data as well as to gauge the effect of winner-loser status on institutional trust. Figure 1 plots the OLS estimates for β_1 for each survey. The β_1 estimates indicate the size of the winner effects (which can also be interpreted as the size of the winner-loser gaps) for each country/round for which we have data. The vertical lines show the 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimated winner effects.

Figure 1 reveals several interesting features. First, the estimated winner effect is significantly positive in most countries across three survey rounds even after controlling for other individual-level variables; the 95 percent confidence intervals typically lie above the zero axis.[24] In general, winner-loser status significantly predicts institutional trust. Similar analysis for the other measures of legitimacy indicate that in nearly all

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[22] For further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of one-step or two-step multilevel modeling strategies see Beck (2005); Bowers and Drake (2005); Franzese (2005); Gelman (2005); and Kedar and Shively (2005). For excellent examples of two-step models using survey data, see Duch and Stevenson (2005); and Huber, Kernell, and Leoni (2005).

[23] We use HC3 heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (Efron standard errors).

[24] With controls, the effect is statistically significant for 35 of 44 surveys (80% of our cases) and the effect is positive but not statistically significant in another 7 surveys. It is negative but not significant in the remaining two cases (Mali rounds 2 and 3). When not controlling for alternative factors, winners are more trusting than losers in every survey except Mali (round 2 and 3) and the difference between winners and losers is statistically significant and positive at 95% level of confidence in 37 of the 44 surveys. We also test to make sure that our results in the second step are robust to the exclusion of such outliers, in particular Mali (rounds 2 and 3), but possibly also Malawi (round 1), and Zimbabwe (rounds 2 and 3).

18 countries for which we have data from the surveys fielded between 1999 and 2005, winners are significantly more likely than losers to think that their institutions are accountable, deserving of consent, appropriate, and satisfying – in addition to being trustworthy.

Figure 1 Winner effect on institutional trust.

Notes: The β_{1j} are estimated by OLS with HC3 heteroskedastic consistent standard errors and controlling for gender, education, urban residence, poverty, media exposure, political participation, and interest. Vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal axis reports surveys in rounds 1, 2, and 3 (where data exists) for each country. Solid circles denote elections where incumbents remained in power. Hollow triangles denote partial turnovers of power (change in leader or party coalition, but not both). Hollow squares denote full turnovers of power. The baseline is a 33 year old woman living in a rural area with a primary education and median levels of poverty, media exposure, participation, and interest in politics
Sources: Afrobarometer (afrobarometer.org) and Lindberg (2006a).

Second, Figure 1 shows considerable variation in the size of the winner effects from country to country, and even between rounds within a country. There is a notable association between winner-loser status and legitimacy of state and government institutions in most surveys, but the association ranges from very strong to none.[25] What accounts for this variation in the winner-loser gaps across countries and across time? Does the quality of the election prior to each survey help account for the narrowing in some cases of the winner-loser gap?

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[25] The winner effect is extremely high for the first round survey in Malawi, and the second and third round surveys in Zimbabwe. In contrast, there appears to be only a minimal effect in the first round survey in Botswana, the third round survey in Malawi, the second and third round surveys in Mali, and the second round survey in Senegal.

As a first cut at answering this question, we marked in Figure 1 those surveys that followed partial or full turnovers of power. The β_1 for surveys following full turnovers are marked with squares, and those following partial turnovers of power are marked with triangles. The rest, where incumbents stayed in power, are marked with solid circles. From a visual inspection of Figure 1 there seems to be a negative relationship between turnovers of power and the winner effect. The winner-loser gap in institutional trust tends to be smaller in surveys that were conducted following partial turnovers (triangles) or full turnovers (squares), than when the incumbent retained power (circles). Figure 1 is illustrative of such a relationship, but to obtain quantifiable estimates of the interactive effect of turnovers on the relationship between being a winner and institutional trust, we proceed to the second step. We also examine the effects of peaceful as opposed to violent elections, approval of opposition elites, and the degree of freeness and fairness in the second step.

Second Step of Model Predicting Institutional Trust
In the second step the estimated intercepts and the coefficients of interest (winner-loser status) are each regressed on the four election-level variables to estimate the direct effect and interactive effects of electoral institutions on perceived legitimacy. The estimated dependent variables in the second step are weighted according to their precision from the first step so as to make the most efficient use of available information (Lewis and Linzer, 2005). To adjust for intra-country correlation we estimated the second-step equations using a variance estimator clustered by country.[26] We conducted this analysis for each of the five indicators of institutional legitimacy: institutional trust, accountability, consent to government authority, support for constitution and, satisfaction with system. Again, in the interest of clarity and economy, we describe in greater detail only the model and the results for the measure of institutional trust.

To obtain the direct effect of electoral traits on institutional trust we estimate the equation

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\, \text{turnover}_j + \gamma_{02}\, \text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{03}\, \text{opposition}_j + \gamma_{04}\, \text{free}_j + u_{0j} \qquad (2)$$

where β_{0j} is the estimated intercepts from Eq. (1) for each survey j. The parameter γ_{01} is the direct effect of turnovers of power on institutional trust, γ_{02} is the direct effect of non-violent elections on institutional trust, γ_{03} is the direct effect of opposition approval of the election outcome on institutional trust, and γ_{04} is the direct effect of an election that has been judged free and fair on institutional trust.[27]

The second step also consists of an additional equation in order to obtain the interactive effects of winner-loser status and the election-level variables. In the equation

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}\, \text{turnover}_j + \gamma_{12}\, \text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{13}\, \text{opposition}_j + \gamma_{14}\, \text{free}_j + u_{1j} \qquad (3)$$

β_{1j} are the estimated coefficients on winner-loser status from Eq. (1) for each survey j. The parameter γ_{10} is the intercept (or the effect of winner-loser status on institutional trust when the election-level variables are zero), γ_{11} is the effect of a turnover on the winner effect, γ_{12} is the effect of non-violent elections on the winner effect, γ_{13} is the effect of opposition acceptance of the election outcome on the winner effect, and γ_{04} is the effect of an election that has been judged free and fair on the winner effect.

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[26] Our 44 observations come from only 18 countries and we can not assume that observations from the same country at different times are independent of each other.

[27] The direct effect is the same as the total effect of each electoral trait on perceived legitimacy *only* for the losers (winner=0). For winners (winner=2) or independents (winner=1), the total effect must take into account both the direct effect and the indirect (interactive) effect.

Results: Turnovers and Winner-Loser Convergence

Table 1 reports the estimated parameters and standard errors resulting from the second step Eqs. (2) and (3) respectively. Model B shows that in the equation predicting the winner effect (β_{1j}), the estimated coefficient on turnover (γ_{11}) is negative and statistically significant with more than 95 percent confidence. Substantively, this means that being a winner is a less powerful determinant of institutional trust following a turnover than when an incumbent won the last election. In contrast, peaceful elections, opposition approval, and free and fair contests do not significantly affect the winner-loser gaps. If they affect legitimacy perceptions of citizens at all, then they must do so for winners and losers fairly equally.[28]

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[28] Looking at the results for Model A in Table 1, there do not seem to be any direct effects of election-level variables on institutional trust; none of the estimated parameters in the first column come close to conventional levels of significance. Thus we can not reject the null hypothesis that the quality of elections has no effect on perceived institutional trust among losers. In general, losers who recently experience a peaceful, free and fair election where incumbents were voted out of office, and nonetheless accepted the result, are not significantly more inclined to trust their police, army, courts and electoral commission than citizens who just survived a violent and unfair election where incumbents hung on to power and the opposition rejected the outcome. However, it is arguably quite likely that the lack of significance is due to multicolinearity and the low number of degrees of freedom we have with only 44 cases. When each of these election-level variables is regressed separately on the intercepts, the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant with at least 90 percent confidence (peaceful: coefficient = 0.22, se=0.12, p-value=0.09; opposition: coefficient = 0.18, se=0.09, p-value=0.05; and free: coefficient = 0.20, se=0.09, p-value=0.05). The bivariate estimated coefficient on turnover is still insignificant (coefficient =0.08, se=0.11, p-value=0.45). With respect to institutional trust, therefore, we can not conclusively say whether or not peaceful processes, opposition approval, and free and fair elections increase levels of institutional trust for losers. Somewhat similar patterns emerge with respect to our other four measures of legitimacy, although turnover does have a significant positive estimated effect on the other measures of legitimacy in the multivariate (except for system satisfaction) and in the bivariate models. Overall, we can not say that electoral qualities significantly and consistently boost perceived institutional legitimacy for the losers, although the estimated effects are in the expected direction.

Table 1 Second-stage estimates of electoral influences on institutional trust

		Model A β_{0j} Main Effect		Model B β_{1j} Winner Interaction Effect
Turnover of Power	γ_{01}	.038 (.113) .738	γ_{11}	-.048 (.017) .014
Peaceful Electoral Process	γ_{02}	.100 (.168) .560	γ_{12}	.018 (.038) .640
Opposition Approval	γ_{03}	.111 (.109) .323	γ_{13}	-.027 (.043) .541
Free and Fair Elections	γ_{04}	.039 (.144) .270	γ_{14}	-.009 (.079) .909
Constant	γ_{00}	1.18 (.195) .000	γ_{10}	.199 (.107) .079
R^2		.159		.173
Prob > F		.234		.032
N		44		44

Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients, followed by standard errors in parentheses, and p-values in italics below. The standard errors are adjusted for intra-country correlation. The dependent variable in Model A is the weighted predicted intercept from the first-step individual-level regression models. The dependent variable in Model B is the weighted predicted regression coefficient for winner from the first-step individual-level regression models. The first-step within-survey regression models regress institutional trust against winner, gender, education, urban residence, poverty, media exposure, political participation, and interest for each of the 44 surveys (countries/rounds), thus generating the 44 intercepts and 44 winner coefficients, which are weighted by their precision (Lewis and Linzer, 2005) and used as the dependent variables here. The baseline is a 33 year old woman living in a rural area with a primary education and median levels of poverty, media exposure, participation, and interest in politics.
Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 1, 2 and 3 (afrobarometer.org) and Lindberg (2006a).

The estimated results thus provide support for the hypothesis that a turnover of power has a significant moderating effect on the winner-loser gap in the 18 countries in Africa we have analyzed. The visuals in figure 1 reported above do not mislead. In fact, it seems that they paint a rather accurate picture of what happens with popular perceptions of legitimacy for political institutions after elections with or without turnovers respectively. Losers consistently ascribe institutions with less legitimacy than winners. But after turnovers, when winners become losers and the other way around, the gap between the two groups of citizens narrows significantly to the effect of reducing polarization. In short, turnovers of power narrow the winner-loser gap in institutional trust.

This set of findings is quite robust; turnovers of power significantly moderate winner-loser gaps for all of our five measures of legitimacy of state and government institutions. For all the equations predicting the winner effect (β_{1j}) the estimated coefficients on turnover (γ_{11}) are negative and statistically significant with 95 percent confidence.[29] Regardless of how we measure legitimacy, turnovers seem to be the *only* significant influence on the winner-loser gaps. Peaceful elections, opposition approval, and free and fair contests have no estimated effect on winner-loser gaps in trust, accountability, consent to authority, constitutional support or system satisfaction.[30] Turnovers are unique in their effect of moderating citizens' evaluations of political institutions legitimacy.

To help interpret the estimated substantive effect of turnovers on institutional trust, we combine Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) into a single equation. Starting with Eq. (1) from above and inserting (2) and (3) yields:

$$Y_{ij} = (\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\,\text{turnover}_j + \gamma_{02}\,\text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{03}\,\text{opposition}_j + \gamma_{04}\,\text{free}_j + u_{0j}) \qquad (4)$$
$$+ (\gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}\,\text{turnover}_j + \gamma_{12}\,\text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{13}\,\text{opposition}_j + \gamma_{14}\,\text{free}_j + u_{1j})\,\text{winner}_{ij}$$
$$+ \beta_{2j}\,\text{gender}_{ij} + \beta_{3j}\,\text{education}_{ij} + \beta_{4j}\,\text{urban}_{ij} + \beta_{5j}\,\text{poverty}_{ij} + \beta_{6j}\,\text{media}_{ij}$$
$$+ \beta_{7j}\,\text{participation}_{ij} + \beta_{8j}\,\text{interest}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

$$\mathbf{Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\,\text{turnover}_j} + \gamma_{02}\,\text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{03}\,\text{opposition}_j + \gamma_{04}\,\text{free}_j + \mathbf{\gamma_{10}\,\text{winner}_{ij}} \qquad (5)$$
$$+ \mathbf{\gamma_{11}\,\text{turnover}_j*\,\text{winner}_{ij}} + \gamma_{12}\,\text{peaceful}_j*\,\text{winner}_{ij} + \gamma_{13}\,\text{opposition}_j*\,\text{winner}_{ij}$$
$$+ \gamma_{14}\,\text{free}_j*\text{winner}_{ij} + \beta_{2j}\,\text{gender}_{ij} + \beta_{3j}\,\text{education}_{ij} + \beta_{4j}\,\text{urban}_{ij} + \beta_{5j}\,\text{poverty}_{ij}$$
$$+ \beta_{6j}\,\text{media}_{ij} + \beta_{7j}\,\text{participation}_{ij} + \beta_{8j}\,\text{interest}_{ij} + (u_{0j} + u_{1j}\text{winner}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij})$$

The substantive interpretation of the interaction effect is made less complicated because the intercepts for the control variables in the first step were calculated so that the baseline is a 33 year-old woman living in a rural area with primary school education and median levels of poverty, media exposure, participation, and interest in politics.[31] Suppose that our baseline individual lived a polity with the most violent election (peaceful=0), where the opposition rejected the outcome (opposition=0), and the election was not free and fair (free=0).[32] Following an election in such a polity where the incumbent retained power (turnover$_j$=0),

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[29] In both bivariate and multivariate models for all five measures of legitimacy, turnovers significantly reduced the gap between winners and losers. There is not a single exception to this general result.

[30] In the models predicting the winner effect for all of the five legitimacy measures, there are no exceptions to the general finding that turnovers are the *only* mechanism for reducing winner-loser gaps in either multivariate or bivariate models.

[31] In other words, the variables were rescaled so that they are zero for each of these traits. For example, 33 years old is coded 0, 32 is coded -1, and 34 is coded 1 and so on. This ensures that the intercepts that we examine in the second step represent a plausible and typical individual. Because the first-step intercepts in each survey vary according to the centering of the individual-level variables the second-step results for the regression on the intercepts are not invariant to rescaling (Huber, Kernell, and Leoni, 2005: 379).

[32] We use these extreme examples to simplify the math in our example. Figure 2 presents the predicted values for individuals living in a more realistic electoral environment.

the predicted difference between our baseline individual aligned with the ruling party (winner$_{ij}$=2), and our baseline individual aligned with the losing power (winner$_{ij}$=0) is:

$$[\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(0) + \gamma_{10}(2) + \gamma_{11}(0*2)] - [\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(0) + \gamma_{10}(0) + \gamma_{11}(0*0)] \qquad (6)$$
$$= \gamma_{10}(2)$$
$$= 0.199(2)$$
$$= 0.398$$

However, following a similar election where there was a full alternation of power (turnover$_j$=2), the predicted difference between our baseline individual aligned with the ruling party (winner$_{ij}$=2), and our baseline individual aligned with the losing power (winner$_{ij}$=0) is

$$[\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(2) + \gamma_{10}(2) + \gamma_{11}(2*2)] - [\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(2) + \gamma_{10}(0) + \gamma_{11}(2*0)] \qquad (7)$$
$$= \gamma_{10}(2) + \gamma_{11}(2*2)$$
$$= 0.199(2) - 0.048(2*2)$$
$$= 0.206$$

In short, the estimated difference between winners and losers in this case is nearly double when incumbents stay in power (0.398) than when there is a turnover (0.206). The estimations from this two-step approach provide information on the effects of alternations in power on individual-level perceptions of the legitimacy of political institutions among winners and losers across 18 African nations over three rounds of AB surveys from September 1999 to March 2006.

The predicted values shown in Figure 2 help to further illustrate the substantive effect of turnovers for all five measures of legitimacy.[33] The vertical axes are the predicted levels of perceived legitimacy (institutional trust, accountability, consent to government authority, support for constitution, or satisfaction with system) and the horizontal axes depict the level of turnover, starting on the left with no turnover, then partial turnover, and full turnover on the right. The circles indicate the predicted values for our baseline individual who is aligned with the winning party. The squares represent our baseline individual who is an independent, and the triangles indicate those who feel close to opposition parties. Everything else being equal, turnover elections make individuals affiliated with political groups competing for political power move closer to each other in their appreciation of political institutions' legitimacy. The opposite is also true; when countries hold elections in which one political party or group of parties consistently win, winners and losers diverge in their attitudes about their institutions.

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[33] The predicted effects in Figure 2 are calculated for the median values of peaceful (1), opposition (1), and free (2).

Figure 2 Predicted institutional legitimacy by levels of turnover and winner-loser status

Notes: Predicted values are calculated for a 33 year old woman living in a rural area with a primary education and median levels of poverty, media exposure, participation, and interest in politics, following an election with median values of peaceful (1), opposition (1), and free (2).

Sources: Afrobarometer Rounds 1, 2 and 3 (afrobarometer.org) and Lindberg (2006a).

We want to reiterate that while we have focused most attention on the measure of institutional trust, the basic results hold across all five legitimacy measures. Regardless of which measure of legitimacy we employ: winners are significantly more supportive of their government institutions than losers but power alternations significantly reduce the size of this winner-loser gap while the other electoral qualities (peaceful process, opposition approval, and free and fair elections) do not have a significant moderating effect.

Making Moderation Play
We find that while a series of elections without turnovers tend to polarize citizens, turnovers bring these two groups closer together in an increasing appreciation of state and government institutions. It is important to keep in mind that the group of winners after a turnover are not the same individuals who were winners before (the same is true for the losers); given that a large majority of citizens/voters tend to have stable preferences,[34] when there is a turnover groups of citizens swap places between winners and losers. Used-to-be losers become more positive in their evaluations of the legitimacy of political institutions but they do not quite reach the same inflated level of appreciation of political institutions as the former winners. These new winners are thus less likely than the old winners to ignore or accept undemocratic or illicit government behavior. Those who formerly were winners, rating political institutions quite high on legitimacy, become losers and ascribe to the same institutions less trust and confidence than before. Yet, they do not descend so far down the scale of legitimacy as to reach the former losers' levels of distress. New losers still see institutions as relatively legitimate. When the roles are reversed, moderation comes into play as individuals on opposite sides of the main political divide come closer to each other in evaluation of their political institutions.[35] Such moderation may be even more important in Africa than many other places, since political divides often align with ethnic-linguistic ones making them particularly susceptible to violence (e.g. Green 2006, Posner 2005). The convergence of perceptions between winners and losers indicates a significant reduction in opportunistic evaluation of state and government institutions in terms of sour (and sweet) grapes. In this way, turnovers appear to further institutionalization of legitimacy becoming relatively independent of electoral outcomes and the individual's feeling of being a winner or loser respectively. That is what consolidation of democracy is about.

Robustness Tests
We examined whether our findings are robust to different specifications of the model, standard error corrections, the exclusion of possible outliers, and estimation strategies. We conducted the robustness checks not only for the equations predicting institutional trust, but for all the five measures of institutional legitimacy.

First, we queried whether the interactive effects of turnover and winner-loser status remain significant, and the interactive effect of the alternative qualities remains insignificant, with different specifications of the second step equations. Our main conclusions stay the same when we consider bivariate models in the second step as opposed to the multivariate model described above. Our results also remain the same if we drop all independents from our analysis and only look compare citizens who say they feel close to winning or losing parties. Furthermore we get the same results if we include an additional variable to control for the general level of political and civil rights within a polity in addition to the electoral measures. While the coefficient on Freedom House's measure of freedom[36] is often significant itself, its inclusion in the

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[34] Lindberg and Morrison's voting behavior studies (2005, *n.d.* 2007) measure a large number of individuals' vote choice in more than one election, and find that about 80% of Ghanaian voters have stable preferences.
[35] This moderation effect of turnovers, also tally well with Anderson *et al.*'s (2005: 52-56) findings from Europe. In the short term, alternations are typically followed by a boost in legitimacy among the new winners while the new losers keep some of their previous appreciation.
[36] This variable from Freedom House (2005) is coded 0=not free, 1=partly free, and 2=free.

equation predicting the intercepts and in the equation predicting the coefficient on winner does not alter the estimated effect of the other parameters. The effects we witnessed initially thus were not a spurious result of multicolinearity, the coding of the winner-loser variable, or of higher levels of freedom in countries with turnovers.

We also tested our theory against a fourth alternative model specification. We replaced the winner-loser status variable with two dummy variables, one for winners and one for losers. In the second step we examined the influence of turnover, peacefulness, opposition party acceptance, and free and fairness on: 1) the intercept (where our baseline individual is now an independent), 2) the coefficient on the winner dummy variable, and 3) the coefficient on the loser dummy variable from the first-step equations. We did this for each of the five measures of legitimacy. The equations are:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} \text{ winner dummy}_{ij} + \beta_{2j} \text{ loser dummy} + \beta_{4j} \text{ gender}_{ij} + \beta_{5j} \text{ education}_{ij} + \beta_{6j} \quad (8)$$
$$\text{urban}_{ij} + \beta_{7j} \text{ poverty}_{ij} + \beta_{8j} \text{ media}_{ij} + \beta_{9j} \text{ participation}_{ij} + \beta_{10j} \text{ interest}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{ turnover}_j + \gamma_{02} \text{ peaceful}_j + \gamma_{03} \text{ opposition}_j + \gamma_{04} \text{ free}_j + u_{0j} \quad (9)$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} \text{ turnover}_j + \gamma_{12} \text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{13} \text{ opposition}_j + \gamma_{14} \text{ free}_j + u_{1j} \quad (10)$$

$$B_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} \text{ turnover}_j + \gamma_{22} \text{peaceful}_j + \gamma_{23} \text{ opposition}_j + \gamma_{24} \text{ free}_j + u_{2j} \quad (11)$$

The results are entirely consistent with our argument that turnovers (and only turnovers)[37] help moderate the euphoric views of winners and increase the negative views of losers, thus narrowing the winner-loser gap.[38] Across all five measures of legitimacy, the first stage equations show that winners are significantly more likely, and losers significantly less likely, to view their institutions as legitimate as compared to independents.[39] The second step results reveal that the sign of the coefficients are as expected in every single case for all five measures of legitimacy. The coefficients on turnover predicting the winner dummy effect (γ_{11}) were negative, indicating that turnovers moderated the strong positive relationship between being a winner and perceived legitimacy. The coefficients on turnover predicting the loser dummy effect (γ_{21}) were positive, indicating that turnovers helped losers to perceive their institutions as more positively than they would otherwise. Furthermore, across the five measures of perceived institutional legitimacy, all the coefficients on turnover predicting the dummy effects (γ_{11} and γ_{21}) were statistically significant with only three exceptions.[40] This alternative specification of the model lends additional support for our argument about the mechanisms by which turnovers lead to smaller gaps in perceived legitimacy. We now have evidence that turnovers change the attitudes of winners *and* losers, though in opposite directions.[41]

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[37] The coefficients on peaceful process, opposition acceptance and free contest were not significant with the one exception of the coefficient on opposition acceptance predicting the relationship between the winner dummy and consent to authority was negative and significant with 90% confidence. These alternative electoral qualities do not seem to affect the attitudes of winners, losers, or independents.

[38] The coefficients on turnover predicting the intercept (γ_{01}) were not significant, except for the model predicting consent to authority where the coefficient was positive and significant. These results indicate that, for the most part, turnovers have little effect on the attitudes of independents.

[39] The one exception was that the coefficient on the loser dummy predicting institutional trust was not significant, though still negative as expected.

[40] The three coefficients on turnover that are in the expected direction but not significant are those predicting the relationship between: 1) winner dummy and institutional trust; 2) the winner dummy and accountability; and 3) the loser dummy and accountability.

[41] With respect to the model using winner and loser dummy variables, the results from a one-step hierarchical model (see explanation below) are identical to the two-step estimation strategy with the following exceptions: 1) The loser dummy does have a significant negative estimated effect on institutional trust as expected; 2) The coefficient on the interaction term between the winner dummy and turnover was not significant in the model predicting institutional trust;

Second, we explored whether our results are consistent if we use an alternative standard error correction in the second step. When we use a general correction for heteroskedasticity[42] instead of clustering by country our central findings are confirmed. Turnovers have a strong moderating influence on the winner effect, but none of the other electoral traits has a significant estimated effect regardless of whether we cluster by country or not.

Third, we checked to ensure that particular observations were not exerting undue influence on our results. For each of the measures of legitimacy, we examined a graph of the estimated intercepts by turnover and a graph of the estimated coefficients on winner by turnover to identify possible outliers. These outliers were excluded and the model was re-estimated. Again our results remain the same. Hence, our findings are not the product of individual countries but rather they reflect general trends.

Fourth, we employed two alternative estimation strategies. We used a two-step estimation strategy where the estimated dependent variables in the second step are *not* weighted; the equation is estimated using a simple OLS procedure.[43] Regardless of whether we clustered by country or used a HC3 correction for heteroskedasticity, the OLS strategy produced results that were consistent with the weighted method. Finally, we also re-estimated each model using a random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression estimation strategy that is grouped by survey and clustered by country. Although a two-step procedure is preferable given the dimensions and properties of the data, it is comforting to know that our conclusions are not an artifact of our estimation strategy. For each of our five measures of institutional legitimacy the estimated coefficient on winner is positive and significant, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term of winner and turnover is significant and negative, and the estimated coefficients on the interaction term of winner and the other election-level variables (including turnover) are not significant. In short, our key findings are quite robust.

Conclusions

For the first time in history a majority of the countries in the world have some type of democratic constitution. Some countries are democratic in name only while others have been democratic for decades. A majority, however, remain somewhere in between the extremes. A key question therefore is how such fragile democratic systems can become more robust and thus consolidated. In contrast to authoritarian regimes, which often rely on coercion, democracies require sufficient legitimacy to ensure citizen compliance. For democracies to survive and govern effectively, losers as well as winners must accept the legitimate authority of state and government institutions. Furthermore, winners should not become so euphoric following electoral victories that they forfeit their critical capacities and grant government unconditional allegiance. Winners as well as losers must be willing to monitor their political institutions and hold government accountable. In the standard view of consolidated democracy, losers lose without revolting against or illegally obstructing post-electoral government and incumbents win elections without doing away with the democratic qualities of the state. Divergent citizen views of political legitimacy are especially troubling in transitional polities where political systems are unstable and democracy is not yet consolidated. We present a theory of four plausible causal mechanisms for how elections play a role in consolidation. Our results suggest that only one mechanism is significant: alternations in power via the

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3) the loser dummy does not significantly predict accountability; and 4) the coefficient on the interaction term between the loser dummy and turnover is not significant in the equation predicting accountability

[42] We use HC3 standard errors (Efron standard errors), a heteroskedastic consistent covariance matrix correction that tends to produce more accurate results when the heteroskedasticity is potentially large and of an unknown form and when the number of observations is small. HC3 produces confidence intervals that are typically more conservative than Huber-White standard errors (Lewis and Linzer, 2005: 346)..

[43] Monte Carlo experiments indicate that with estimated dependent variables regression models, OLS estimators (with Huber-White or HC3 heteroscedastic consistent standard errors) are generally reliable, though often inefficient compared to FLGS estimators (Lewis and Linzer, 2005).

ballot box. Shared understandings of state legitimacy are a central feature of democratic consolidation and electoral turnovers can help achieve common views among citizens aligned with opposing parties.

In our interrogation of national- and micro-level data we consistently find a very wide gap in perceived legitimacy of political institutions between winners and losers across the 18 countries and 44 surveys. Citizens who feel close to ruling parties on average put a lot more trust in their institutions; think that government can be held accountable; consent to government authority; support their constitution; and are satisfied with their existing (more or less democratic) political system than citizens who are aligned with the losing side. Yet, these extreme winner-loser gaps in legitimacy are significantly reduced by alternations in power as both sides move towards a shared common middle ground.

Other electoral qualities, such as peacefulness of the process, opposition acceptance of the outcomes, and fairness of the contest do not affect the gaps between winners and losers in Africa. Winners and losers appear to remain polarized in their attitudes about the legitimacy of their institutions regardless of whether elections are violent or peaceful, accepted or rejected by opposition elites, and free or forged. Turnovers alone exhibit the estimated harmonizing effect. This suggests that democracy promotion activities with an eye to consolidation should be more attentive to improving opposition capacity, thus making alternations more possible. It takes time for opposition parties and candidates to develop coalitions, structures, tactics and platforms that will allow them to mount a concerted challenge against incumbent leaders. Intensive monitoring during the heady electoral period may help make elections more peaceful, accepted by opposition elites, and free and fair, but improving the quality of elections will not alone reduce polarization of the citizenry. Some level of electoral quality may be necessary for turnovers to happen, but merely improving the quality of electoral contests will not guarantee opposition success, nor will it bring winners and losers together to a shared and productive view of their government institutions.

How long do the moderating effects of a turnover last and what are the effects of repeated turnovers? We can only speculate about the specific effects of repeated turnovers since none of the AB countries have experienced two turnovers during the surveyed period. We can perhaps say something – even if only tentatively – about the durability of attitudinal changes. The effects of turnovers on winner-loser gaps seem to diminish with time, suggesting that repeated turnovers are needed for consolidating new democracies much along the lines of what Huntington (1991) suggested with his emphasis on two turnovers after the founding election. We re-estimated our analysis above including a measure of turnovers in the second most recent election before each survey. What had been large and consistent effects when we considered turnovers in the most recent elections were insignificant for all of our measures when we considered the second most recent elections.[44] Furthermore, in our sample we also have four countries in which one particular election that resulted in a partial or complete turnover was followed by two rounds of surveys distanced by approximately two years without another intervening election: Cape Verde, Kenya, Mali, and Senegal. In three out of four cases (Cape Verde and Senegal in 2001, and the elections in Kenya in 2002), the later round surveys carried out in 2005 (between 31 and 49 months after the elections) showed a wider winner-loser gap than the earlier round surveys carried out seven to 17 months after the turnover election. This pattern is also reinforced by the only case (Ghana) with an incumbent-won-election followed by round 1 of the surveys, turnover-election followed by round 2, incumbent-won-election followed by round 3. The winner-loser gap in this case displays a U-shaped curve from high to low to high again (though not as high as before the turnover) exactly as predicted by the reasoning above. Although the evidence we have at our disposal is not conclusive, we find it suggestive of a gradually eroding of the moderation effect of turnovers.

In sum, alternations in power seem to bring citizens of emerging democracies closer together in shared perceptions of the legitimacy of political institutions – an important feature for consolidation of democracy

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[44] The results for the second most recent elections control for the characteristics of the most recent elections.

– but repeated alternations seem to be needed to sustain moderation and institutionalize the legitimacy of state and government institutions in the new democratic dispensation. Theories of democratization and consolidation have for long theorized the importance of alternations in power but until recently the small number of cases as well as the lack of data on popular attitudes in transitional regimes have prevented more rigorous testing. Controlling for both individual-level characteristics as well as national level electoral qualities, we have found substantial and consistent empirical support for the claim that turnovers do in fact play a causal role in furthering democratic consolidation. When Lipset (1959) theorized the importance of legitimacy for democratic endurance, he emphasized the role of political competition. Fifty years later we can confirm that competition plays this significant role not only in the *de jure* sense of the term, but also through the *de facto* rotation of the people in power.

Appendix: Measurement of Key Variables

Dependent Variables:

Institutional Trust: Index variable that measures average trust in four political institutions based on the question "How much do you trust the following institutions [to do what is right]: the police, courts of law, the army, the electoral commission?". Each answer is coded "not at all" = 0; "distrust somewhat" = 1; "trust somewhat" = 2; "trust a lot" = 3. The combined scores are divided by four and the institutional trust index thus ranges from 0-3.

Accountability is based on three slightly different questions asked in the various AB Rounds: In Round 1 respondents were asked to choose between two statements "A. No matter who we vote for, things will not get any better in future. or B. We can use our power as voters to choose leaders who will help us improve our lives". In Round 2 respondents were asked: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? If you had to, you would be able to get together with others to make elected representatives listen to your concerns". In Round 3, the question was: "Think about how elections work in practice in this country. How well do elections: Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want?". Answers were coded ranging from 0 to 4.

Consent to Authority: For AB Round 1 this variable is based on one question: "Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers. Just tell me what you think: Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by, whether or not they agree with them?". Replies were coded "strongly disagree"= 0; "disagree" = 1; "neither agree nor disagree" = 2; "agree" = 3; "strongly agree" = 4. For AB Round 2 and 3, three similar questions were asked regarding the police, courts and tax authority, answers coded in the same way as above, summed and divided by three.

Support for Constitution: is based the question: "Please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers. Just tell me what you think: Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the [country] people?" Replies were coded "strongly disagree"= 0; "disagree" = 1; "neither agree nor disagree" = 2; "agree" = 3; "strongly agree" = 4.

Satisfaction with System is based on the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? Replies were coded "not at all satisfied"= 0; "not very satisfied" = 1; "don't know" = 2; "fairly satisfied" = 3; "very satisfied" = 4.

Independent Variables:

Winner-Loser Status: First we coded each party in each country/election as winner if it won the presidency or was part of a coalition whose candidate won (presidential elections) or if the party won a majority of legislative seats or was part of a coalition of parties making up a majority in the legislature. Second, we coded each respondent's party affiliation accordingly, based on the question "Do you feel close to any political party? If yes, which one?" If party choice does not match with the party that won the most recent national election according to the definition above [loser] = 0; if they do not choose a party [independent] = 1; if party choice matches with the party that won the most recent election [winner] = 2.

Turnover: Elections were coded: if there is no turnover = 0; if there is an alternation in power and the new president is an immediate successor to the former president of the same party, or, in legislative elections if there is a partly new coalition forming a majority in parliament = 1; and if there is a new president from a different party, or, there is a new party/coalition of new parties with a legislative majority = 2.

Peaceful Electoral Process. Elections were coded: when there is systematic and / or widespread politically related violence during the campaign, on election day and / or during the post-election period = 0; when

there are non-systematic and isolated incidents of violence, or geographically very limited outbreaks = 1; for cases of peaceful elections = 2.

Opposition Approval. Elections were coded: when none of the main losing parties accept the outcome = 0; when either some or all losing parties reject the results at first but within three months accept it, or, if some losing parties do not accept the results = 1; when all losing parties concede defeat immediately after the results are pronounced = 2.

Free and Fairness of Elections. Elections were coded; when elections were wholly unfair and obviously a charade = 0; when there were numerous irregularities that affected the result = 1; when there were deficiencies but they did not affect the outcome of the election = 2; when elections were free and fair although there might have been fewer number of human errors and logistical restrictions on operations = 3.

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