

AFRO BAROMETER

Afrobarometer Paper No. 30

EIGHT YEARS OF MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN MOZAMBIQUE: THE PUBLIC'S VIEW

By Joao Pereira, Ines Raimundo,
Annie Chikwanha, Alda Saute,
And Robert Mattes

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)
6 Spin Street, Church Square
Cape Town 8001, South Africa
27 21 461 2559 • fax: 27 21 461 2589
Mattes (bob@idasact.org.za)

Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana)
14 West Airport Residential Area
P.O. Box 404, Legon-Accra, Ghana
233 21 776 142 • fax: 233 21 763 028
Gyimah-Boadi (cdd@ghana.com)

Michigan State University (MSU)
Department of Political Science
East Lansing, Michigan 48824
517 353 3377 • fax: 517 432 1091
Bratton (mbratton@msu.edu)

afrobarometer.org

AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 30

**EIGHT YEARS OF MULTIPARTY
DEMOCRACY IN
MOZAMBIQUE: THE PUBLIC'S
VIEW**

by Joao Pereira, Ines Raimundo,
Annie Chikwanha, Alda Saute
and Robert Mattes

August 2003

Joao C.G. Pereira is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies, University of Eduardo Mondlane, and Researcher, Public Opinion Service of the Centre for Population Studies, Mozambique.

Ines M. Raimundo is a Lecturer in the Department of Geography, University of Eduardo Mondlane, and Researcher, Public Opinion Service of the Centre for Population Studies, Mozambique.

Annie B. Chikwanha is a Researcher with the Public Opinion Service, Institute for Democracy (Idasa), South Africa.

Alda Saute is a Lecturer in the Department of History, Pedagogic University, and Researcher, Public Opinion Service of the Centre for Population Studies, Mozambique.

Robert Mattes is Associate Professor in the Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town, and Co-Director of the Afrobarometer, Idasa, Cape Town

We gratefully acknowledge the support for this survey project provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).

AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

Editors: Michael Bratton, E. Gyimah-Boadi, and Robert Mattes

Managing Editor: Carolyn Logan

The Afrobarometer Series, launched in October 1999, reports the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets, civil society and other aspects of development. The Afrobarometer is a collaborative enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana). Afrobarometer papers are simultaneously co-published by these partner institutions.

Electronic copies of Working Papers can be downloaded in Adobe Acrobat format from www.afrobarometer.org.

Printed copies of Working Papers are available for \$15.00 each plus applicable tax, shipping and handling charges.

Orders may be directed to:

IDASA POS
6 Spin Street, Church Square
Cape Town 8001 SOUTH AFRICA
(phone: 27 21 461 5229, fax: 27 21 461 2589, e-mail: tanya@idasact.org.za)

An invoice will be sent.

Publications List

AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

- No.1 Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?” 1999.
- No.2 Bratton, Michael, Peter Lewis and E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Ghana,” 1999.
- No.3 Lewis, Peter M. and Michael Bratton, “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria,” 2000.
- No.4 Bratton, Michael, Gina Lambright, and Robert Sentamu, “Democracy and Economy in Uganda: A Public Opinion Perspective,” 2000.
- No.5 Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes, “Democratic and Market Reforms in Africa: What ‘the People’ Say,” 2000.
- No.6 Bratton, Michael and Gina Lambright, “Uganda’s Referendum 2000: The Silent Boycott,” 2001.
- No.7 Mattes, Robert, Yul Derek Davids, Cherrel Africa and Michael Bratton, “Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa,” July 2000.
- No.8 Mattes, Robert, Yul Derek Davids and Cherrel Africa, “Views of Democracy in South Africa and the Region: Trends and Comparisons,” October 2000.
- No. 9 Bratton, Michael, Massa Coulibaly and Fabiana Machado, “Popular Perceptions of Good Governance in Mali,” March 2000.
- No.10 Bratton, Michael and Robert Mattes, “Popular Economic Values and Economic Reform in Southern Africa,” 2001.
- No. 11 The Afrobarometer Network. “Afrobarometer Round I: Compendium of Comparative Data from a Twelve-Nation Survey.” 2002.
- No.12 Chikwanha-Dzenga, Annie Barbara, Eldred Masunungure, and Nyasha Madingira, “Democracy and National Governance in Zimbabwe: A Country Survey Report.” 2001.
- No.13 Gay, John and Thuso Green. “Citizen Perceptions of Democracy, Governance, and Political Crisis in Lesotho.” 2001.
- No.14 Lekorwe, Mogopodi, Mpho Molomo, Wilford Molefe, and Kabelo Moseki. “Public Attitudes Toward Democracy, Governance, and Economic Development in Botswana.” 2001.
- No.15 Keulder, Christiaan. “Public Opinion and Consolidation of Democracy in Namibia.” 2002.

- No.16 Tsoka, Maxton Grant. "Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Malawi." 2002.
- No.17 Simutanyi, Neo. "Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Zambia: Public Attitudes to Democracy and the Economy." 2002.
- No.18 Chaligha, Amon, Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton, and Yul Derek Davids. "Uncritical Citizens and Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' Views of Political and Economic Reform." 2002.
- No.19 Bratton, Michael. "Wide but Shallow: Popular Support for Democracy in Africa." 2002.
- No.20 Lewis, Peter, Etannibi Alemika, and Michael Bratton. "Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Towards Democracy and Markets in Nigeria." 2002.
- No.21 Whiteside, Alan, Robert Mattes, Samantha Willan, and Ryann Manning. "Examining HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa Through the Eyes of Ordinary Southern Africans." 2002.
- No.22 Pereira, Joao C. G., Yul Derek Davids, and Robert Mattes. "Mozambicans' Views of Democracy and Political Reform: A Comparative Perspective." 2003.
- No.23 Mattes, Robert, Michael Bratton, and Yul Derek Davids. "Poverty, Survival, and Democracy in Southern Africa." 2003.
- No.24 Mattes, Robert, Christiaan Keulder, Annie B. Chikwana, Cherrel Africa, and Yul Derek Davids. "Democratic Governance in South Africa: The People's View." 2003.
- No.25 Ames, Barry, Lucio Renno, and Francisco Rodrigues. "Democracy, Market Reform, and Social Peace in Cape Verde." 2003.
- No.26 Norris, Pippa, and Robert Mattes. "Does ethnicity determine support for the governing party?" 2003.
- No.27 Logan, Carolyn J., Nansozi Muwanga, Robert Sentamu, and Michael Bratton. "Insiders and Outsiders: Varying Perceptions of Democracy and Governance in Uganda." 2003.
- No.28 Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Kwabena Amoah Awuah Mensah. "The Growth of Democracy in Ghana. Despite Economic Dissatisfaction: A Power Alternation Bonus?" 2003.
- No.29 Gay, John. "Development as Freedom: A Virtuous Circle?" 2003.
- No.30 Pereira, Joao, Ines Raimundo, Annie Chikwanha, Alda Saute, and Robert Mattes. "Eight Years of Multiparty Democracy in Mozambique: The Public's View." 2003.

Executive Summary

Since its emergence from a brutal, 17-year civil war, Mozambique's process of political reform has faced a number of challenges. The first has been to *empower ordinary Mozambicans* by allowing them to participate in a democratic system and enabling them to voice their demands to the state and hold it accountable. The second has been to rebuild a *state with the capacity to respond to citizen demands effectively*. And given the long history of violent division, a third challenge has been to build a state that enjoys *broad legitimacy* – a legitimacy that spans the bitter partisan divides of the past, enabling the formation of a strong, authoritative state with the ability to enforce the rule of law, but also the discipline to rule through transparent procedures.

Perhaps the best evidence by which to judge the success of the process of political reform are the opinions of ordinary Mozambicans. Rather than looking to expert judgments or to measures of formal constitutional rights, we believe that the views of ordinary citizens – as the ultimate consumers of what democratic governments supply – can offer perhaps the most conclusive assessment of the quality of governance. What do *they* say?

Through its partner in Mozambique, the Public Opinion Service of the Centre for Population Studies at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, the Afrobarometer surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1425 Mozambicans citizens, aged 18 years and older, using a multi-stage, area-stratified, clustered sample designed by the National Institute for Statistics. The survey was carried out between August and October 2002 in all 10 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique. At a confidence level of 95 percent, a sample of this size allows a confidence interval, or margin of error, of plus or minus 2.5 percent. This means that, had we interviewed every Mozambican, 19 times out of 20 the results would differ from those of this survey by no more than 2.5 percent.

The evidence from this survey suggests that although Mozambique is plagued by what appear to be insurmountable problems, in general the country appears to be on the right path as an *emerging democracy*. While the society faces vast challenges of building human and social capital to empower citizens further and increase the capacity of the state, the democratization that has occurred since Mozambique opened its political space has gone a long way in propelling democracy forward.

Key Results

Empowered Citizens?

- Mozambicans' evaluations of the extent of their democracy are on the increase. Two-thirds now say that their country is either a "democracy with minor problems" (38 percent) or a "full democracy" (29 percent). This is a significant increase since 2001, when just one-third said the country was acceptably democratic. The country's ability to find a sustained procedural resolution to the crisis following the disputed 1999 election may be a major factor in these trends.
- Yet Mozambicans recognize that a lot of content still needs to be added to the democratic shell. Just over half (53 percent) say they are "satisfied with the way democracy works" in their country.
- While Mozambicans have broad access to political information from radio (79 percent), just one-quarter receives news from television (26 percent) or newspapers (24 percent) at least occasionally. Mozambicans lag behind other Africans (as measured by Afrobarometer surveys in over a dozen other countries) in terms of access to TV and print media. Rural people face huge obstacles in trying to get information from these sources.

- At the same time, most Mozambicans are interested in public affairs (72 percent) and discuss politics with friends and neighbours (62 percent).
- While only a plurality (43 percent) say that people can speak their minds about politics without concern, widespread majorities think that the environment of political rights has improved since the end of the one-party regime: 80 percent say there is more freedom of speech, 77 percent say there is greater freedom of association, and 77 percent say there is greater ability to vote without pressure. Smaller majorities feel freer from arbitrary arrest (53 percent) and more able to influence government (53 percent) than they did under the old regime.
- While most people feel they could organize with others to make their leaders listen to them (59 percent), Mozambicans are significantly less confident than other Africans in their abilities as individual political actors: just 18 percent feel they have good understanding of politics, and 27 percent feel they are able to influence other people politically.
- Mozambicans lag far behind other Africans in terms of joining local development oriented groups (8 percent) or professional or business groups (8 percent).
- Mozambicans are far more likely than other Africans to have attended a local community meeting (68 percent) in the past year, and about as likely to join with others to raise issues (35 percent) or attend marches or demonstrations (11 percent).
- Just one-quarter of people think their elected representatives are concerned with looking after their interests (24 percent), or listening to their opinions (26 percent).

An Effective State?

- Unemployment and job creation are cited by 63 percent of the public as one of the three most important problems facing the country that the government ought to address. Health and health care (39 percent), education (29 percent), poverty (26 percent) and AIDS (16 percent) round out the top five problems on the public's agenda.
- Almost six in ten (58 percent) of Mozambicans believe that their government has the capacity to solve all or most of their national problems.
- Mozambicans discriminate among their levels of satisfaction with government performance across a range of discrete policy areas. They offer positive assessments of government performance over the past year in the areas of education (66 percent), improving health services (58 percent) and resolving conflict (52 percent). Forty-five percent are satisfied with government efforts to combat AIDS.
- People are far more critical of government performance on economic matters. Less than one-quarter approve of government attempts to create jobs (23 percent), control prices (22 percent) or reduce inequality (20 percent).
- However, when it comes to an overall assessment, people are quite positive about their political leaders. Four in five approve of the performance of President Chissano (80 percent), 74 percent approve of their Provincial Governor, and 62 percent approve of the performance of the National Assembly. However, only 51 percent approve of the performance of the country's new local authorities.

- While people report that it is relatively easy to get a voter registration card (80 percent) or a place in school for their children (58 percent), Mozambicans encounter serious problems obtaining identity documents (just 42 percent say this is easy), help from the police (32 percent), or household services (15 percent). Of utmost concern is the high percentage that would not even bother to seek assistance from the police if they were the victims of a crime (28 percent).

A Legitimate State?

- The majority of Mozambicans are not particularly happy with their constitution. Less than half of the citizens (49 percent) agree that the Constitution expresses their values and aspirations.
- Trust in the President (75 percent), the ruling party (61 percent), the National Assembly (57 percent), and state broadcaster (57 percent) is relatively high. However, only around half the public trusts institutions of law enforcement such as the army (52 percent), police (51 percent), and provincial courts (51 percent). Opposition parties are the least trusted institution (22 percent).
- A matter of particular concern is the rather low level of trust in the National Electoral Commission (NEC) by the public (51 percent) in the face of the upcoming 2003 municipal elections and the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections.
- On the other hand, traditional leaders still command a surprisingly high level of trust among both rural (63 percent) and urban (49 percent) respondents. Could this be an indicator that they need space in governance structures?
- Three-quarters agree that the courts (75 percent) and police (76 percent) have the right to make people obey the law. By wide margins they also believe they would be caught and prosecuted if they committed a serious crime (85 percent) or failed to pay a tax they owed (78 percent). However, just two-thirds (66 percent) feel they would be caught if they obtained municipal services without paying user fees.
- The police and border officials lead the pack as the nation's most corrupt institutions, with about one-third of citizens (33 and 34 percent, respectively) saying that most or all of them are involved in corrupt practices. The presidency (13 percent) and other elected leaders (17 percent) are thought to be more honest.
- Overall, less than one-third (30 percent) find the current government more trustworthy than it was under the one-party regime, and only slightly more (35 percent) find the current government more effective in delivering services than the previous regime. Just one in five (21 percent) feel it is less corrupt. However, almost half (48 percent) say it is better able to enforce the law. This stands in contrast to the fact that people overwhelmingly say they have greater freedom under the new democratic regime to say what they think (80 percent) and to join any organization they choose (77 percent).
- In general, public opinion in Mozambique varies across regions, but in ways that were not anticipated based on the known regional inequalities. In particular, while recent growth and development has been concentrated around Maputo in the southern region, citizens in the South nonetheless express less satisfaction with changes since 1994 than respondents in the country's Central and Northern regions.

INTRODUCTION

Since its emergence from a brutal, 17-year civil war, Mozambique's process of political reform has faced a number of challenges. The first has been to *empower ordinary Mozambicans* by allowing them to participate in a democratic system and enable them to voice their demands to the state and hold it accountable. The second has been to rebuild a *state with the capacity to respond to citizen demands effectively*. And given the long history of violent division, a third challenge has been to build a state that enjoys *broad legitimacy* – a legitimacy that spans the bitter partisan divides of the past, enabling the formation of a strong, authoritative state with the ability to enforce the rule of law, but also the discipline to rule through transparent procedures.

To what extent has Mozambique's political reform process succeeded? On the face of it, the country has made marked progress. Since the end of the civil war, Mozambique has opened up political space to the wider public, with the potential to empower a previously stifled citizenry. During Frelimo's 19 years of one-party rule (as well as the previous decades of Portuguese colonial rule) ordinary citizens were denied the opportunity to engage with the state or acquire any information from alternative, non-socialist-oriented sources; citizens were forced into a political straightjacket. The 1990 Constitution marked a radical departure, ending the one-party state and granting citizens fundamental freedoms and political rights, especially freedom of speech and association. The country's first democratic elections in 1994 heralded a new era of multiparty politics: former combatants became political opponents, with Frelimo maintaining its position as the ruling party, and the former rebel movement, Renamo, becoming the official opposition. Reforms took a further step forward in 1996 with elections for local authorities for which both political parties and civic associations could offer candidates. In 1999, the country held its second, peaceful national election.

At the same time, however, the state remains highly centralized, with most political power concentrated in the executive rather than the legislature. In addition, while there is democratic local government, the absence of elected provincial government in such a large country helps to concentrate power in the national government where ordinary citizens have least access (Weinstein, 2000).

In terms of an effective state, Mozambique has taken significant strides towards sustained development. It is true that 27 years after independence from Portugal, Mozambique remains one of the poorest nations in the world. With a rural population of over 80 percent, illiteracy stands at approximately 65 percent. Yet since 1990, Mozambique has recorded some of the highest levels of annual economic growth in Africa, averaging 6 to 10 percent per annum. The government has rebuilt transport corridors linking the country to key trading partners, leading to burgeoning international investment both in transport facilities and processing industries. There has also been a steady increase in the number of small businesses, most notably in the service sector.

However, this growth has not been widely distributed, but has instead been concentrated mainly in Maputo, the mineral rich enclaves, and the export sector. In fact, inequalities not only persist, they may have gotten worse. A clear example is the stark difference between Zambezia and Maputo provinces. In recent years, GDP per capita in Maputo rose from US\$168 to \$171, while it fell from US\$95 to \$78 in Zambezia. Maputo City – which is treated as a separate province – has a per capita GDP six times the national average, and 12 times that of Zambezia. The high national rate of manufacturing growth recorded in 2001 (10.3 percent) was mainly due to the fact that Maputo's Mozambique Aluminium Smelting (MOZAL) had begun to operate at maximum capacity

(Mozambiquefile 2002:9). Largely due to these trends, the Human Development Index¹ of the southern region stands at 0.439 compare to 0.258 for the Central and 0.233 in the northern.² Prospects for sustained recovery remain low despite overall growth: the country faces a huge trade deficit, endemic corruption and environmental degradation (Woods, 1999: 164). The importance of Mozambique's ability to sustain growth and spread it more evenly is underscored by Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi: "Poverty must be reduced as quickly as possible in order to consolidate democracy and economic development. Without tackling poverty, our democratic consolidation will remain fragile" (Mozambiquefile 2002:11).

While the Mozambican state has attempted to develop and broaden its legitimacy through democratization and effective governance, the results are by no means clear, especially if the profile of the governing party's electoral support base is anything to go by. While in comparison to most other African democracies the country is characterized by an exceptionally high degree of competitive electoral politics on the national level, with Renamo and Frelimo contesting some of the closest elections in Southern Africa, much of the country remains a virtual one-party fiefdom, with Frelimo dominating in the South, but Renamo equally dominating the Northern and Central regions. Moreover, Renamo refused to accept the results of the closely contested 1999 elections. While it was encouraging that they took the case to court rather than resorting to armed resistance, political tensions resulted in bloody strikes and the deaths of many opposition supporters.

But perhaps the best evidence by which to judge the success of the process of political reform are the opinions of ordinary Mozambicans. Rather than looking to expert judgments or to measures of formal constitutional rights, we believe that the views of ordinary citizens – as the ultimate consumers of what democratic governments supply – can offer perhaps the most conclusive assessment of the quality of governance. What do *they* say? Do they feel empowered to place demands on the state and hold it accountable? Do they think the state has the capacity to govern efficiently and effectively? Do they see the state as the legitimate source of authority and feel compelled to obey the law? Do they feel that government governs transparently?

Given recent developments in African international relations, answers to such questions are not only important to an evaluation of Mozambique, but also to the success of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). NEPAD has committed participating countries to free and fair elections, respect for human rights, an accountable executive and legislature, and a commitment to the rule of law. Ultimately, it will be ordinary African citizens who will be the best judges of whether these goals are actually achieved.

Methodology

Public opinion is commonly measured by sample surveys. If scientifically designed and administered in a culturally sensitive manner, sample surveys are a powerful tool for revealing, among other things, public evaluations of the quality of government. The survey on which this report is based was carried out between August and October 2002 in all 10 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique. Through its partner in Mozambique, the Public Opinion Service of the Centre for Population Studies at the

¹The Human Development Index (HDI) is based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two thirds weight) and the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ration (one third weight); and standard of living, as measured by real per capita GDP (PPS). The HDI is derived by dividing the sum of these 3 indices by 3: it has a maximum value of 1. See Mozambique National Human Development Report 2000, p. 96.

²For purposes of analysis, the provinces were grouped into 3 regions as follows: Northern region - Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula; Central region - Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala; Southern region - Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo Province and Maputo city.

University of Eduardo Mondlane, the Afrobarometer surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1425 Mozambicans citizens, aged 18 years and older, using a multi-stage, area-stratified, clustered sample designed by the National Institute for Statistics.

At a confidence level of 95 percent, a sample of this size allows a confidence interval, or margin of error, of plus or minus 2.5 percent. This means that, had we interviewed every Mozambican, 19 times out of 20 the results would differ from those of this survey by no more than 2.5 percent.

Interviews were conducted in 115 sites (or Enumerator Areas) distributed across all three regions (North, South and Central), all provinces, and across rural and urban areas within each province (see Table 1 and Appendix A). An average of 12 interviews per site were conducted. In order to make sure that women's voices were fully reflected, every second interview had to be with a female respondent. An equal number of interviews were conducted in each of the ten provinces, plus Maputo city. Then, based on the 1997 census, all the interviews were weighted to reflect the population size of each province, including relative rural and urban proportions. Maputo City was treated as a separate province.

Table 1: Profile of Sample (Weighted Data)

Sample size	1400		%
Gender	%	Home Language	
Male	50	Portuguese	4
Female	50	Emakhuwa	20
Median Age	35yr	Cisena	10
Location		Cindau	8
Rural	54	Xichangana	18
Urban	46	Cicopi	5
Provinces		Gitonga	6
Niassa	8	Citshwa	8
Cabo Delgado	7	Chitewe	4
Nampula	7	13 others below 2.8 percent each	16
Zambezia	4	Income	
Tete	5	Less than 900 contos/month	78
Manica	20	Up to 1000 contos	10
Sofala	9	1001 – 2000 contos	7
Inhambane	19	2001 – 4000 contos	3
Gaza	7	4001 – 6000 contos	1
Maputo (province)	7	Over 6000 contos	<1
Maputo (city)	8	Religion	
Education		None	15
No formal schooling	33	Islam	16
Informal schooling only	12	Catholic	31
Primary school (some or complete)	37	Protestant (mainstream)	10
Secondary school (some or complete)	15	Protestant (evangelical)	18
Post-Secondary education	2	African Independent	6
		Traditional religion	3
		Agnostic	<1
		Atheist	<1
		Others	1

Interviews were conducted in Portuguese (the official language) and in four other national languages (Changane, Sena, Ndaou and Macua). The research instrument was a questionnaire containing structured and semi-structured items administered face-to-face to respondents by teams of trained interviewers. To adapt the questionnaire to local conditions, all items were pre-tested in trial interviews in urban and rural areas. The original Portuguese version was translated into all relevant home languages and all interviews were administered in the language of the respondent's choice.

Potential Obstacles

Several potential obstacles presented themselves to Afrobarometer interviewers during the course of this survey. First of all, we found that Mozambicans still need to get used to the notion that fieldworkers and researchers can represent independent organizations and universities. Even though we went to great lengths to tell people in the sampled households that we represented the Afrobarometer and Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) only, 56 percent of respondents still told us – when asked at the end of the interview – that they thought that we had been sent by “the government,” another 3 percent said “Frelimo,” and 1 percent said “the President.” Only 5 percent said “UEM.” At the same time, we should note that there is no evidence that this perception affected the responses. To check this, we looked at responses to three politically sensitive questions: 1) What parties did they support?; 2) Did they approve of the performance of the President?; and 3) Did they approve of the performance of the National Assembly? We find that those respondents who thought we were from official sources (government, Frelimo, the President) were no more likely to tell us they supported Frelimo, or to tell us that they approved of the performance of the President or the National Assembly, than were respondents who thought we were sent by independent sources.

Second, continuous natural disasters and poverty have made rural citizens suspicious of researchers' motives. In a few instances, respondents refused to be interviewed, arguing that “since they became a target group of many researchers, their situation has never improved and they were exhausted with questioning.” Interviewers also observed that many local people assumed that the households in which we interviewed were selected to provide them with things like furniture, food or blankets. There was also a view that the respondents selected for interviews were relatives or contacts of the local authorities. This situation caused some jealousies, especially in rural communities. Each time, interviewers took time to explain to people the purpose of the project and that no would received any material benefit from participating. Finally, in some rural areas where traditional influences are still strong, the absence of male heads of households denied some women the chance to participate in interviews since they could not obtain their husband's permission.

EMPOWERED CITIZENS?

An empowered citizenry is one in which people have access to basic information on public affairs and feel able to exercise their rights and take part in the political process. Moreover, it is one in which people actually do take part, collectively or individually. In this section, we ask how aware Mozambicans are of national affairs. Are they able to speak their minds and associate freely? Do they feel able to participate and influence affairs? Do they, in fact, join community organizations or join with others to raise political issues? Do they contact elected leaders? And finally, do they think elected officials are willing to listen to them? Do they believe that the system is, in fact, democratic?

Political Awareness

A vital basis of an empowered democratic citizenry is information. Better-informed citizens are more able to make decisions based on a careful evaluation of available choices. Informed citizens are more likely to be interested and take part in politics. All people are able to evaluate the government

through the lenses of their immediate circumstances (e.g., personal, household and community circumstances), but exposure to news media provides people with critical information they can use to put their own circumstances into a national context, comparing their immediate circumstances with what is happening elsewhere.

While the demise of the one-party state in the early 1990s has expanded access to new sources of knowledge and information, survey responses indicate that access to such media, especially privately owned print media, remains low and very uneven. As is likely to have been the case for many years, Mozambicans' main source of news and information is the radio: eight in ten (79 percent) say they get their news from radio at least "a few times a month" (see Figure 2). This figure is far higher than for newspapers (24 percent) or television (26 percent). Two-thirds of the population (66 percent) "never" get news from television or newspapers. Given the degree of state dominance of the electronic media, this means that the government and ruling party have a clear advantage when it comes to campaigning and lobbying for policies.

There is also a tremendous divide between urban and rural areas. While one-half of citizens in urban areas get some of their news from television (51 percent), only 5 percent of rural citizens do so, a difference that can be attributed to the lack of electricity and disposable cash income to buy television sets in rural areas. Forty-four percent of urban residents read newspapers at least occasionally, compared to only 6 percent of rural people. Part of this vast discrepancy can be explained by the difficulties in circulating newspapers outside of cities, but another part of the explanation must lie in the fact that no local newspapers are published in an indigenous languages, which makes the ability to read Portuguese – and hence formal schooling – a prerequisite for access to this source. Yet we know that almost one-half of our sample (45 percent) has no formal education, and just 17 percent have at least some secondary schooling. While there are no significant gender differences in television use, men are more likely than women to get news from radio (86 versus 71 percent) and newspapers (29 versus 18 percent).

Regardless of these low levels of access to formal news media, a high portion of Mozambicans (72 percent) claim to be "somewhat" or "very interested" in public affairs. Even so, just 39 percent say that they talk about politics with family, friends and neighbours at least occasionally, and just one in five (22 percent) does so with some regularity. Both political interest and discussion are higher in urban areas, in the central provinces, and among men.

Table 2: Indicators of Political Awareness

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Central	South	Women	Men
News from radio*	79	72	88	77	84	77	71	86
News from TV*	26	5	51	15	21	36	25	28
News from Newspapers*	24	6	44	17	22	28	18	29
Interested in Politics**	72	68	77	62	75	75	65	78
Discuss politics with others***	39	35	42	31	48	35	31	46

*How often do you get news from the following sources? (% few times a month /few times a week /every day)

**How interested are you in public affairs? (% somewhat interested /very interested)

***Please tell me whether you, personally, have discussed politics with friends and neighbours during the past year? (% once or twice/several times/often)

In comparison to results from Round 1 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 12 countries between 1999 and 2001,³ Mozambicans' access to news from the radio is about the same as the 12-country mean (82 percent); Mozambicans have significantly greater levels of access than Basotho (66 percent) and Ghanaians (69 percent). However, in terms of television and newspaper use, Mozambicans are relatively information poor: television access lags well behind the 12-country average (37 percent), and is comparable to a country like Tanzania (24 percent), though well ahead of countries such as Malawi (10 percent), Uganda (15 percent), and Lesotho (16 percent). Newspaper use is also well below the Afrobarometer average (37 percent) and is on par with Nigeria (31 percent), ahead only of Lesotho (18 percent) and Mali (7 percent).

However, when it comes to political interest, Mozambique (72 percent) is very comparable with other Afrobarometer countries, where the average level of interest is 70 percent. Interest in politics is significantly higher than in Botswana (59 percent) and Mali (33 percent). And in terms of the frequency of political discussion, the Afrobarometer 12-country average (61 percent) is just slightly higher than the figure for Mozambique. Mozambique falls between the extremes of Uganda (82 percent) and Tanzania (75 percent) at the high end, and Lesotho (40 percent) and Mali (43 percent) on the low side.

Enabling Environment

An empowered citizenry depends on an enabling environment characterized by a matrix of political and civil rights that allow people to do the things necessary to join with others and voice their preferences. As noted earlier, the 1990 Constitution marked a radical departure from the past for Mozambique, granting a range of rights to ordinary people. Yet if not put into practice, these rights may become mere "paper rights." Do ordinary Mozambicans feel that these rights and liberties are being put into practice?

Because of its central importance to political expression and participation, the Afrobarometer asks people about the state of free speech in their country by enquiring: "In this country, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?" Apparently, Mozambicans do not feel that freedom of speech has been completely realized; just 43 percent say people "never" or "rarely" have to be careful (Table 3). Perceived freedom of speech is significantly higher in the central provinces (58 percent), and significantly lower in the southern region (33 percent).

Table 3: Extent of Freedom of Speech

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
Can speak freely	43	43	42	40	58	33	43	41

In this country, how often do people have to be careful of what they say about politics? (% never/rarely)

At the same time, Mozambicans feel that freedom of speech and a range of other freedoms and rights are far better now than they were under the one-party regime. In a standard set of Afrobarometer questions designed to gauge Africans' sense of political progress under multiparty democracy, we see that Mozambicans perceive significant gains in a range of civil and political freedoms (Table 4). Four

³Round 1 surveys were conducted in Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Although it was not "official" Afrobarometer survey, a 2001 survey in Mozambique asked approximately 20 questions from the Round 1 survey instrument, enabling some comparisons with the 12 Afrobarometer countries. To see overall responses to a wide range of Round 1 results, see *Afrobarometer Round I: Compendium of Comparative Data From A Twelve Nation Survey*, Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 11 (Cape Town / Accra / East Lansing: Afrobarometer, 2002). For the comparable Mozambique results, see Joao Perreira, Yul Derek Davids and Robert Mattes, *Mozambicans' Views of Democracy and Political Reform: A Comparative Perspective*, Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 22 (Cape Town / Accra / East Lansing: Afrobarometer, 2003). Papers are available at www.afrobarometer.org.

in five (80 percent) say that people are better able to speak their minds under the multiparty regime, 77 percent see improvements in freedom of association and voting freedom, and smaller majorities see gains in freedom from arbitrary arrest and in people’s ability to influence government. Respondents in the central provinces are consistently more likely to see progress in their rights and liberties than other respondents.

Table 4: Improvements in Political and Civil Rights

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
Freedom to say what you think	80	79	80	72	86	78	78	82
Freedom to join any political organization you want	77	76	79	68	84	77	77	78
Freedom from being arrested when you are innocent	53	50	57	52	67	51	52	54
Freedom to choose who to vote for without pressure	77	76	79	73	84	74	75	79
Ability of ordinary people to influence government	53	48	58	46	66	45	51	54

We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of one-party rule. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same? (% better/much better)

Citizen Efficacy

Consistent with these perceived increases in political freedoms, a significant number of Mozambicans say they are confident about their ability to participate in and make a difference in the policy-making process. Six in ten (59 percent) feel that, if they had to, they would be able to “get together with others to make elected representatives listen to your concerns.” However, it is important to note that while people are optimistic about the possibilities of collective action, they do not necessarily see themselves as efficacious individual political actors. More people agree (39 percent) with the statement that “As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbours do not listen” to them than disagree (27 percent). Similarly, by a three-to-one margin respondents are more likely to agree (53 percent) that politics “sometimes seems so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going on” than to disagree (18 percent). These various reflections of political efficacy differ by region, location and gender in only minor ways.

Mozambicans appear less confident than other Africans surveyed: an average of 28 percent across 12 countries disagreed with the statement that politics is too complicated, ranging from highs of 47 percent in Uganda and 46 percent in Tanzania, to lows in South Africa (12 percent), Lesotho (15 percent) and Zambia (18 percent). The other two measures of efficacy were not asked in Round 1 surveys.

Table 5: Political Efficacy

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
If you had to, you would be able to get together with others to make elected representative listen to your concerns (% agree).	59	53	64	65	62	52	56	61
Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on. (% disagree)	18	18	18	20	19	16	17	19
As far as politics are concerned, friends and neighbours do not listen to you (% disagree)	27	26	28	28	28	25	22	31

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Associational Life

An empowered citizenry is one that rests on a vibrant web of social networks and associations, or what social scientists have come to call “social capital.” The existence of such groups is an essential element of the democratisation process, creating not only private goods for those who belong to them, but also public goods for the entire society by developing organizational and advocacy skills, creating a forum to discuss public affairs, and acting as watchdogs over elected officials.

Yet Mozambicans do not yet appear to have taken advantage of the freedom of association to create or join civic associations in large numbers. With the exception of membership in religious groups, organisational affiliation in civil society groups is relatively low in Mozambique. While it is true that two-thirds (66 percent) are active or inactive members of a religious organization, less than one in five (17 percent) belong to a trade union or farmers’ group, and less than one in ten belong to a professional or business association or a local development association (8 percent each).

Table 6: Associational Affiliations – National Results

	Official Leader	Active member	Inactive member	Non-member
Religious group	4	37	25	33
Trade union / farmers association	1	7	9	75
Professional/business association	1	4	3	83
Development association	2	3	3	80

Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are: an active member, official leader, inactive member, or not a member?

While there are few major differences between urban-based citizens and rural folk, rural people are twice as likely to belong to an agricultural group (22 percent) as urbanites are to a trade union (11 percent). While religious group affiliation is lowest in the Northern provinces, affiliation in all other groups is highest in that region.

Table 7: Associational Affiliations by Demographic Group

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
Religious group	66	68	64	59	71	66	65	68
Trade Union / Farm Associations	17	22	11	22	18	14	17	17
Prof / Business Associations	8	8	8	15	8	5	8	8
Development Associations	8	9	8	14	8	5	7	10

(% official leader/active member/inactive member)

Mozambicans' affiliation with religious organizations is equal to the Afrobarometer 12-country average (65 percent), and about the same for membership in trade unions or farmers' associations (17 percent). However, it lags far behind the African average for belonging to local development groups (28 percent) or professional or business groups (19 percent).

Political Participation

While few Mozambicans belong to politically oriented associations, large proportions (68 percent) have attended a community meeting, possibly organized by a church, a political party or the government (Table 8). But going beyond mere attendance at such meetings to actions that require some degree of personal initiative, levels of political participation drop sharply. One-third (33 percent) report participating with others to raise an issue in the past year, while one in ten (11 percent) have attended a demonstration or protest march, and 3 percent used force or violence for a political cause.

Table 8: Political Participation – National Results

	Yes, have done it	No, but might if have the chance	No, would never do it
Attended a community meeting	68	17	13
Joined others to raise an issue	35	34	34
Attended a demonstration	11	20	56
Used force or violence for a political cause	3	11	79

Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year?

Respondents in the northern provinces are significantly more likely to say they attended a protest march (17 percent) or used force of violence (10 percent) in the past year than other respondents (Table 9). There is a significant gender gap across all forms of participation, with men consistently more likely to take part, especially once we move beyond attending meetings.

Table 9: Political Participation by Demographic Group

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
Attended a community meeting	68	77	57	61	75	64	63	72
Joined others to raise an issue	35	38	31	31	37	34	26	43
Attended a demonstration	11	11	11	17	9	10	8	15
Used force/violence for a political cause	3	3	3	10	2	1	2	5

(% yes)

To put this in context, however, we need to note that Mozambicans' average level of participation in community meetings (68 percent) is far higher than the 12-country Afrobarometer average (47 percent). And Mozambicans are only slightly less likely to join in collective actions with others than the “average” African (43 percent), or to attend a demonstration or march (average of 12 percent).

Contacting Leaders

Consistent with the picture presented by the previous responses, Mozambicans are not likely to take initiatives to contact leaders to voice their views or for help solving problems, especially once we move beyond religious or traditional leaders. Mozambicans do not appear to be in the habit of using official channels to redress grievances or address public problems. Fourteen percent report contacting a local government official or councillor in the past year, 12 percent a political party official, 8 percent a member of a regional council, 8 percent a government official. Just 4 percent contacted a Member of the National Assembly, and 2 percent a Member of the National Council. Instead, they are much more likely to turn to religious leaders (30 percent) and traditional rulers (33 percent), or to other “influential” persons in the community (19 percent). Perhaps surprisingly, rural people are more likely to contact leaders across most categories. There is also a gender gap for contacting most community and political leaders, with men consistently more likely to make such contacts in all cases except religious leaders, where men and women make contact with roughly equal frequency.

Table 10: Contact with Leaders

	National	Rural	Urban	Northern	Central	South	Women	Men
Religious leader	30	36	24	36	34	24	31	30
Traditional leader	33	44	20	43	20	20	33	35
Other influential person	19	21	17	19	31	9	22	35
Local government councillor	14	16	12	22	13	10	10	18
Political party official	12	14	11	11	14	12	11	14
Government ministry official	8	7	8	9	10	6	6	10
Regional council representative	8	10	7	12	4	10	7	9
National Assembly member	4	3	5	6	3	4	3	5
National Council member	2	1	3	5	1	2	2	3

During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help to solve a problem or to give them your views? (% yes)

Government Responsiveness to Public Opinion

Now that we have seen what Mozambicans are doing to voice their opinions, the question shifts to whether or not they think anyone is listening. This is important because people may become frustrated or dissatisfied with the political system if they feel that elected representatives do not listen to their opinions or care about their interests enough to pay attention to them (Norris, 1999: 25). While we earlier reported that 59 percent feel they can join forces with other citizens to make elected leaders listen to their concerns, it appears that Mozambicans are not so optimistic about the intentions of their leaders. Only one out of four feel that their elected leaders, such as members of the National Assembly or local councillors, “look after the interests of people like you” (24 percent) or “listen to what people like you have to say” (26 percent) (Table 11). Both rural and urban respondents discern

Table 11: Elected Leadership's Responsiveness to Public Opinion

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
Look after the interests of people like you	24	25	23	36	20	20	22	25
Listen to what people like you have to say	26	28	29	41	19	24	23	29

How much of the time do you think elected leader, like parliamentarians or local councillors, try their best to: (% most of the time/always)

little personal impact on the highly centralised government: both groups express the same low levels of optimism about their representatives' priorities. Northerners, however, perceive slightly higher levels of responsiveness.

While these questions were not asked in the first round of the Afrobarometer, we can compare Mozambicans' responses to those from recent Round 2 surveys. It appears that other Africans are equally or even more pessimistic about the responsiveness of their elected leaders.

Table 12: Leadership's Responsiveness to Public Opinion, by Country⁴

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
Look after the interests of people like you	24	9	26	12	12
Listen to what people like you have to say	26	10	28	10	11

Assessing the Quality of Democracy

Based on their experiences as emerging citizens, how democratic do people think their political system is? While democratization has been a central theme of Mozambique's political reforms process, many experts remain unconvinced. For example, Freedom House, the international democracy watchdog organization, currently labels Mozambique as only "partly free" (Karatnycky, 2002). Recent analyses emphasize Mozambique's centralized presidential system of top-down control, with little separation of powers and limited channels for a very strong opposition to influence public policy (Weinstein, 2000).

Yet fully two-thirds (66 percent) of ordinary Mozambicans think that their country has at least an acceptable level of democracy: almost one-third (29 percent) say it is a "full democracy," and more than a third (37 percent) say it is a "democracy, but with minor problems" (Table 13). Another 14 percent see it as a "democracy, but with major problems," while only 3 percent said it is "not a democracy." This represents a sharp increase in public ratings of the extent of democracy since 2001. Compared to the findings in 2001, the proportion saying that Mozambique is a full democracy has tripled, from 10 percent to 29 percent, and the proportion saying it is a democracy with major problems has fallen by well over half, from 39 percent to 14 percent. It is also important to note, however, that 15 percent are not able to venture an opinion as to the state of democracy in Mozambique.

Table 13: Extent of Democracy over Time

	2001	2002
A full democracy	10	29
A democracy, but with minor problems	25	38
A democracy, with major problems	39	15
Not a democracy	6	4
Don't know/Don't understand question	20	15

In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Mozambique today?

⁴Cross-country comparisons in this table and those that follow report results from "Round 1.5" (Nigeria (August 2001) and Namibia (April 2002)) and early Round 2 results (Cabo Verde (June 2002) and South Africa (September-October 2002)).

These sharp increases may reflect increasing public confidence and satisfaction with the government's sustained ability to manage the potential crisis that followed the 1999 election. This may have led people to conclude that democracy is taking root as opponents decided to pursue legal and political options, rather than resolve disputes through the barrel of a gun. These trends may also reflect growing exposure to the actual operation of democracy, particularly through the increasing level and openness of public criticism of government and political debate in the news media.

Are people satisfied with these levels? To measure the level of satisfaction with democracy, the Afrobarometer asks a standard international survey question about whether people are "satisfied with the way democracy works in their country." The responses to this question demonstrate considerable ambivalence: just over half (53 percent) are either "very" (17 percent) or "fairly satisfied" (36 percent) with the way democracy works, but another one-third (32 percent) is either "not very" (24 percent) or "not at all satisfied" (8 percent).

Rural respondents are somewhat more likely to say Mozambique is a democracy and to express satisfaction with the way democracy is working, as are respondents from the Central region, and men (Table 14). This may be due in part to Frelimo's decision to reverse the policy of "villagisation" that had reorganised rural life under the one-party system. Since the 1992 peace agreement, villagers have been allowed to move back to their former homes (Pereira, 1996: 25; and 1999: 30; Geffray, 1991). Whatever the reason, the economic development centred in Maputo and the South does not seem to have translated into more positive assessments of democracy in these areas. Southerners evince much lower assessments of the quality of democracy in the country, and are much less likely to be satisfied with how it is working in practice. These findings are particularly surprising given that the South is the government's stronghold and has gained the most economically in the post-war, democratic era. Perhaps Frelimo supporters in the South hold a more substantive, socialist-derived view of how democracy should change their lives. They may consequently judge the political system primarily in terms of the persistent poverty and growing inequality they are experiencing, rather than in terms of the expanding political rights and freedoms that appear to dominate perceptions of democracy in the North and Central regions.

Table 14: Extent and Satisfaction With Democracy

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South	Women	Men
Full Democracy / Democracy With Minor Problems	66	68	63	77	80	47	62	70
Very / Fairly Satisfied With Way Democracy Works	53	58	48	63	65	37	50	57

Compared to the Afrobarometer average (50 percent who say their country is a full democracy or has only minor problems), Mozambicans are now far more likely to see their country as democratic. The Mozambican response is comparable to that of Namibians (71 percent), Zambians (63 percent) and Malawians (62 percent), but Mozambicans are somewhat more enthusiastic about their democracy than South Africans (60 percent), though they lag well behind Batswana (82 percent). Mozambican satisfaction with democracy (53 percent) is, however, slightly below the Afrobarometer average (58 percent), falling between Botswana (76 percent) on one extreme and Zimbabwe (18 percent) on the other.

AN EFFECTIVE STATE?

We turn now from our assessment of citizen empowerment to examine the effectiveness of the Mozambican state, again, as seen through the eyes of ordinary citizens. An active citizenry can meet only some of the requirements for democratization: democratization also requires a capable and effective state, with the necessary financial resources, skills and infrastructure to respond to citizen demands.

We start by outlining the demands that people are placing on the government and the state. To assess this, the Afrobarometer asks an open-ended question: “In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?” No options are read out to respondents: the answers are totally spontaneous, and are recorded in respondents’ own words. People could identify up to three different problems. Their verbatim responses were then grouped into broader categories for analysis.

By far the most frequently mentioned problem is *unemployment* (63 percent); this holds true not only across the entire nation, but across both urban and rural areas, as well as in all three regions. Rounding out the five most frequently cited problems are *health care*, cited by four in ten (39 percent), *education*, cited by 29 percent, *poverty/destitution*, mentioned by one-quarter (26 percent), and *HIV/AIDS*, mentioned by 16 percent.⁵

In addition, smaller proportions cite *food shortages or famine* (14 percent) – a figure that is perhaps surprisingly low given the extent of the current famine across the region – as well as *water* (11 percent) and *farming/agriculture* (11 percent).

Table 15: Most Important Problems

	Total	Urban	Rural	Northern	Central	South	Men	Women
Unemployment	63	70	57	66	64	61	67	59
Health	39	34	43	39	42	35	37	40
Education	29	29	30	26	34	27	31	28
Poverty/ Destitution	26	26	26	26	25	27	22	30
AIDS	16	17	15	16	16	16	17	15
Food Shortages/ Famine	14	10	17	7	9	22	13	15
Water	11	5	17	12	10	12	9	13
Farming/ Agriculture	11	9	13	11	14	15	12	10
Transportation	9	5	13	10	11	8	9	10
Crime / Security	8	12	5	5	4	14	7	9
Rates / Taxes	6	6	6	10	5	5	5	7
Housing	6	6	6	4	9	3	6	6
Corruption	7	9	6	8	7	7	7	6
Wages / Income	7	11	4	1	7	10	7	7
Managing the Economy	5	5	5	10	5	3	7	3

⁵Note that evidence from other surveys also suggests that when Southern Africans mention “health care” they are often thinking about the HIV/AIDS problem. See A. Whiteside, R. Mattes, S. Willan and R. Manning, 2002, “Examining HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa Through the Eyes of Ordinary Southern Africans,” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 21 (Cape Town / Accra / East Lansing: Afrobarometer), available at www.afrobarometer.org.

In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (All problems mentioned by at least 5 percent of the national sample)

State Capacity to Solve Problems

Do people have any confidence that the state has the capacity to solve the problems they have identified? Six in ten people (58 percent) say that the government should be able to “solve” “all” (17 percent) or “most” (41 percent) of the country’s problems. An additional one-quarter of the population (28 percent) think that the government can at least solve “some” of the country’s key problems. Just one in ten offer the pessimistic responses that government can solve “very few” (6 percent) or “none” 3 percent of the nation’s problems.

To provide context from other recent Afrobarometer surveys, Mozambicans are equally optimistic about their government’s capacity to take on and solve the country’s most pressing problems as Nigerians (62 percent) and South Africans (57 percent). In contrast, more cautious views have been expressed by citizens in Cabo Verde (32 percent) and Namibia (28 percent).

Economic Trends

One basis on which people can draw conclusions about the effectiveness of government performance is personal and national economic conditions. As of late 2002, one-third (36 percent) of Mozambicans describe their present living conditions as “good” or “very good,” while an almost equally large 32 percent say they are “bad” or “very bad.” But four in ten (39 percent) say things had improved for them in the previous 12 months, compared to 29 percent who say they have gotten worse. Just over one-quarter (28 percent) feel they are worse off than the average Mozambican, but most (65 percent) say they are about the same or better off. Fully one-half (50 percent) expect things to improve in the next 12 months. Interestingly, even though economic growth has been concentrated in the southern region, respondents there are far less likely to be satisfied with their living conditions or to perceive positive change, and more likely to feel they are worse off than other people in the country.

Table 16: Evaluations of Personal Economic Conditions

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Your own present living conditions (good/very good)	36	37	35	51	43	23
Your living conditions compared to 12 months ago (better/much better)	39	38	40	45	49	23
Your living conditions compared to those of other Mozambicans (same/better/much better)	65	64	67	71	76	52
Your expected living conditions in 12 months time (better/much better)	50	46	55	61	60	36

In general how would you describe:

Evaluations of national economic conditions are even better. One-half (51 percent) are satisfied with the national economy at the present time, with 45 percent seeing an improvement over the previous year. Forty percent feel the country’s economy is better than neighboring countries, though responses range from 22 percent in the South, where respondents probably draw comparisons with South Africa, to 60 percent in the Central and 47 percent in the Northern regions. Almost six in ten (57 percent) expect the economy to improve even further in the next 12 months.

Table 17: Evaluations of National Economic Conditions

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
National economy (good/very good)	51	53	49	63	65	33
National economy compared to 12 months ago (better/much better)	45	45	46	53	56	32
National economy compared to neighboring countries (better/much better)	41	46	36	47	60	22
Expect national economy in next 12 months time (better/much better)	57	57	57	65	69	41

In general how would you describe: (%fairly good/very good” or “better/much better”)

Mozambicans’ level of satisfaction with micro-economic conditions is similar to that measured in recent surveys in South Africa and Namibia. These three southern African countries are, however, far less satisfied and optimistic about their personal circumstances than Nigerians. But Mozambicans are significantly more positive about the state of their national economy than their neighbors in South Africa.

Table 18: Evaluations of Personal Economic Conditions, by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
Your own present living conditions (good/very good)	36	17	33	61	37
Your living conditions compared to 12 months ago (better/much better)	39	78	34	56	33
Your living conditions compared to those of other Mozambicans (better/much better)	36	21	--	58	31
Your expected living conditions in 12 months time (better/much better)	50	83	42	84	42

Evaluating Policy Implementation

Government, however, does not seem to reap much benefit from these positive macro-economic trends. Forty-four percent say the government is handling the management of the economy “fairly” or “very well,” just one-quarter approve of government attempts to create jobs (23 percent), and only one-fifth approve of its efforts to control prices (22 percent) or narrow the income gap (20 percent). But these relatively low approval ratings arise in a context where fully one-quarter of respondents are unable to offer any opinion about the government’s performance (27 percent with regard to the income gap, and 23 percent with respect to overall economic management). In addition, these ratings have increased significantly since 2001 (see Table 20). New manufacturing investments have undoubtedly had an impact on public perceptions, although the high-tech companies do not employ unskilled labourers, an issue that riles Maputo job seekers and retrenched workers.

Table 19: Performance Ratings

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Education	66	62	70	75	60	66
Basic Health Services	58	51	65	62	54	59
Combating malaria	53	50	56	60	52	50
Resolving conflicts	52	55	47	57	60	41
HIV / AIDS	46	40	49	47	38	49

Managing economy	44	41	48	63	55	25
Reducing crime	43	47	38	52	49	32
Basic Services	42	34	51	39	48	39
Enough to eat	36	31	40	52	39	24
Fighting corruption	24	25	22	37	24	17
Creating jobs	23	23	27	39	21	18
Controlling prices	22	21	23	36	24	13
Narrowing income gap	20	21	18	36	27	55

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% fairly well/very well)

Despite all the investments being concentrated in their area, respondents in the southern provinces are especially cynical about the government's economic performance. In this region, the government approval ratings fall to just 18 percent for creating jobs, 13 percent for controlling prices, and 25 percent for managing the economy. Southerners are, however, considerably more positive than other regions when it comes to government handling of the income gap, with 55 percent giving a positive review! One likely reason for Southerners' general cynicism about the government's economic management efforts is the effects of the privatisation of state assets, which has left many workers unemployed. As an area affected heavily by internal migration during the war, many of the inhabitants were already unemployed and having difficulty coping with the escalating cost of living. This is compounded by the fact that many of the privatised firms are not yet operational, but the state does not have the capacity or the resources to provide welfare.

Government receives far more positive job performance ratings in the areas of addressing educational needs (66 percent), improving basic health services (58 percent), combating malaria (53 percent), and resolving conflicts between communities (52 percent). Government efforts to combat HIV/AIDS are viewed positively by 46 percent, amidst estimates that one out of three adults are HIV positive. AIDS is widely predicted to affect education, health services and the police, placing heavy costs on public expenditure.

Table 20: Performance Ratings over Time

	2001	2002
Education	46	66
Basic Health Services	39	58
Combating malaria	NA	53
Resolving conflicts	NA	52
HIV / AIDS	49	46
Managing economy	NA	44
Reducing crime	25	43
Basic Services	NA	42
Enough to eat	NA	36
Fighting corruption	15	24
Creating jobs	12	23
Controlling prices	9	22
Narrowing income gap	10	20

(% fairly well/very well)

Respondents were also asked to compare the overall effectiveness of the current government and the government under the previous system of one-party rule. Only one-third (35 percent) feels that government today is more effective in delivering services. There are also important regional differences; only one in four Southerners (26 percent) sees an improvement. These results are comparable to findings in South Africa, where just 41 percent say their democratic government is

more effective than the apartheid government. However, it lags far behind the 54 percent of Cabo Verdians and 56 percent of Nigerians who say their new democratic governments are more effective than the old military and one-party regimes.

Table 21: Improvements in Delivery of Services

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Effective in the delivery of services	35	34	37	43	40	26

Comparing the current government with the former government under the one-party system, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: effective in the delivery of services? (% more/much more)

Comparisons of the performance evaluations of the Mozambican government to those of its counterparts in other countries reveals that there is no issue on which the Mozambique government receives especially high ratings, but also no issue on which it do especially badly. Even on the issues where it gets its worst reviews, such as controlling prices, narrowing the income gap, and making sure people have enough to eat, it seems that no government has done very well in the eyes of its people in handling these matters.

Table 22: Performance Evaluations by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Nigeria	South Africa
Education	66	55	61	61
Basic Health Services	58	53	62	54
Combating malaria	53	NA	NA	41
Resolving conflicts	52	34	61	38
HIV / AIDS	46	54	65	46
Managing economy	44	33	55	38
Reducing crime	43	31	57	23
Basic Services	42	49	43	60
Enough to eat	36	31	30	21
Creating jobs	23	20	47	9
Controlling prices	22	27	26	17
Fighting corruption	24	23	48	29
Narrowing income gap	20	23	26	19

Political performance

Most Mozambicans are able to discriminate among their levels of satisfaction with government performance across a range of discrete policy areas. Also, as discussed, they do not think that the main priority of elected officials is to listen to their opinions or look after their interests. Nevertheless, when it comes to offering summary evaluations of their political leaders, they arrive at very favourable overall conclusions. Perhaps they err on the side of deference.

Four in five say they approve of the way President Chissano handled his job over the previous 12 months. Perhaps one of the his most important recent achievements was simply his announcement that he would step down from office voluntarily and with dignity – unlike his counterparts in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Malawi – showing his commitment to promoting a democratic culture.

Six in ten (62 percent) approve of the performance of the National Assembly (though fully one-quarter (26 percent) say they don't know enough about it to offer an opinion). Three-quarters (74 percent) approve of the efforts of their Provincial Governor, but just one-half (51 percent) approve of their Local Authority (and just 39 percent in the South). Fifteen percent cannot offer an opinion about their Provincial Governor, and 27 percent are unable to say anything about their Local Authority. It should also be kept in mind that Renamo boycotted the 1998 municipal elections,

shrouding local authorities in controversy. On the other hand, municipal services in urban areas are deplorable: roads are not maintained and all other services are erratic. The authorities clearly have not developed the capacity to manage these areas.

Table 23: Overall Job Performance

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Central	South
President	80	78	80	78	86	75
National Assembly	62	56	69	69	66	55
Provincial Governor	74	76	71	79	80	65
Local Authority	51	51	49	61	59	39

Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs in the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% approve/strongly approve)

Compared to other Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys, as well as by the standards of Round 1 surveys, President Chissano's approval rate is extremely high, matched only by the 90 percent approval rating given to Tanzania's President Mkapa in 2001. Ratings of the National Assembly are higher than the Round 1 Afrobarometer average for national legislatures (49 percent), but the Local Authority scores about the same as the Afrobarometer average (53 percent).

Table 24: Overall Job Performance by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Nigeria	South Africa
President	80	37	72	51
Parliament/National Assembly	62	41	46	45
Provincial/Regional Government	74	-	45	38
Local Council	51	40	48	33

How Accessible Is the State?

People may offer positive evaluations of political leaders because they think things are better than they used to be, or that things are getting better for the country as a whole. But citizens also interact directly with the state and its agencies. Thus, another indicator of public perceptions of the effectiveness of the state is the extent to which people use government services, and to which they do so with ease. A well-governed state is one in which people feel they can approach state institutions to obtain important services without encountering a great many obstacles.

We asked people whether they found a range of government services easy or difficult to obtain. Mozambique's state is regarded as user-friendly in just two areas: voter registration and school enrolment. Eight in ten (80 percent) say it is "easy" or "very easy" to obtain a voter registration card. A sizeable majority of six in ten (58 percent) say it is easy to obtain a place in primary school for children (Table 25), a not inconsequential feat in a country where over one-third of the adult population lacks functional literacy skills. Perhaps equally important is the fact that even 57 percent of rural respondents say this is easy. At the same time, this still leaves significant proportions of people that do encounter at least some difficulties in getting their children into school. Access to schools appears most burdensome in the southern provinces (46 percent easy/very easy) and least burdensome in the Central region (71 percent). We also find no real differences in reported ease of access between men and women respondents. This is encouraging since only one of ten rural women can read and write (UNDP, 2000: iii). Nonetheless, the UNDP reports that men continue to benefit more from educational advances, with male illiteracy falling by 4.4 percentage points annually in recent years, while the annual drop has been only 2.9 percent for women (over the past two decades, illiteracy has fallen by 28 percent for men, but only 19 percent for women).

Far lower percentages report ease of access when it comes to obtaining identity or other official documents from government: just 42 percent say this is easy. Moreover, there is a sizeable urban-rural divide: while one-half (51 percent) of urban respondents find obtaining documents easy, just one-third (35 percent) of rural residents feel this way. Even fewer people say it is easy to get household services from government (15 percent), though many never even try to do this (31 percent). This points to the need to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by years of civil war.

Given the limited reach of the Mozambican welfare state and its services, it may be understandable that many people do not even attempt to get these things. However, the state has no such excuses when it comes to policing. Yet there is consensus across all provinces that it is difficult to get help from the police: just 32 percent say this is easy to obtain. Of even greater concern is the fact that almost four in ten (37 percent) say they never even bother to seek police services.

Lastly, for a country dominated by subsistence farming, it would be interesting to find out why 42 percent of rural residents do not bother to seek government loans, subsidies, or agricultural credits. Only 8 percent say it is easy to access these services. This may support Renamo's argument that only cronies of the ruling elite get opportunities to access resources for investment purposes. With urban poverty on the increase, a high percentage of urban dwellers also do not bother to get government loans that could aid in starting income generating projects. A major constraint could be the centralization of most services in the cities. Considering that over one-third of the citizens find it hard to get an identity document, which they need for any other transaction, decentralizing some state services would appear to be essential.

Table 25: Accessibility of the State

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Central	South
Voter registration card	80 (4)	76 (5)	81 (4)	76 (4)	84 (5)	75 (4)
Place in primary school for a child	58 (3)	57 (3)	59 (3)	60 (2)	71 (3)	46 (4)
An identity document (birth certificate, driver's license, passport)	42 (3)	35 (4)	51 (2)	41 (1)	48 (5)	38 (5)
Household services (piped water, electricity, telephone)	15 (31)	11 (35)	21 (26)	23 (27)	15 (38)	12 (26)
Help from the police when you need it	32 (28)	32 (31)	31 (25)	34 (31)	37 (27)	26 (28)
A loan or payment from government (e.g., agricultural credit)	8 (42)	7 (43)	9 (41)	18 (29)	8 (48)	3 (42)

Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? (% easy/very easy) Figures in brackets are those who "never try."

The ease with which Mozambicans access voter registration cards should not be overlooked: this is a service that in some countries has been reserved only for government supporters. For example, just 61 percent of Nigerians say it is easy to get one (Table 26). However, in most other service areas, levels of access to the Mozambican state lag behind those recorded in other recent Afrobarometer surveys. The inculcation of a new, people-oriented work ethic in the public service is a must if NEPAD is to work.

Table 26: Accessibility of the State by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Nigeria	South Africa
Registering to vote	80 (4)	70 (9)	61 (16)	86 (3)
A place in primary school	58 (3)	71 (10)	56 (21)	78 (6)
An identity document	42 (3)	75 (2)	29 (32)	70 (2)
Household services	16 (31)	38 (15)	12 (30)	54 (8)
Help from the police	32 (29)	32 (2)	14 (39)	40 (12)
Govt. loan or payment	8 (42)	10 (50)	5 (51)	23 (32)

A LEGITIMATE STATE?

Finally, we turn to the concept of state legitimacy. Legitimacy has to do with the acceptability or appropriateness of the state's exercise of authority; in other words, it has to do with whether and why the state deserves the allegiance of its members (Strong, 1997: 279). Max Weber (1922/1982) found that the stability of social organisations and their ability to exercise authority is decisively influenced by their legitimacy, and that the most efficient way a social system can uphold social order and cohesion is through maintaining its legitimacy. One of NEPAD's criteria is that participating states must enjoy high levels of legitimacy.

State Legitimacy in Mozambique

To test the level of the Mozambican state's legitimacy, the Afrobarometer posed a number of questions about the constitution and the right of the state to enforce the law. According to Bryce, a constitution is a "frame of political society, organised through and by law, that is to say, one in which the law has established permanent institutions with recognised functions and definite rights" (Bryce, 1921). This definition is supported by Strong (1997:10), who sees a constitution as a "collective of principles according to which powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and relations between the two are adjusted." In other words, a constitution is meant to be the supreme law of the country that embodies the values and aspirations of the governed.

Do Mozambicans feel this way about their constitution? Importantly, just one-half of the respondents (50 percent) agrees that "the constitution expresses the values and aspirations of all Mozambicans." The legitimacy of the Constitution is significantly lower in the South (32 percent), but quite high in the Central region (65 percent). While the 1990 Constitution guarantees basic rights - life, liberty and property - to all, these results show that the legislative and regulatory framework for the rule of law in Mozambique is contested. In fact, most of the Constitution's major codes are antiquated, and many are under active review. It appears that a constitution that emanates from negotiations aimed at ending a civil war, as in Mozambique, may eventually require an overhaul to ensure long-term political stability and peace.

Opinions regarding other aspects of state legitimacy, however, reveal a more solid consensus on the state's right to rule the people. We find that three-quarters of Mozambicans (75 percent) agree with the statement that "our courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by." Similar proportions agree that the police "always have the right to make people obey the law" (76 percent) and that the tax department "always has the right to make people pay taxes" (71 percent).

Moreover, in contrast to the regional differences in perceptions of the Constitution, these sentiments have diffused across the country, with few significant rural-urban or regional differences.

Table 27: State Legitimacy

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the Mozambican people.	50	47	53	59	65	32
The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.	75	70	80	71	78	73
The police always have the right to make people obey the law	76	74	79	73	80	75
The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes	71	68	75	74	73	67

For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree? (% agree/strongly agree)

Mozambicans are not unique in their limited affection for their constitution, although they fall somewhat below citizens of several other countries: just 60 percent of South Africans, 57 percent of Nigerians, and 54 percent of Cabo Verdians see their constitutions as broadly encompassing documents. Mozambique might do well to write a new one based on national consensus and reflecting national values, especially those embraced by opponents who were previously denied political space. The current piecemeal changes are a recipe for frustration. On the other hand, attitudes toward the legitimacy of the law and state enforcement are on par with those measured in other Afrobarometer surveys.

Table 28: State Legitimacy by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the [Mozambican] people.	50	54	70	57	60
The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by.	75	84	61	72	68
The police always have the right to make people obey the law	76	81	70	75	67
The tax department (SARS) always has the right to make people pay taxes	71	74	51	73	60

Trust In Political Institutions

Another way to measure legitimacy is to gauge public confidence, or trust, in political institutions. While all individuals are not expected to agree with everything that institutions do on a daily basis, they should ideally trust governing bodies to rule in the public interest over the long haul. This sense of trust can provide institutions with authority, which can be defined as a form of power that is not based on the use of violence but where the compelling force for compliance is found in the relationship between the public and the institution prior to the issuing of commands (Arendt 1969).

Levels of trust in political institutions range from a high of 75 percent with respect to the President and his office, and 61 percent for the ruling party, to a low of just 22 percent for opposition parties. The results for opposition parties are not surprising given that Renamo has been beset by squabbling and internecine conflict. Intense rivalry among the party president, Alfonso Dhlakama,

parliamentarians, and regional party officials has affected the party's ability to function (Woods 1999: 163).

In between these extremes, traditional leaders command a reasonably high level of trust nationally (57 percent), and score even higher (63 percent) in rural areas. This high trust among rural inhabitants was likely bred by Renamo, which administered its 'liberated zones' through traditional structures in conjunction with 'majubas.'⁶

In the face of the upcoming 2003 municipal elections and the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections, the rather low levels of trust in the National Electoral Commission (NEC) (51 percent) are a matter of concern (in addition, 17 percent say they don't know enough about the NEC to offer an opinion). Renamo has raised concerns about the Commission's composition and role since the 1998 municipal elections. The NEC has to convince the public of its impartiality in overseeing elections. However, since it is composed of presidential appointees, this is unlikely to happen. That only 44 percent trust local authorities points to problems of capacity to deliver within these institutions (in addition, 24 percent say they don't know enough about local authorities to offer an opinion).

Institutions of law and order enjoy mixed levels of trust. Provincial courts, tasked with upholding the rule of law, have disconcertingly low levels of trust (51 percent trust; while 21 percent don't know enough). Just 50 percent trust the police, dipping to 45 percent in urban areas where the police are heavily concentrated. Possibly people are saying there is too much surveillance of urban-based citizens. The relatively low level of trust placed in the integrated army (52 percent) is also worrisome, especially considering an incident that occurred in May 2001 when a Sofala-based army unit, made up of both former Renamo and Frelimo troops, stormed and attacked a police station in Beira and terrorised several others with the full knowledge and blessing of the commander. This act was in retaliation for police intervention in an incident in which some soldiers had been harassing local civilians. For a country with a history of war, some wounds will probably heal only after the soldiers who were notorious for cruelty during the civil war retire from the army.

Trust drops sharply when it comes to the independent news media, with just 26 percent expressing confidence in private broadcasting services, and 25 percent in independent newspapers. One problem may be that these institutions are usually viewed as linked to opposition parties, which, as we have seen, also enjoy little popular trust. In addition, the independent media have not offered anything new: their main medium of communication remains Portuguese. As indicated earlier, there is not a single newspaper in any local language in the entire country.

Respondents in the northern provinces express the highest level of trust for opposition parties (41 percent), but also the highest levels of trust in the ruling party (76 percent). Trust for the opposition in these provinces is explained by the fact that Renamo's leadership has been drawn disproportionately from the North and Central regions of the country. But generally, the North invests high levels of trust in all institutions. On the other end of the spectrum, respondents in southern provinces consistently express the lowest levels of trust.

⁶Majubas were Renamo militia who, during the civil war, had the obligation to be the "eyes and ears of Renamo."

Table 29: Trust in Public Institutions

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
President	75	78	72	80	83	67
Ruling Party	61	64	58	76	63	52
National Assembly	57	57	56	71	64	43
State Broadcasting Corporation	57	51	64	58	66	48
National Law Courts	57	63	49	70	66	41
Traditional Leaders	57	63	49	74	63	42
Army	52	54	50	62	61	40
Provincial Courts	51	52	49	66	54	40
National Electoral Commission	51	48	64	65	55	42
Police	50	55	45	67	54	37
Local Authority	44	44	45	62	48	32
Public Corporations	33	24	45	48	29	30
Government Newspapers	32	22	43	39	28	31
Independent Broadcasting Services	26	18	34	31	18	29
Independent Press / Newspapers	25	17	37	37	19	26
Opposition Parties	22	24	20	41	21	14

In the context of other recent Afrobarometer surveys, President Chissano enjoys very high levels of trust, second only to Namibia's Sam Nujoma: these two are the only presidents trusted by more than three-quarters of their citizens. The president of Cabo Verde, another Lusophone country, is the least trusted, with only 23 percent expressing confidence. In general, Mozambicans express relatively high levels of trust in their institutions, second only to Namibians among these initial Round 2

Afrobarometer surveys. In comparison with Round 1 surveys, Mozambicans' trust in their president is far higher than the Afrobarometer 12-country average (55 percent). It is about the same with regards to police (50 percent) and national courts (54 percent). However, levels of trust lag behind the African mean when it comes to the national broadcaster (68 percent) and the army (61 percent).

Table 30: Trust in Public Institutions by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
The President	75	23	79	39	37
The Ruling Party	61	20	63	26	32
National Assembly/Parliament	57	22	57	21	31
The police	58	37	59	10	35
Courts of law	57	44	72	26	39
Traditional leaders	57	-	62	38	19
State Broadcasting (TV or Radio)	57	37	77	29	47
The Army	52	34	62	14	32
Provincial government/courts	51	-	NA	33	28
Electoral commission	51	16	67	21	31
Your local government	44	18	45	27	20
Opposition parties	22	21	27	16	13
Independent broadcasting services	25	34	60	35	43
Independent press/newspapers	26	23	70	32	35
Public corporations	33	29	76	18	43
Mean	48	28	63	26	32

However, responses to a separate question demonstrate that trust in political institutions has not significantly benefited from the transition to multiparty rule: less than one-third (30 percent) say that government today is more trustworthy than it was under the one-party system. Just 12 percent of respondents in the South think so, while almost one-half (45 percent) of respondents in the Central

region think that government is “more” or “much more” trustworthy today than before. This figure is broadly similar to that found in other recent Afrobarometer surveys (Table 32).

Table 31: Comparing the Multiparty State With the Former One-Party State

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Trustworthy	30	30	29	38	45	12

Comparing the current government with the former one-party system, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: (% more/much more)

Table 32: Comparing Regimes by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Nigeria	South Africa
Trustworthy	30	43	29	32

(% more/much more)

Law Enforcement Capacity

Besides their normative beliefs about obedience to authority, or their affective sense of trust in political institutions, a key element of whether people obey the law or not may simply be their sense of the state’s capacity to enforce the law. In this sense, rational citizens may simply try to get way with whatever they think they can, obeying the law only when non-compliance is too risky.

Given this logic, it is encouraging that roughly eight in ten Mozambicans feel that the law would be enforced if a person like themselves committed a serious crime (85 percent), or if they failed to pay a tax on some income they earned (78 percent). That being said, these results also mean that significant minorities feel they have a better than even chance of getting away with non-compliance.

Municipalities are seen to possess the least enforcement capacity: just two-thirds (66 percent) feel that the law would be enforced if they did not pay user fees for household services, like water or electricity. Avoiding payment of user fees is in fact common judging by the problems the municipalities have had in securing fees for garbage collection. For instance, Maputo City, acknowledging its own lack of capacity, arranged to have the garbage collection fee added to the electricity bill. But the contract broke down in July 2002, leaving the municipality without an alternative collection method. Across all three items, perceived state law enforcement capacity is consistently weakest in the North, and in rural areas.

Table 33: Law Enforcement Capacity

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Committed a serious crime	85	81	90	71	92	87
Did not pay a tax on some income they earned	78	74	82	64	86	78
Obtained household services (like water and electricity) without paying	66	63	73	56	69	70

How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like yourself: (% likely /very likely)

Mozambique’s perceived capacity to enforce the law is comparable to that of other countries with Round 2 surveys (the question was not asked in Round 1). Cabo Verde, scattered over a number of islands, stands out as having the highest enforcement capacity; but then, its population is small (just over half a million) and this could be a factor in enhancing monitoring and policing.

Table 34: Law Enforcement Capacity by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
Committed a serious crime	85	95	82	83	78
Did not pay a tax on some income they earned	78	80	63	76	69
Obtained household services (like water and electricity) without paying	66	86	65	74	66

Compared to the limited increase in trustworthiness since the onset of the multiparty era, Mozambicans are more likely to feel that law enforcement capacity has increased: one-half (48 percent) say that government today is better able to enforce the law than it was during the one-party regime (Table 35). Their recollections of the negative effects of the civil war on law and order may weigh heavily in many people's responses. Mozambicans are more likely to perceive improvements in this area than South Africans, but less likely than Cabo Verdians (Table 36).

Table 35: Comparing Past and Present Regimes: Law Enforcement

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Able to enforce the law	48	48	47	43	51	40

Comparing the current government with the former one-party system,, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: (% more/much more)

Table 36: Comparing Past and Present Regimes by Country: Law Enforcement

	Mozambique	South Africa	Nigeria	Cabo Verde
Able to enforce the law	48	39	48	57

How Corrupt?

Public perceptions of the levels of corruption versus transparency are a final element that likely contributes to overall assessments of state legitimacy. A perception of rampant government corruption may reduce the legitimacy of state institutions and decrease people's willingness to obey their directives.

This issue may be especially relevant in Mozambique, where rapid privatization and economic growth may have increased the opportunities for corruption (Woods 1999:164). Woods observed that very little of what has been exploited in the country has found its way back to the mainstream economy except in the form of bribes to key officials. Joseph Hanlon, a journalist who has been studying Mozambique since 1975, has pointed out the devastating effects of a more ominous form of corruption that arises as the rule of law is replaced by the rule of crime that reigns when criminals take over the state. All the efforts and stated wishes of the elected president and the legislature and other leadership noises about corruption amount to nothing if organized crime can penetrate the legal system and buy off police officials, attorneys and judges. In fact, many believe that "Mozambique is very close to becoming a criminalized state" (Mosse and Gastrow 2002:21; Mozambiquefile 2002:14).

The highly publicised murders of journalist Carlos Cardoso in November 2000 and Austral banker Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua in August 2001 have been linked to scandals that rocked Banco Comercial de Moçambique (BCM) and Austral banks and have been placed at the centre of the country's governance crisis (Mozambiquefile, 2002:15). The influx of dubious foreigners has been facilitated by the sale of Mozambican passports on the open market for US\$20 and permanent

residence permits for US\$100 by unscrupulous members of the bureaucracy. In 1997, customs officers at two border posts with South Africa's Kwa-Zulu/Natal were accused of charging US\$8 for entry to people anyone wishing to cross the border. These same officials have been known to turn a blind eye to smuggling activities at the border posts. There is a general, albeit dangerous, acceptance in the country of the idea that "everyone is corrupt."

However, this survey reveals that ordinary Mozambicans do not necessarily share the impression of their country as a haven of corruption. While police and border officials are most likely to be seen as corrupt, just one-third say that "most" or "all" police officers (33 percent) or customs and immigration officials (34 percent) are involved in corruption. One-quarter (24 percent) feel this way about teachers and school administrators. Perhaps surprisingly, government officials are viewed more positively than the uniformed forces; just one-fifth (19 percent) see significant corruption among government officials, and even fewer think that elected leaders (17 percent) or judges (16 percent) are corrupt. Just over one in ten (13 percent) think that there is substantial corruption in the Office of the Presidency.

Urban respondents are slightly more likely to see corruption in public institutions, as are respondents in the North. However, police corruption appears to be a much larger problem in the South (40 percent). Corruption at border posts is seen more often in the Central region (38 percent), among provinces that have long stretches of border with Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. Cross-border trading and movement of people are quite high in the area, and it appears that law enforcement forces cash in on the situation to at least some extent by demanding bribes. The governor of Sofala is always in the media complaining about the high levels of corruption in his province.⁷

Table 36: Perceptions of Corruption

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
The President and officials in his office	13	11	14	18	7	15
Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councilors	17	15	19	25	13	17
Government officials	19	18	21	26	16	19
Police	33	30	37	29	28	40
Border officials (e.g., customs and immigration)	34	31	38	26	38	34
Judges and magistrates	16	14	18	21	12	16
Teachers and school administrators	24	20	28	27	17	28
Religious leaders	13	14	12	20	10	12
Local businessmen	21	18	23	23	15	24
Foreign businessmen	22	17	27	23	20	23
NGOs	5	3	9	1	8	6

Compared to life under the one-party system, a multiparty regime does not appear to have produced much benefit when it comes to corruption. Just one-fifth (20 percent) say that government today is less corrupt than it was under the old regime. In the South, this figure stands at just one in ten (13 percent).

Table 37: Comparing Past and Present Regimes: Corruption

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Less Corrupt	21	23	20	25	28	13

⁷During the survey, the provincial governor was in the process of weeding out corrupt officials and a number were imprisoned. He moved around to all levels of the government and addressed officers on corruption; this may have influenced the findings.

Comparing the current government with the former one-party system,, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: (% less/much less)

In general, perceptions of public corruption in Mozambique are far lower than in a country like Nigeria, and tend to be roughly comparable to those found in Namibia and South Africa. In contrast Cabo Verdians express far higher levels of confidence in the transparency of government.

Table 38: Perceptions of Corruption by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
Border officials (e.g., customs and immigration)	34	12	25	52	28
Police	33	8	36	66	38
Teachers	24	16	-	23	16
Government officials	19	6	39	44	27
Elected Leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councilors	17	7	27	43	23
Judges and magistrates	16	5	15	34	15
Religious leaders	13	10	-	10	10
The President and officials in his office	13	6	18	34	13

Personal Experience with Government Corruption

On what do people bases their judgements of public corruption? Is it personal experience? Regardless of what they think they know about corruption, how often do they actually encounter it in their personal dealings with the state?

On average, 11 percent reported having paid a bribe or done a favour over the past year in order to obtain four different types of government services. On the high side, one in five (19 percent each) say they had to do this in order to get an official document or permit or get their children into school. Fifteen percent report having paid bribes to avoid problems with the police, and 12 percent say they had to do this to get a household service. Urban respondents tend to be victimized by corruption more often than rural folk.

Table 39: Personal Experience with Corruption

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Centre	South
Get a document or permit	19	18	20	18	20	18
Get a child into school	19	17	22	23	14	21
Get a household service (liked piped water, electricity or phone)	12	10	14	13	12	11
Avoid a problem with the police	15	13	16	19	15	11

In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to? (% once or twice/ a few times/often/always)

Comparing the percentages that encountered frequent instances of corruption, Mozambicans appear to encounter similar levels as Nigerians and Namibians, but far higher levels than South Africans and Cabo Verdians.

Table 40: Personal Experience with Corruption by Country

	Mozambique	Cabo Verde	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa
Get a document or permit	11	3	10	10	2
Get a household service (liked piper water, electricity or phone)	8	1	12	12	3
Get a child into school	13	1	14	11	2
Cross a border	-	1	6	5	2
Avoid a problem with the police	10	1	8	12	3

In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to? (% a few times/often)

What Do Mozambicans Do When the State is Inaccessible?

It appears that at least part of the problem is that people have become used to the – often unspoken – game of corruption. When asked what they would do if they encountered a delay in obtaining an official permit or licence, one in four would readily resort to some type of unethical or illegal behaviour: 10 percent say they would simply offer a bribe, tip or gift; another 13 percent would “work their connections” by seeking out the help of influential people; and 2 percent would simply go ahead and do whatever they wanted to do without the permit.

Others would take a more sanctioned approach. Fourteen percent would seek official redress by writing a letter to superiors or head office. Another one-third express confidence in government by saying there was no reason to worry – if they just waited, the document would come. The most worrying are the dejected 14 percent who say there is nothing that can be done. Civic education on alternative courses of action available to citizens could empower them to demand better services. Respondents in the North are most likely to remain patient (40 percent), those in the Central region are most likely to use connections (16 percent), and those in the South are most likely to resort to bribery (13 percent).

Table 41: Citizen Strategies to Deal With Bureaucratic Delay

	National	Rural	Urban	North	Central	South
Don't worry, just wait	32	32	33	40	35	26
Write a letter head office	14	12	17	9	10	21
Do nothing because nothing can be done	14	15	13	4	17	17
Use connections to influential people	13	14	12	17	16	9
Offer a tip or give to an official	10	8	12	8	9	13
Do what you want without the permit	2	2	1	1	1	2
Other	4	<1	-			
Don't know	13	16	11	18	12	13

What would you do if you were waiting for a government permit or license, but kept encountering delays? (%)

Conclusion

As it emerged from a long and brutal civil war in the early 1990s, Mozambique faced many challenges as it embarked on the path of political and economic reform. One key task the country has faced in its efforts to democratise has been to empower ordinary citizens to participate in politics, voice opinions and needs, and demand accountability from the state. Another has been to build the state's capacity to respond effectively to these newly expressed needs and demand. And a third has

been to enhance the legitimacy of the state among all citizens so as to span the bitter partisan divides of the past.

The evidence from the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey in Mozambique suggests that, while there is still a long way to go and the country continues to face many seemingly insurmountable problems, the public does indeed perceive progress in the country's travels down the path toward democracy. Mozambicans confirm that despite many challenges that are still unmet, the political space in the country has been steadily widening, and its institutions consolidating. Overall, their evaluations of the extent of democracy are on the increase. In particular, the country's ability to weather the storm generated by the 1999 elections and resolve the controversies peacefully and through established procedures may have done a great deal to increase citizens' confidence in their emerging democracy. At the same time, levels of satisfaction with democracy are still relatively low, and Mozambicans recognize that a great deal of content must still be added to this newly formed democratic shell.

Surprisingly, it is those in the southern region – those who are closest to the government and who have gained the most from Mozambique's recent economic progress – that are the least satisfied with the current state of political and economic affairs. This may reflect the differing political histories among the regions during the war years, resulting in differing expectations of what democracy should produce for the country, but it is a finding that deserves further exploration.

Sources Cited

- Arendt, H. 1969. *Between Past and Future*. Cleveland and New York: Harcourt, Bruce and World.
- Bryce, J. 1921. *Modern Democracy*. New York: Macmillan Co.
- Geffray, C. 1991. *A causa das armas em Mocambique: Antropologia de guerra contemporanea em Mocambique*. Porto: Edicoes Afrontamento.
- Karatnycky, A. 2002. "The 2001 Freedom House Survey." *Journal of Democracy* 13/1 (January): 108.
- Miller, D. (ed). 1991. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*. Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
- Mosse, M. and P. Gastrow. 2002. *Mozambique: Threats Posed by the Penetration of Criminal Networks*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Mozambique News Agency (AIM). 2002. *Mozambiquefile*. August, no. 313.
- Mozambique News Agency (AIM). 2002. *Mozambiquefile*. August, no. 314.
- Norris P. 1999. "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens," in P. Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pereira J.C.G. 1999. *The Politics of Survival: Peasants, Chiefs and Renamo in Maringue District, Mozambique, 1982-1992*.
- Perreira C.G. 1996. "As primera eleicoes multipartidarias e o comprtamento eleioral no distrito de Marromeu." *Boletim do Arquivo Historico de Mocambique*, 21. Maputo.
- Strong, C.F. 1997. *Modern Political Constitutions*. London: Sedgwick and Jackson.
- United Nations Development Programme. 2000. *Mozambique National Human Development Report 2000*. United Nations Development Programme.
- Weber, Max. 1922/1982. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society)*.
- Weinstein, J. 2000. "Mozambique: A Fading U.N. Success Story." *Journal of Democracy* 13/1 (January): 140-156.
- Whiteside, A., R. Mattes, S. Willan and R. Manning. 2002. "Examining HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa Through the Eyes of Ordinary Southern Africans." Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 21. Cape Town/Accra/East Lansing: Afrobarometer. www.afrobarometer.org.
- Woods, G. 1999. "Democratisation in Mozambique: Trends and Practices," *Democratisation* 6/2.