



# Violent extremism in Africa

Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn

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## Introduction

Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies' social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014).

In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns – the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region.

Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015).


Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE.<sup>1</sup> Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST).

These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism's impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present.

Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in 2014/2015 asked security-related questions in several countries that have experienced growth in violent extremism in recent years. This paper provides exploratory analysis of new opinion data from three of sub-

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<sup>1</sup> In April 2015, the U.S. government drafted an action agenda that outlines its CVE strategies (Baker & Davis, 2015). The European Union has laid out its CVE approach in the 2014 Strategy on Prevention of Radicalization and Recruitment (European Commission, 2014).



Saharan Africa's regional "hotspots" of extremist activity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific groups:

1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria)
2. Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun (among others) in the Sahel region (Mali).
3. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Uganda).

Afrobarometer survey data suggest that security-related issues are a top priority for citizens of countries that have experienced high levels of extremist activity. Public trust in security forces varies widely by country; trust is generally lower in the police than in the army. Public approval of government counter-extremist efforts ranged from about four in 10 in Nigeria and Kenya to three-fourths or more in Mali, Cameroon, Niger, and Uganda. Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Among citizens' perceptions of what motivates people to join extremist groups, personal gain was a far more common response than religious beliefs.

While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism.


### **Afrobarometer survey**

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in Africa. Five rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2013, and results from Round 6 surveys (2014/2015) are currently being released. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples, which yield country-level results with a margin of sampling error of +/-2% (for a sample of 2,400) or +/-3% (for a sample of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level. Round 6 interviews with almost 54,000 citizens in 36 represent the views of more than three-fourths of the continent's population (see Appendix Table A.1 for a list of countries and survey dates).

This policy paper draws mainly on Round 6 data from the six sub-Saharan countries where questions on violent extremism were asked: Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Mali, Kenya, and Uganda. Findings from North African countries related to violent extremism are reported in Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 100 (available at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org)).

### **Key findings**

- About four in 10 Kenyans (45%), Nigerians (39%), and Malians (38%) cited security-related issues as one of the top three problems facing their countries – roughly double the average (19%) across 36 countries surveyed in 2014/2015.
- Security was a higher priority for additional government spending in Nigeria (43%), Kenya (34%), Cameroon (22%), Mali (21%), and Niger (19%) than on average across 36 countries (17%).
- Across 36 countries, only half (51%) of respondents said they trust the police "somewhat" or "a lot," while 64% said they trust the army. Among the six countries under study, trust levels were highest in Niger (86% police, 92% army) and lowest in Nigeria (21% and 40%).

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- In the Lake Chad region:
    - Nigerians were more likely to believe that there was local and international support for extremist groups like Boko Haram (33% on average across a range of potential sources) than their counterparts in Cameroon (11%) and Niger (12%).
    - Nigerians were far more critical of government counter-extremist efforts (during former President Goodluck Jonathan's administration) than Cameroonians and Nigeriens.
    - Bolstering the military response to armed extremism was significantly more popular in Niger (73%) and Cameroon (58%) than in Nigeria (40%).
    - A desire for personal enrichment or personal power was seen as a far more common motivation for people to join extremist groups than religious beliefs.
  
  - In Mali:
    - As of December 2014, three-quarters (75%) of Malians said that negotiation between the government and armed groups was the best way of addressing the crisis in the North of the country.
    - The proportion of citizens who said that prosecuting suspected extremists was the best option for lasting peace and reconciliation dropped by about half between 2013 (70%) and 2014 (36%).
    - Three-fourths (75%) of Malians approved of the government's efforts to counter violent extremism.
  
  - In Kenya and Uganda:
    - Public approval of the government's response to extremism was considerably lower among Kenyans (44%) than among Ugandans (83%).
    - Although two-thirds (66%) of Kenyans said that the country's intervention in Somalia had been worth the extremist reprisals, only 43% would oppose a military withdrawal.


## Prioritizing security in Africa

Across 36 countries surveyed in 2014/2015, about one in five citizens (19%) cited security-related issues (crime and security, political violence, political instability, ethnic tensions, interstate war, civil war, and terrorism) as one of the three most important problems facing their country. This places security in seventh place, following unemployment, health, education, infrastructure/transport, water supply, and poverty (Bentley et al., 2015) (Figure 1).


Perceptions of problems varied widely by country. Security was a leading concern for half of the countries featured in this publication: Kenya (cited by 45% of respondents, placing it first among all problems), Nigeria (39%), and Mali (38%), all of which experienced significant threats from violent extremist groups prior to the time of their respective surveys (Figure 2). The proportion of citizens who cited security among the top three national problems was significantly lower in Cameroon (22%), Niger (14%), and Uganda (10%).

When asked which of six key sectors should be prioritized if their governments could increase their expenditures, only 17% of citizens across 36 countries cited security as their first or second priority for future investment. This is significantly lower than the responses for education (55%), health care (51%), agriculture (30%), and infrastructure

(27%) (see Appendix Table A.2). Citizens' preferences varied considerably by national context. Prioritization of investment in security was higher than average in Nigeria (43%), Kenya (34%), Cameroon (22%), Mali (21%), and Niger (19%) (Figure 3).




**Figure 1: Most important national problems | 36 countries | 2014/2015**



**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?*

*Note: Respondents could give up to three responses. Figure shows % of respondents who cited each issue among their top three problems. "Security-related issues" combines the categories of crime and security, political violence, political instability, ethnic tensions, interstate war, civil war, and terrorism.)*


**Figure 2: Security-related issues among top three problems facing their country | 36 countries | 2014/2015**



**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?*

**Note:** Respondents could give up to three responses. Figure shows % of respondents who cited each issue among their top three problems. "Security-related issues" combines the categories of crime and security, political violence, political instability, ethnic tensions, interstate war, civil war, and terrorism.)

**Figure 3: Security as a priority for additional government spending**  
 | 36 countries | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:** *If the government of this country could increase its spending, which of the following areas do you think should be the top priority for additional investment? And which would be your second priority? (% who cited security as one of their two priorities)*

### Public trust in security forces


Public trust in security forces has a profound effect on the success of security-led initiatives to combat violent extremism. It determines whether local communities, who are an important source of information and often best situated to understand the distinct dynamics of conflict in their region, are willing to work with or against security forces (Hultman, 2007). A lack of trust in the army or police, particularly in their ability to identify armed extremists among the general population, could incite civilian support for these violent organisations. Furthermore, disarmament, deradicalization, and reintegration programs generally target people who were drawn into violent extremist groups through either coercion or financial incentives, rather than ideology.

A lack of trust in security forces could deter these people from engaging with such programs, fearing that involvement with security forces will compromise their safety.

### Police force

Across the 36 African countries surveyed in 2014/2015, on average only half (51%) of citizens said they trust the police "a lot" or "somewhat" (Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Trust in police** | 36 countries | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The police? (% "a lot" or "somewhat")





Public trust in the police was highest in East Africa (57%), followed closely by North Africa (56%) and Southern Africa (54%), while West Africans and Central Africans were less trusting.<sup>2</sup> Among the six countries that are the focus of this analysis, public confidence was lowest in Nigeria (21%) and Kenya (36%) and highest in Niger, where almost nine in 10 citizens (86%) said they trust the police.

The 2014/2015 survey also found that the police were the public institution most widely considered to be corrupt: Almost half of survey respondents (47%) in sub-Saharan Africa said that “all” or “most” police officials are involved in corruption, followed by business executives (42%), government officials (38%), and tax officials (37%) (Transparency International, 2015). Across all 36 surveyed countries, 45% of citizens shared this view (see Appendix, Table A.3, for full frequencies). Levels of perceived corruption among the police were significantly lower in North Africa (31%) than in other regions.

### Armed forces

Public confidence in the armed forces is generally higher than in the police: 64% of Africans said they trust their respective armies “a lot” or “somewhat” (Figure 5), 13 percentage points more than trust the police. Regional averages follow the same overall ranking as with trust in the police, with the highest levels in East Africa (79%) and the lowest in Central Africa (52%). Nigerians were again the least trusting of all 36 countries, at four in 10 (40%), while Niger (92%) had the second-most-trusting citizenry, exceeded only by Tunisians (94%). Among the six featured countries, all but Nigeria expressed above-average levels of trust in the army, including Kenya, whose armed forces enjoy considerably more confidence than the police (68% vs. 36%).

### Violent extremism in the Lake Chad region


Nigeria has experienced an exponential rise in violent extremism over the past six years (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). A majority of these attacks are attributable to Boko Haram. Established in 2009, the group seeks to overthrow the Nigerian state and establish a caliphate governed by *sharia* law. In 2014, Boko Haram surpassed IS as the world’s deadliest violent extremist organisation, with an estimated 7,512 casualties that year, representing an increase of 317% from the previous year (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015). The Council on Foreign Relations (2016) estimates that 23,000 civilians have died since the beginning of the insurgency in 2010.

The Nigerian government has been criticized for a lack of coherent policy to combat Boko Haram, as well as for heavy-handed approaches taken by the Nigerian Police Service, the State Security Service, and the military. Amnesty International (2015) reports that since the insurgency began, “military forces have extrajudicially executed more than 1,200 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture” (p. 4).

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<sup>2</sup> Regional groupings are: East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo), Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe), North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia), and Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe).

**Figure 5: Trust in armed forces** | 36 countries | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The army? (% "a lot" or "somewhat")

Boko Haram's activities are largely concentrated in the country's northeastern states (Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa), but over the past two years, they have increasingly exploited the porous borders in the Lake Chad area to establish a presence in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. An estimated 2.3 million people have been displaced in the region as a result of this crisis (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015).




In response to this growing regional threat, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – a combined formation of security forces from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin backed by the African Union (AU) – launched its West African Offensive in January 2015. The following month, Boko Haram posted a statement on YouTube threatening countries contributing troops to the MNJTF with reprisal attacks (Al Arabiya, 2015). Since then, Boko Haram has increased the frequency of its attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

### Prioritizing violent extremism in the region

As seen above, countries differ significantly in their citizens' rankings of security as a problem and as a priority for additional government spending. In the Lake Chad region, about four in 10 Nigerians cited security-related issues among their top problems and investment priorities, compared to about half as many Cameroonians and even fewer Nigeriens and Beninese (Figure 6). (Afrobarometer has not conducted a survey in Chad.)

**Figure 6: Prioritizing security** | 4 countries in Lake Chad region | 2014/2015




#### Respondents were asked:

1. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (% who cited security-related issues among their three responses)
2. If the government of this country could increase its spending, which of the following areas do you think should be the top priority for additional investment? And which would be your second priority? (% who cited security as one of their two priorities)

Each country's experience of armed extremism helps to explain these differences in perception. Nigerians' preoccupation with security is not surprising, given the high number of attacks and fatalities in the country (Table 1). Security was not a priority at all for Nigerians in the initial Afrobarometer survey in 2000 but increased dramatically in priority starting in 2012 (Appendix, Table A.4).

**Table 1: Frequency and impact of extremist attacks** | 4 countries in Lake Chad region | 2014/2015



	Survey dates	Security a priority problem	Number of attacks, 2014 <sup>3</sup>	Number of fatalities, 2014	Global Terrorism Index score, 2014 <sup>4</sup>
<b>Nigeria</b>	Dec 2014-Jan 2015	39%	621	7,461	8.58
<b>Cameroon</b>	Jan-Feb 2015	22%	56	526	1.45
<b>Niger</b>	April 2015	14%	3	11	2.59
<b>Benin</b>	May-June 2014	10%	0	0	0

Cameroon recorded its first Boko Haram attack in early 2013. The group increased its activity in the country over the following year and in July 2014 attacked the home village and kidnapped the wife of Cameroonian Deputy President Amadou Ali (Al Jazeera, 2014). Corresponding to their less intense experience of Boko Haram violence, Cameroonians were less likely than Nigerians to cite security as a top national concern (22% vs. 39%). Similarly, citizens of Niger, which recorded three violent extremist attacks in 2014, were less likely than Cameroonians to rate security as a top problem (14%).<sup>5</sup> Although Benin has contributed 800 soldiers to the MNJTF, to date no confirmed Boko Haram attacks have occurred in the country.

### Perceived support for violent extremist groups

To assess citizens' perceptions of support for violent extremist groups, Afrobarometer asked respondents in Nigeria and Cameroon, "How many of the following people do you think are involved in supporting and assisting the extremist groups that have launched attacks and kidnappings in [country], or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Traditional leaders? Local government officials? Senior officials in the federal and central government? Members of the [country's] military? Members of the National Assembly? [The country's] Muslims? International extremist groups?"


Perceived support for armed extremism was considerably lower in Cameroon than in Nigeria (Figure 7). On average, one-third (33%) of Nigerians said "most" or "all" members of these entities assist organisations like Boko Haram, compared to 11% of Cameroonians. In both countries, support was perceived as highest among

<sup>3</sup> Numbers were derived using all three criteria used to define a terrorism incident in the Global Terrorism Database: An act must (1) "be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal," (2) "be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims," and (3) "be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). Ambiguous cases were excluded from the search criteria.


<sup>4</sup> A country's Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (2015) score is based on the number of attacks, fatalities, and injuries as well as the amount of property damage attributed to terrorists in a given year (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Niger's GTI score is higher than Cameroon's, despite a lower number of attacks in 2014, because the index takes into account attacks from the preceding four years in order to account for the traumatic after-effects of terrorist attacks.

international extremist groups (43% and 32%, respectively) and as lowest among traditional leaders. (For full frequencies, see Appendix Table A.5.)



**Figure 7: Perceived support for armed extremism | Nigeria vs. Cameroon | 2014/2015**




**Respondents were asked:** How many of the following people do you think are involved in supporting and assisting the extremist groups that have launched attacks and kidnappings in [country], or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% "most of them" or "all of them")

A similar question was asked in Niger, where perceptions of support for Boko Haram among Western countries (36%) were considerably higher than among all of the other categories (Figure 8). Only 5% of Nigeriens "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that civil society organisations and the media support the extremist group. (For full frequencies, see Appendix Table A.6). As in Cameroon, perceived support among local Muslims was low (13%), in contrast to Nigeria, where more than one-third (36%) of respondents believe that "all" or "most" Muslim citizens support extremist groups.

The prevalence of the belief that Western countries support groups like Boko Haram in Niger is surprising and clearly indicates a need for further exploration of citizen views if Western development partners are to play a larger role in countering violent extremism in the country.

**Figure 8: Perceived support for Boko Haram | Niger | 2015**




**Respondents were asked:** Do you disagree or agree with the following statements concerning the Islamist group Boko Haram: Certain Western countries support and assist Boko Haram? Certain \_\_\_\_\_ in this country support and assist Boko Haram? (% who "agree" or "strongly agree")



Large proportions of citizens in all three countries said support for extremist groups like Boko Haram is primarily driven by self-interest (Figure 9). A majority of Nigeriens (56%) and Nigerians (52%) believe that a desire for personal enrichment or personal power drives this support, as do 34% of Cameroonians. Despite Boko Haram's self-identification as a jihadist group, only about one in 10 respondents said supporters are primarily motivated by religious beliefs.

**Figure 9: Motivations for supporting extremist groups** | Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what is the main reason why some people in [country] support and assist these armed extremist groups?<sup>6</sup>*


Cameroonians were significantly more likely to respond “I don’t know” to this question (35%) than their counterparts in Niger (10%) and Nigeria (8%). They were also roughly twice as likely as Nigerians to say “I don’t know” when asked about sources of support for Boko Haram. This may indicate a lower level of awareness of the group in Cameroon in comparison with its neighbours.

### Addressing Boko Haram

Public evaluations of state counter-extremist efforts also differ considerably among countries: While only four in 10 Nigerians (42%) rated their government's efforts as “very effective” or “somewhat effective,” large majorities did so in Cameroon (81%) and Niger (96%) (Figure 10). These evaluations likely reflect the comparatively lower frequency of attacks in the latter countries.

<sup>6</sup> The survey text in Cameroon and Niger made specific reference to Boko Haram, although other extremist groups also operate in Niger.

**Figure 10: Evaluations of counter-extremist efforts** | Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:** *How effective do you think the [country] government has been in its efforts to address the problem of armed extremists in this country?*<sup>7</sup>


These assessments may also align with findings shown above regarding public trust in security forces. Nigerians expressed the lowest confidence in their security forces among the 36 countries surveyed in 2014/2015: Only 21% of respondents said they trust the police “a lot” or “somewhat,” while 40% said the same for the army. Low levels of trust in Nigerian security forces may have been reinforced by aggressive government counterinsurgency operations that have engaged in the indiscriminate arrest, torture, and extrajudicial killing of some suspected of being supporters or members of Boko Haram (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Moreover, nearly three-fourths of Nigerians view most or all police officials as corrupt (Appendix Table A.3). While Afrobarometer has not asked about perceived corruption in the military, recent accusations that Nigeria’s former defence chief, Alex Badeh, stole \$20 million from the government seem likely to strengthen such perceptions (BBC, 2016).

Trust in the police and the army is considerably higher in Cameroon (42% and 70%, respectively) and Niger (86% and 92%). This suggests that there may be a relationship between public trust and evaluations of counter-extremist efforts, although the direction of such a relationship is unclear.

In line with these varying evaluations and trust levels, support for strengthening military capacity in order to improve counter-extremism efforts is considerably higher in Niger (73%) and Cameroon (58%) than in Nigeria (40%) (Table 2). When respondents were asked what they think are the best and second-best ways to improve the effectiveness of their government’s response to violent extremists, strengthening military capacity was the most frequent response in all three countries. But in Nigeria it was nearly matched by improving the economy and creating jobs (34%), whereas in Niger and Cameroon, no other option came within 40 percentage points of a stronger military response. These divergent views could be a result of Nigerians’ awareness that past military approaches in the country failed to defeat Boko Haram, whereas military operations against the group are a relatively new development in Cameroon and Niger.

<sup>7</sup> The survey text in Cameroon and Niger made specific reference to Boko Haram.

**Table 2: Best ways to improve government response to armed extremism**  
| Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger | 2014/2015



	Nigeria	Cameroon	Niger	Average
<b>Strengthen the military response or military capabilities</b>	40%	58%	73%	65%
<b>Working together with religious leaders to address the issue</b>	17%	6%	20%	13%
<b>Working together with traditional leaders to address the issue</b>	14%	12%	9%	10%
<b>Cooperate more with other countries in our region to address the issue</b>	10%	16%	4%	10%
<b>Improve the economy and create more jobs</b>	34%	9%	11%	10%
<b>Nothing/The government is already effective in combating them</b>	5%	8%	10%	9%
<b>Govern more effectively / provide better government services</b>	16%	8%	6%	7%
<b>Cooperate more with the international community to address the issue</b>	12%	8%	2%	5%
<b>Improve education standards</b>	16%	4%	2%	3%
<b>Give more power to local governments to make their own decisions</b>	9%	2%	4%	3%
<b>Treat the communities the extremists come from more fairly</b>	9%	2%	1%	1%
<b>Increase resources distributed to states and local communities</b>	6%	1%	1%	1%
<b>Split the country</b>	2%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Other</b>	1%	15%	9%	12%
<b>Don't know</b>	2%	12%	3%	7%

**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what do you think would be the best way for the government to be more effective in addressing the problem of armed extremists in our country? And what would be the second-best way? (% of respondents who cited each option among their two responses)*

The second-most-frequent response in Cameroon was regional cooperation (16%), but this approach enjoyed less support in Nigeria and Niger. Regional approaches to addressing violent extremism in West and Central Africa include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Counterterrorism Strategy (with an implementation plan adopted in 2013) and the West African Police Information System (WAPIS). However, relationships between Nigeria and many of its neighbours are characterized by mistrust, especially in the Lake Chad region, where tensions are exacerbated by territorial and water disputes (Okpara, Stringer, Dougill, & Bila, 2015). As Adetula (2015) writes, in relation to these regional CVE efforts, “How much will be achieved depends a lot on the capacity and political will of the countries to implement commitments and common standards that have already been agreed to” (p. 20).

### **Violent extremism in Mali**

The Sahel has become a hub of violent extremist activity. In addition to governance and security weaknesses conducive to jihadist groups (Steinburg & Weber, 2015), ,





the 2011 Libyan civil war and subsequent collapse of the country's security apparatus flooded the region with light and heavy weapons from the state's immense arms stockpiles, "enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups" (United Nations Security Council, 2013).

Rather than a single dominant group, as in the Lake Chad region, several smaller violent extremist groups are based in the Sahel. Their alliances shift frequently. The most active groups include Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun. While their specific goals differ, they all share a common Salafi/Islamist ideology (Lacher & Steinberg, 2015). These groups are most active in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

In December 2014, the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad created the G5 Sahel, an institutional framework that aims to coordinate both development and security policies in the region, with the support of the United Nations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015).

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Violent extremism in Mali is part of a larger security crisis involving jihadist movements and separatist groups in the North of the country. The regional mix of extremist activity came into clear focus in northern Mali in March

2012, when Mali's president, Amadou Toumani Touré, was ousted in a military coup. In the ensuing instability, Tuareg separatists allied with Ansar Dine and AQIM and gained control over cities and territories across northern Mali. The capture of the country's capital, Bamako, was narrowly avoided by French military intervention (Cilliers, 2015). UN peacekeeping forces were deployed to the country in April 2013 to support the re-establishment of state authority.

However, despite significant progress toward peace, including an agreement between the Mali government and the Tuareg separatists, armed jihadist groups continue their activities unabated. Of 199 terrorist attacks in Mali between 1990 and 2014 (killing 725 people), 70% occurred between 2012 and 2014 (Miller, 2015). The frequency of terror attacks has only increased since 2014, with 77 attacks in the first six months of 2015. In November 2015, al Mourabitoun and AQIM attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, killing 20 civilians.


The same groups claimed responsibility for high-profile attacks in neighbouring Burkina Faso (January 2015) and Côte d'Ivoire (January 2016), and France has expanded its military and counter-terrorism operations across the entire Sahel region (Al Jazeera, 2014; Sèbe, 2016).

### *Prioritizing violent extremism*

Security-related issues became prominent in Mali after 2008; prior to that point, they accounted for 10% or less of total responses, then increased sharply to 51% in 2012 and 56% in 2013 (see Appendix, Table A.7). By 2014, this declined to 38%, reflecting growing public optimism in the country.

Still, Malians were about twice as likely as the continental average to consider security-related issues a top national problem their government should address (19% on average across 36 surveyed countries). In comparison, only 11% of citizens in Burkina Faso and 22% in Côte d'Ivoire considered security a top problem (Figure 11). Similarly, Malians were more likely to support greater government spending on security than Ivoirians and Burkinabé.

**Figure 11: Prioritizing security** | Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:**

1. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (% who cited security-related issues among their three responses)
2. If the government of this country could increase its spending, which of the following areas do you think should be the top priority for additional investment? And which would be your second priority? (% who cited security-related issues among their two priorities)

As in the Lake Chad region, citizens' views on the priority of security-related problems appear to correlate with the frequency of violent extremist attacks. Burkina Faso experienced no major incidents in 2014. Malians, in comparison, experienced 55 attacks by violent extremist groups in 2014, and are about four times as likely as Burkinabé to identify security as a national priority (Table 3). Côte d'Ivoire experienced one incident in 2014, though incidents in preceding years as well as instability in neighbouring states may have had an effect on citizen priorities.

**Table 3: Frequency and impact of extremist attacks** | Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso | 2014/2015

	Survey dates	Security a priority problem	Number of attacks, 2014	Number of fatalities, 2014	Global Terrorism Index score, 2014
<b>Mali</b>	Dec 2014	38%	55	117	5.29
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Aug-Sept 2014	22%	1	4	3.141
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	April-May 2015	11%	0	0	0.7

*Addressing the crisis in northern Mali*


The 2013 Afrobarometer survey in Mali found, unsurprisingly, that residents of the three northern provinces (Kidal, Tombouctou, and Gao) bore the brunt of the political crisis (Coulibaly, 2014). However, the November 2015 attack on the country's capital shows the extent to which the security crisis is a national problem, as opposed to a problem affecting only certain regions of the country.

This section will address questions related to the crisis in general, while those specifically referring to violent extremism will be addressed in the next section.

Previous analysis found that the proportion of Malians who felt that the country was “mostly secure” or “totally secure” increased significantly between 2012 (17%) and 2013 (60%) (Bratton & Penar, 2014). In 2012, the leading suggestion for resolving the political crisis was dialogue between the government and armed groups (favoured by 29% of survey respondents), while war between the two sides (25%) and war supported by ECOWAS forces (13%) also had significant support (Coulibaly, 2014).

According to the most recent survey results (2014), three-quarters of citizens said that negotiations between the government and armed groups offer the best chance of resolving the security crisis in the North (Figure 12). Support for a military solution was significantly lower, at 14%. This suggests an increase since 2012 in public preference for dialogue or negotiations over a purely military response.

**Figure 12: Best way to resolve crisis in the North | Mali | 2014**




**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, which of the following options now offers the best chance of resolving the crisis in northern Mali?*

Only 2% of respondents said that secession of the northern states is the best way to resolve the political crisis, a reduction of 8 percentage points since 2013. Citizen support for national unity remained high during the crisis: In 2013, nine in 10 respondents (92%) expressed their preference for remaining a unified country over northern secession (6%) (Bratton, Coulibaly, & Dulani, 2014).

Between the 2013 and 2014 surveys, the proportion of citizens who believe that retributive justice (i.e. prosecuting suspected extremists) is the best option for lasting peace and reconciliation dropped by about half, from 70% to 36%, while support increased for alternative measures such as general amnesty (24%) and confession and forgiveness (17%) (Figure 13).

**Figure 13: Best option for lasting peace and reconciliation** | Mali | 2013-2014




**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, which of the following options offers the best chance for lasting peace and reconciliation in Mali?*

### Addressing violent extremism in northern Mali

In December 2014, three-quarters (75%) of Malians said the government's efforts at addressing armed extremist groups in the North were "somewhat effective" or "very effective." Citizen satisfaction was lower in rural areas (62%) and in the capital, Bamako (53%) (Figure 14). Men, more educated citizens, and younger citizens were less likely to see government efforts as effective. Residents of the occupied regions were largely supportive of the government's efforts, although those in Tombouctou (72%) were less satisfied than residents of Gao (84%) and Kidal (83%).

**Figure 14: Effectiveness of counter-extremism efforts** | by region, education level, age, sex, and urban-rural location | Mali | 2014




**Respondents were asked:** *How effective do you think the government was in its efforts to address the problem of armed groups in northern Mali? (% who said "very effective" or "somewhat effective")*

When asked for suggestions on how to improve counter-extremist efforts, one-quarter (24%) of Malians said that no improvements were needed or that the government was already effective, which is significantly higher than levels of that response in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. As in the Lake Chad region, however, strengthening military responses and/or capabilities was the leading response option (32%), followed by negotiations (26%) (Figure 15). Public support for negotiations in Mali is particularly interesting, as it was not among the options presented to respondents and was therefore unprompted.



**Figure 15: Best ways to improve counter-extremism efforts | Mali | 2014**



**Respondents were asked:** What would you consider the best way for the government to be more effective in treating the problem of armed groups in northern Mali? And what would be the second-best way? (Figure shows % of respondents who cited each option among their two priorities.)

## Violent extremism in the Horn of Africa

Over the past decade, the al Shabaab insurgency against the Somali government has increasingly bled into the broader East Africa region. In January 2007, the African Union Peace and Security Council created the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a regional peacekeeping force mandated to support transitional government structures and assist in improving the security environment. In July 2010, al Shabaab launched its first major international attack in Kampala, Uganda, which left 76 dead and 70 injured (Al Jazeera, 2010). Since then, the group has targeted countries in the region contributing troops to AMISOM, carrying out attacks in Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania. Attempted attacks have been thwarted in Ethiopia.

In October 2011, Kenya and Somalia launched Operation *Linda Nchi* ("Protect the Country"), a joint military operation to take "coordinated pre-emptive action" against al Shabaab in southern Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2011). The move quickly



precipitated reprisal attacks in Kenya, which has witnessed a steady year-on-year increase in attacks by the group. An estimated 25% of al Shabaab militants are Kenyan nationals (BBC, 2014).


The group's deadliest attacks in Kenya targeted Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi (September 2013), resulting in 67 deaths and more than 175 wounded, and Garissa University College (April 2015), leaving 148 dead and 79 injured. The Westgate attack highlighted the role of foreign fighters within the group; Samantha Lewthwaite (popularly known as the "White Widow"), a British citizen, is alleged to have been instrumental in planning the incident (Guardian, 2013).

In response to the increased insecurity, the Kenyan government has taken a heavy-handed security-led approach, which has faced strong criticism for its alleged human-rights violations. In April 2014, the government launched *Usalama Watch*, an internal security operation aimed at improving security and capturing illegal aliens suspected to be supporting al Shabaab activities within Kenya. Amnesty International (2014) documented numerous cases of beatings, intimidation, extortion, and forcible relocation at the hands of government security forces, especially targeting the Somali Kenyan community.

### Prioritizing violent extremism in the region

As seen earlier, security-related issues were the most frequently cited problem in Kenya, mentioned by 45% of respondents (see Appendix Table A.8) compared to a 36-country average of 19%. This is well above the levels in neighbouring Tanzania (9%) and Uganda (10%) (Figure 16). One-third (34%) of Kenyans supported additional government spending on security, compared to only 14% of Tanzanians and 12% of Ugandans.

**Figure 16: Prioritizing security** | Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda | 2014/2015



#### Respondents were asked:

1. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (% who cited security-related issues among their three responses)
2. If the government of this country could increase its spending, which of the following areas do you think should be the top priority for additional investment? And which would be your second priority? (% who cited security-related issues among their two priorities)



As in the Lake Chad and Sahel regions, there appears to be a correlation between citizens' prioritization of security-related issues and the frequency of extremist attacks. Kenya experienced significantly more attacks in 2014 than either of its neighbours (Table 4).


**Table 4: Frequency and impact of extremist attacks** | Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda<sup>8</sup> | 2014/2015

	Survey dates	Security a priority problem	Number of attacks, 2014	Number of fatalities, 2014	Global Terrorism Index score, 2014
<b>Kenya</b>	Nov-Dec 2014	45%	95	287	6.58
<b>Tanzania</b>	Aug-Nov 2014	9%	9	4	3.71
<b>Uganda</b>	May 2015	10%	3	32	2.93

### Citizen responses to Kenyan intervention in Somalia

Public satisfaction with government efforts to combat terrorism was significantly lower in Kenya (44%) than in Uganda (83%) (Figure 17). As seen earlier, public confidence in security forces was also significantly lower in Kenya than in neighbouring countries: While only about one-third (36%) of Kenyans said they trust the police, around six in 10 citizens did so in Uganda (56%) and Tanzania (61%). Similarly, fewer Kenyans said they trust the army (68%) than did Ugandans (78%) and Tanzanians (82%).

**Figure 17: Evaluations of counter-terrorism efforts** | Kenya vs. Uganda<sup>9</sup> | 2014/2015



**Respondents were asked:** How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting terrorism in [country]?


In Kenya, citizen evaluations of the government's counter-extremist efforts varied little by gender, age, and urban-rural location. Respondents with no formal education expressed the lowest levels of support (24%) (Figure 18). Analysis by province (the

<sup>8</sup> The attacks in Uganda are attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a militia group, rather than to al Shabaab.

<sup>9</sup> This question was not asked in Tanzania.

country's former administrative unit) shows clear differences in citizen satisfaction: Residents of Central province expressed by far the highest levels of approval (79%), followed by Eastern province (53%) and Nairobi (48%), while residents of the North Eastern (12%), Coast (27%), and Western (29%) provinces were the most critical.

**Figure 18: Approval of counter-extremism efforts** | by region, education level, age, sex, and urban-rural location | Kenya | 2014



**Respondents were asked:** How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting terrorism in [country]? (% "very well" or "fairly well")

Kenyans showed some ambivalence regarding the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) intervention in Somalia. While two-thirds (66%) of citizens said the intervention "has been necessary despite the terrorist problems resulting from it," only 43% opposed withdrawing from Somalia (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2015).


Support for the intervention in Somalia was higher among men and citizens aged 18-49 years, and increased with formal education (Figure 19). There was no difference by urban/rural location, but support by province followed a similar pattern to public evaluations of the government's CVE efforts.

Regarding a KDF withdrawal from Somalia, male and younger Kenyans were more likely to oppose such a move than female and older citizens (Figure 20). Disagreement with a proposed withdrawal increased with education levels. Residents of the Central province again had the highest levels on this measure (63%), while disagreement was lowest in Nyanza (28%), Coast (33%), and North Eastern (34%) provinces.

These results could help the Kenyan government identify areas in which to focus awareness campaigns in order to bolster public support for future policies.




**Figure 19: Support for intervention in Somalia** | by region, education level, age, sex, and urban-rural location | Kenya | 2014



**Respondents were asked:** For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree, or haven't you heard enough to say: The involvement of Kenya Defence Forces or KDF in Somalia has been necessary despite the terrorist problems resulting from it? (% "strongly agree" or "agree")

**Figure 20: Opposition to KDF withdrawal from Somalia** | by region, education level, age, sex, and urban-rural location | Kenya | 2014



**Respondents were asked:** For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree, or haven't you heard enough to say: The KDF should pull out of Somalia? (% "strongly disagree" or "disagree")

## Conclusion

Over the past decade, the threat of violent extremism has grown substantially in a number of sub-Saharan African countries. Extremist groups' regionalization of their activities and strengthening of ties to international jihadist networks pose a significant challenge to national security forces, requiring greater regional cooperation between affected countries and support from international development partners.

Afrobarometer survey data indicate low levels of public trust in security forces, particularly the police, in many African countries, which may have an adverse effect on government efforts to prevent and address violent extremism.

Focusing on three regional "hotspots" for violent extremism – the Lake Chad region, Sahel, and Horn of Africa – analysis shows that citizens considered security-related issues a high-priority problem, especially in countries that had suffered frequent extremist attacks.

Public evaluations of government counter-extremist efforts varied widely by country, with high support in Niger, Cameroon, Uganda, and Mali. Nigerians and Kenyans, on the other hand, were significantly more critical of their governments' efforts. This, too, may be related to the precarious security situation in Nigeria and Kenya at the time of the surveys.

Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Nigerians also expressed substantial support for governance-related solutions. Malians were also highly supportive of negotiations between the government and armed groups, but the country's experience shows the difficulty of resolving violent extremism via dialogue: Although the government was able to agree on a peace agreement with a number of Tuareg rebel groups, jihadist groups such as AQIM continue to operate unabated.


Generally, support for increased regional and international cooperation was fairly low, despite the geographic spread of these extremist groups. Kenyans were somewhat ambivalent about their government's intervention in Somalia: Although two-thirds said that it has been necessary, less than half rejected a proposed withdrawal from Somalia.

Current understanding of countering and preventing violent extremism indicates, among other factors, a greater need to address root causes of conflicts and build stronger relationships between governments and local communities. While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism.



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## Appendix

**Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 6 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds**

Country	Months when Round 6 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Algeria	May-June 2015	2013
Benin	May-June 2014	2005, 2008, 2011
Botswana	June-July 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Burkina Faso	April-May 2015	2008, 2012
Burundi	September-October 2014	2012
Cameroon	January-February 2015	2013
Cape Verde	November-December 2014	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011
Côte d'Ivoire	August-September 2014	2013
Egypt	June-July 2015	2013
Gabon	September 2015	N/A
Ghana	May-June 2014	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Guinea	March-April 2015	2013
Kenya	November-December 2014	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011
Lesotho	May 2014	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Liberia	May 2015	2008, 2012
Madagascar	December 2015-January 2015	2005, 2008, 2013
Malawi	March-April 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Mali	December 2014	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013
Mauritius	June-July 2014	2012
Morocco	November 2015	2013
Mozambique	June-August 2015	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Namibia	August-September 2014	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012
Niger	April 2015	2013
Nigeria	December 2014-January 2015	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013
São Tomé and Príncipe	July-August 2015	N/A
Senegal	November-December 2014	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013
Sierra Leone	May-June 2015	2012
South Africa	August-September 2015	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011
Sudan	June 2015	2013
Swaziland	April 2015	2013
Tanzania	August-November 2014	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012




Country	Months when Round 6 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Togo	October 2014	2012
Tunisia	April-May 2015	2013
Uganda	May 2015	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Zambia	October 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013
Zimbabwe	November 2014	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012

**Table A.2: Citizens' priorities for additional government spending** | 36 countries | 2014/2015

	First priority	Second priority	Total
<b>Education</b>	37%	18%	55%
<b>Health care</b>	21%	30%	51%
<b>Agriculture</b>	13%	16%	30%
<b>Infrastructure</b>	14%	13%	27%
<b>Security</b>	8%	9%	17%
<b>Energy supply</b>	5%	10%	14%

**Respondents were asked:** *If the government of this country could increase its spending, which of the following areas do you think should be the top priority for additional investment? And which would be your second priority?*

Table A.3: Perceived corruption in police force | 36 countries | 2014/2015




	All/Most	Some	None	Don't know
Liberia	77%	19%	2%	1%
Kenya	75%	20%	3%	2%
Nigeria	72%	24%	2%	2%
Ghana	64%	25%	5%	6%
Gabon	63%	33%	3%	1%
Uganda	63%	25%	6%	5%
Sierra Leone	59%	26%	5%	10%
Zimbabwe	58%	31%	6%	4%
Cameroon	55%	34%	4%	6%
Benin	54%	38%	6%	2%
Mali	53%	34%	13%	0%
Zambia	51%	38%	7%	4%
Tanzania	50%	40%	6%	5%
Côte d'Ivoire	49%	40%	9%	2%
Madagascar	49%	36%	15%	1%
South Africa	48%	48%	4%	1%
Togo	44%	35%	8%	13%
Mozambique	43%	26%	9%	22%
Sudan	42%	43%	9%	6%
Swaziland	42%	45%	6%	8%
Burundi	41%	40%	15%	5%
Namibia	40%	50%	8%	3%
Lesotho	39%	36%	10%	15%
Malawi	39%	43%	10%	9%
Guinea	38%	40%	15%	7%
Botswana	34%	47%	11%	9%
Morocco	34%	55%	5%	6%
Senegal	31%	43%	13%	14%
Burkina Faso	28%	51%	18%	3%
São Tomé and Príncipe	28%	33%	11%	27%
Niger	27%	41%	27%	5%
Egypt	26%	53%	12%	10%
Tunisia	26%	47%	19%	7%
Algeria	25%	46%	17%	12%
Mauritius	22%	70%	5%	4%
Cape Verde	19%	37%	10%	34%
East Africa	57%	31%	7%	4%
Central Africa	48%	34%	6%	12%
West Africa	47%	35%	10%	8%
Southern Africa	42%	43%	8%	7%
North Africa	31%	49%	12%	8%
Average	45%	39%	9%	8%

**Respondents were asked:** How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The police?



**Figure A.1: Media-reported deaths attributed to Boko Haram** | May 2011-  
January 2016




Source: Council on Foreign Relations (2016)

**Table A.4: Security-related issues as an important problem** | Nigeria  
| 2000-2014<sup>10</sup>

	2000	2003	2005	2008	2012	2014
<b>First response</b>	0%	4%	1%	1%	13%	12%
<b>Second response</b>	0%	6%	4%	3%	9%	9%
<b>Third response</b>	-	8%	5%	4%	12%	15%
<b>Total</b>	0%	18%	10%	8%	34%	36%

**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (Note: Respondents were allowed to give up to two responses in 2000 and up to three responses in subsequent survey rounds. The table shows the percentage of respondents who cited security-related issues as an important national problem.)*

<sup>10</sup> Numbers do not include “other responses” specific to that year (e.g. “Boko Haram” in 2014).



**Table A.5: Perceived support for extremism | Nigeria vs. Cameroon | 2014/2015**


	None	Some	Most	All	Don't know
<b>Nigeria</b>					
Traditional leaders	26%	39%	15%	5%	15%
Local government officials	23%	37%	18%	6%	16%
Senior federal/central government officials	11%	40%	26%	12%	11%
Members of Nigerian military	13%	44%	23%	8%	11%
Members of National Assembly	12%	40%	27%	8%	13%
Nigerian Muslims	16%	35%	25%	12%	13%
International extremist groups	10%	33%	27%	16%	14%
<b>Cameroon</b>					
Traditional leaders	33%	35%	4%	1%	26%
Local government officials	35%	32%	4%	1%	28%
Senior officials in government	26%	38%	6%	1%	28%
Members of Cameroonian military	34%	31%	5%	1%	29%
Members of National Assembly and Senate	30%	32%	4%	1%	31%
Cameroonian Muslims	10%	39%	11%	2%	27%
International extremist groups	10%	26%	22%	10%	31%

**Respondents were asked:** How many of the following people do you think are involved in supporting and assisting the extremist groups that have launched attacks and kidnappings in \_\_\_\_\_, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

**Table A.6: Perceived support for extremism | Niger | 2015**

	Disagree/Strongly disagree	Agree/Strongly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Don't know
Traditional leaders	86%	7%	2%	4%
Media	86%	5%	3%	6%
Civil society organisations	86%	5%	2%	6%
Politicians	83%	8%	4%	5%
Nigerien Muslims	81%	13%	3%	3%
Regions	81%	12%	3%	5%
Western countries	48%	36%	5%	11%

**Respondents were asked:** Do you disagree or agree with the following statements concerning the Islamist group Boko Haram: Certain Western countries support and assist Boko Haram? Certain \_\_\_\_\_ in this country support and assist Boko Haram?



**Table A.7: Security-related issues as a national priority | Mali | 2001-2014**

	2001	2002	2005	2008	2012	2013	2014
<b>First response</b>	4%	1%	1%	3%	33%	33%	19%
<b>Second response</b>	2%	3%	1%	4%	10%	11%	9%
<b>Third response</b>	Not asked	5%	2%	3%	8%	12%	10%
<b>Total</b>	6%	9%	4%	10%	51%	56%	38%

**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (Note: Respondents were allowed to give up to two responses in 2001 and up to three responses in subsequent survey rounds. The table shows the percentage of respondents who cited security-related issues as an important national problem.)*

**Table A.8: Security-related issues as a national priority | Kenya | 2003-2014**

	2003	2005	2008	2011	2014
<b>First response</b>	5%	6%	8%	5%	20%
<b>Second response</b>	6%	6%	10%	8%	13%
<b>Third response</b>	8%	7%	10%	10%	11%
<b>Total</b>	19%	19%	28%	23%	45%

**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (Note: Respondents were allowed to give up to three responses. The table shows the percentage of respondents who cited security-related issues as an important national problem. Due to rounding, total may differ by 1 percentage point from the sum of responses.)*

# AFRO BAROMETER

LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY



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For more information, please visit [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

*Cover image: Adapted from photograph by Jordi Bernabeu Farrús [CC BY 2.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0>)] showing traders fleeing an explosion at Bakara market in Mogadishu, Somalia.*

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