



The viability of political opposition in Africa: Popular views

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Introduction

How competitive are African political regimes? Why do opposition parties often struggle to gain a foothold? In many countries, an incumbent ruling party dominates the political arena, essentially reducing elections to a one-horse race and limiting day-to-day governance to a closed shop. In these countries it is unclear whether opposition political parties are sufficiently viable – either alone or in electoral alliance – to amass enough votes to win and exercise political office.


This paper addresses the question of opposition viability from the perspective of ordinary African citizens. Do citizens desire real choices at the ballot box? Do they differentiate ruling and opposition parties, and if so, how? And how do they perceive the role of the political opposition in the long periods between elections? Do they wish opposition parties to play the classic democratic role of holding rulers accountable? And what explains the perceived viability of political opposition?

We offer preliminary answers to these questions with reference to early returns from 31,163 interviews conducted in the first 20 countries surveyed during Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014-2015).¹

Key findings

- During elections, Africans want political competition: Across 20 countries in 2014-2015, two-thirds (68%) of Africans interviewed say they prefer a system with “many political parties” to ensure that people have real choices, a level of opinion that has held steady since 2005.
- But between elections, they prefer conciliation to competition: Rather than “holding government accountable,” strong majorities in almost every African country surveyed want opposition parties to “cooperate with the government and help it develop the country.”
- In survey-based comparisons of popular trust across a range of political institutions, citizens consistently grant the lowest levels of trust to opposition parties.
- Citizens perceive a larger trust gap between ruling and opposition parties in countries that have not experienced a recent peaceful electoral turnover of ruling parties.
- A majority of citizens think that the political opposition has a viable vision and plan for governing in only four African countries: Malawi, Madagascar, Namibia, and Ghana.
- Asked about the “most important difference between ruling and opposition parties,” a plurality of citizens (23%) claim to distinguish them based on their “economic and development policies.”
- In practice, however, when judging the viability of political opposition, citizens rely more on feelings of institutional trust than on assessments of policy performance.

¹ In Round 6, Afrobarometer will ultimately conduct surveys in 35 or 36 countries. As of August 2015, data are available from 21 countries. See www.afrobarometer.org for more information. However, because Swaziland holds only non-partisan elections and the status of political parties in the country remains unclear, many of the questions about ruling and opposition parties that form the basis for this analysis could not be asked there. In a few cases where we do have data from Swaziland on a particular question, it is added in as a 21st country, but otherwise, mean values are reported only across 20 countries. This paper also makes over-time comparisons for 15 of those countries where we have data dating back to Afrobarometer Round 3 (2005-2006).




Afrobarometer

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in Africa. Five rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2013, and Round 6 surveys are currently under way (2014-2015). Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples, yielding results with a margin of error of +/-2% (for a sample of 2,400) or +/-3% (for a sample of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level.

Multiparty competition

To begin to assess the viability of political opposition in Africa, Afrobarometer asks about popular support for a multiparty political system. On average across 20 countries, two-thirds (68%) of Africans interviewed say they prefer a system with "many political parties" to ensure that voters have a choice of leaders at the time of elections (Figure 1). Although multiparty competition attracts majority support, it does so at a lower level than elections in general (83%, not shown), which suggests that at least some Africans remain comfortable with ceremonial contests that serve mainly to confirm incumbents in power.

Figure 1: Popular support for a multiparty political system | 21 countries
| 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [your country].
Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make sure that people have real choices in who governs them.
(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" with Statement 2)




Moreover, across countries, the range of support for multiparty politics is wide, from a high of 82% in Côte d'Ivoire (which approaches a critical contest in October 2015) to a low of 42% in Senegal. In one of the few questions that could be asked about multiparty competition in Swaziland, support is even lower, at just 31%. In this context, where it is unclear whether political parties are legal, 64% of Swazis believe that parties are too divisive for the country.

The average level of popular support for a multiparty system has held steady over time. In the 15 countries for which Afrobarometer currently has trend data², multiparty competition is favoured by about the same proportion in 2015 (65%) as in 2005 (64%).

Yet citizens in different countries display distinctive patterns of opinion on this subject. Malawians have always preferred multiparty competition, never more widely than today (Figure 2). And Namibians are far more supportive of the right of opposition parties to contest elections now (73%) compared to 2005 (57%). By contrast, support for multiparty competition in Madagascar has fluctuated alongside the country's unstable political fortunes; at present, Malagasy are lukewarm toward political competition, and support for multiple parties has sometimes been only a minority sentiment. And despite 2012 elections in Senegal that blocked an incumbent president from securing a third term, citizens have voiced newfound scepticism that multiparty competition suits their country's political needs.

Figure 2: Trends in support for a multiparty political system | selected countries
| 2005-2015




(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" that many parties are needed)

On average, nearly two-thirds (65%) of Africans feel that, in practice, elections offer voters a genuine choice, although Nigerians (33%), Zimbabweans (46%), and Tanzanians (48%) find elections much more deficient in this regard (Figure 3). Senegal – where, incongruously, support for multiparty competition is low – tops the list (86%). Malians also consider that restored democracy offers real political options (84%).

² Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Figure 3: Elections offer voters a genuine choice | 20 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections: Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections? (% "often" or "always")*


Role of the opposition

Majorities of citizens in most countries therefore agree that opposition parties should exist, contest elections, and offer voters electoral choices. But what do people think opposition parties should do for the rest of the time, that is, in the long intervals between elections? The classic view of the opposition's role in a democracy is that it should be a watchdog – and inevitably a critic – of government, checking the activities of public officials and holding them politically accountable.

But Afrobarometer results reveal that Africans generally do not subscribe to this vision. On average across 20 countries, only one-fourth (27%) of survey respondents consider that "opposition parties should monitor and criticize government in order to hold it accountable" (Figure 4). Rather, strong majorities in almost every country – ranging from 61% in Ghana to 82% in Botswana and Senegal – instead want opposition parties to "cooperate with the government and help it develop the country." Only in Mauritius, a parliamentary system that has experienced frequent electoral turnovers, does a majority opt for an adversarial role for a (loyal) opposition.

An earlier Afrobarometer study made a case that a non-confrontational role for opposition parties in Africa is consistent with a widespread cultural preference for consensus politics (Logan, 2008). Recent research on Mali further suggests that opposition parties are easily tempted to collude in the distribution of patronage rewards rather than criticize an incumbent government from outside the spoils system (Gottlieb, 2014).

Figure 4: Perceived role of opposition parties | 20 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view?
 Statement 1: After losing an election, opposition parties should monitor and criticize the government in order to hold it accountable.
 Statement 2: Once an election is over, opposition parties and politicians should accept defeat and cooperate with government to help it develop the country.

There are other possible explanations. Perhaps conciliatory attitudes reflect popular perceptions that the differences among political parties are more personal than programmatic. Or perhaps citizens think that leaders place their own interests and careers ahead of the public good. Under these conditions, and once elections are over, people might expect to gain little from an adversarial relationship among political elites. The perception is in fact widespread in Africa that leaders are more interested in advancing their own political ambitions than in serving the interests of people: 71% agree, including majorities in all countries (not shown), although barely so in Lesotho (51%), where nearly half the public see leaders as public-minded. However, popular beliefs that leaders put personal ambitions above the public interest are weakly but significantly, and negatively ($r=-.029, p<.01$), associated with preference for an adversarial opposition. The large proportion of Africans who see political leaders as interested in serving their own interests suggests instead that citizens who perceive a self-serving leadership also recognize that governments cannot be left to police themselves.

It is also possible that Africans ascribe a limited role to opposition political parties simply because they do not trust them; in the current Afrobarometer data, an individual's trust in the political opposition is positively, significantly, and somewhat more strongly related to his or her preference that these parties demand accountability ($r = .073$, $p < .001$). To explore this possibility further, we now turn to the subject of trust.



Institutional trust

In survey-based comparisons of popular trust across a range of political institutions, African citizens consistently grant the *lowest* levels of trust to opposition parties. Afrobarometer rankings of trusted institutions – led by religious leaders, the army, and government broadcasters – consistently place opposition parties dead last (Table 1).

Importantly, a large inter-party trust gap has historically separated opposition and ruling parties. According to trends across 15 countries (see the matched columns for

Table 1: Institutional trust | selected countries | 2005-2015

2005	18 countries	15 countries	2015	20 countries	15 countries
	(unmatched)	(matched)		(unmatched)	(matched)
Army	65	65	Religious leaders	75	76
Government broadcaster	65	64	Army	65	67
President	64	62	Traditional leaders	60	63
Law courts	62	60	President	59	57
Police	58	58	Law courts	56	57
Parliament	56	54	Electoral commission	53	53
Ruling party	56	53	Police	52	51
Independent broadcasters	55	55	Parliament	50	51
Electoral commission	53	51	Local council	50	51
Local council	53	51	Ruling party	47	48
Independent newspapers	51	51	Tax department	46	47
Government newspapers	49	41			
Opposition parties	36	36	Opposition parties	38	39


Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following? (% "somewhat" or "a lot")




each year), more than half (53%) of Africans interviewed in 2005 said that they trusted ruling parties “somewhat” or “a lot,” but just over one-third (36%) said the same about opposition parties. While this trust gap has closed significantly over time, dropping from 17 percentage points to 9, the change is due more to declining popular trust in ruling parties (down an average 5 percentage points between 2005 and 2015, to 48%) than rising popular trust in opposition parties (up an average of 3 percentage points, to 39%).

Average continental patterns again conceal important country differences. Among the countries with the largest gaps in favour of incumbent rulers, we find several – including Namibia (25-percentage-point gap), Botswana (23-point gap), and Tanzania (17-point gap) – that possess one-party dominant systems (Figure 5). We also find Burundi (29-point-gap) and Zimbabwe (20 points), both of which are ruled by strongmen who have manipulated rules to undermine opposition parties and maintain their hold on power. Others, such as Mali (16 points), Lesotho (16 points), and Kenya (15 points), are generally more competitive, but the ruling party nonetheless has a strong trust advantage.

Figure 5: Trust in ruling and opposition parties | 20 countries (ordered by size of the trust gap) | 2014/2015







Indeed, trust in the ruling party exceeds trust in the opposition in 16 out of 20 Afrobarometer countries in 2015, though the gap is very small in Benin, and in Madagascar no party attracts much trust. By contrast, citizens trust opposition parties more than ruling parties in just four countries: barely so in Nigeria (where again, trust levels are very low for both parties) and Cape Verde (the trust gap is within the surveys' margin of sampling error for both countries), but by meaningful gaps in Ghana and Malawi (where citizens favour the opposition by 9 and 13 percentage points, respectively).

A comparison of two extreme country cases – Ghana and Zimbabwe – underscores the point that popular trust in political parties is sometimes a variable, even volatile sentiment. In Ghana through 2008, citizens adhered to the African norm of trusting the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) more than its opponent, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) (Figure 6). After an electoral turnover in 2009, however, the balance was reversed when trust in the ruling party declined sharply as the now-ruling NDC seriously underperformed in office, leading to a widening trust gap favouring the now-opposition NPP. Quite different trends are observed in Zimbabwe. When entering a power-sharing agreement in 2008, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) attracted twice as much trust as the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which had run the country's economy and social services into the ground. By 2015, however, fortunes were reversed, with the MDC trailing the ZANU-PF in trust by 20 percentage points, perhaps indicating the perils for opposition parties of cooperating too closely with entrenched rulers who are unwilling in practice to surrender the reins of power.

Figure 6: Trends in trust in ruling and opposition parties | Ghana and Zimbabwe | 2005-2015



Nonetheless, while these examples demonstrate that trust in ruling and opposition parties can fluctuate over time, the widespread pattern that opposition parties tend to be trusted substantially less than ruling parties holds across most countries.



Electoral alternation

What creates the trust gap? One possibility is that the size of the trust gap may be related to election outcomes. Generally speaking, citizens perceive a larger trust gap between ruling and opposition parties in countries that have not experienced a peaceful electoral turnover (or alternation) of ruling parties in the recent past. Among Afrobarometer countries for which 2014/2015 data are available, nine of the 20 did not undergo a peaceful political alternation between 2005 and 2014³; in these countries, the average trust gap (pro-ruling party) is a substantial 17 percentage points. By contrast, among the 11 countries that experienced electoral turnover between 2005 and 2015, the average trust gap is a mere 3 percentage points. Although the gap still slightly favours the ruling party, it barely exceeds the margin of error for the surveys, suggesting little substantive trust difference between parties in power and parties out of power in these countries.

Thus, beyond the opportunity to gain political office, electoral alternation may also help opposition parties level the playing field in terms of popular perceptions of trustworthiness. Note, however, that a closing trust gap appears to reflect a decline in trust in former ruling parties rather than gains for former opposition parties that have become ruling parties.

Table 2: Electoral alternation and the trust gap | 20 countries | 2014/2015

	Trust ruling party 2015	Trust opposition parties 2015	Trust gap (pro-ruling) 2015
Countries with electoral alternation, 2005-2015 (n=11)	41%	38%	3
Countries without electoral alternation, 2005-2015 (n=9)	55%	38%	17

Once again, stark differences are evident in the trajectories of institutional trust for both groups and in particular countries. Among countries that experienced alternation, we see the expected effects most strongly in Lesotho, where the trust gap decreased from a resounding 52 percentage points in 2005 to (a still substantial) 16 points in 2015, and Madagascar, where the gap dropped from 37 points to just 4 (Figure 7). In contrast, in both Ghana and Malawi, former ruling parties apparently retained trust while current ruling parties (formerly opposition) failed to gain ground, thus causing the trust gap to flip, and now favour the opposition.

Meanwhile, in Tanzania, which has never experienced electoral alternation, the trust gap has dropped from a startling 55 percentage points in 2005 to 17 points in 2014. This shift reflects both a sharp decline in perceptions of the trustworthiness of the ruling party (trust has dropped from 90% in 2005 to 71% in 2014) and a similarly sharp


³ Electoral alternations occurred in the following 11 countries: Benin (2006), Cape Verde (2011), Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Ghana (2008), Lesotho (2012), Madagascar (2014), Malawi (2009), Mali (2013), Mauritius (2005), Senegal (2012), and Zambia (2011). Note that Malawi and Mauritius both underwent second turnovers during 2014, as did Lesotho in early 2015, but in all cases these transitions occurred after Round 6 data were collected during 2014, so they do not affect the results reported here. Nigeria underwent alternation in early 2015, but again, this occurred shortly after Round 6 data were collected in December 2014; there were no transitions in Nigeria in the 10 years preceding Round 6 data collection.

increase in trust for the opposition (up from 35% in 2005 to 53% in 2014). Tanzania is now the only country covered by Afrobarometer surveys in which a majority trusts the opposition.



Figure 7: Changes in the trust gap | 15 countries | 2005-2015

(Trust gap = trust in ruling party minus trust in opposition parties)



Policy differences?

Most analysts agree that political parties in Africa are built around the distribution of patronage resources rather than the promotion of policy platforms (e.g. van de Walle & Butler, 2007; Elischer, 2013; Resnick, 2014). A somewhat different picture emerges when the opinions of citizens are sought on this subject. Asked about the “most important difference between ruling and opposition parties,” a plurality of citizens (23%) claim to distinguish them based on their “economic and development policies” (Figure 8); fully 40% of Malawians claim to perceive policy differences, compared to just 11% in Mali.

The extent to which this unexpected response reflects social desirability or policy sophistication is unclear. In fact, the second-most-common response is that there is “no difference” between the parties (18%), which ranked as the top response in six of the 20 countries. Citizens otherwise mention personal characteristics of party leaders – such as their perceived “honesty” (17%), “experience” (15%), or “personality” (7%) – that seem to describe the attributes of political patrons (and that together amount to 39% of all responses). Finally, even if Africans ultimately vote in blocs, they claim that

considerations of social identity – whether ethnic, regional, or religious (together 9%) – play little role in the way they distinguish among political parties.





Figure 8: Main differences between ruling and opposition parties | 20 countries
| 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following do you see as the most important difference between the ruling party and opposition parties in [your country]?

If, for the moment, we take citizen assertions at face value – that is, that they see African political parties as differing primarily on policy grounds – then ruling parties possess a distinct advantage. The surveys asked respondents to assess the capacity of ruling and opposition parties to address policy challenges in key areas such as job creation, inflation management, service delivery, and corruption control. Respondents always give an edge to incumbents, often by extremely wide margins. For example, ruling parties are deemed to have a 60-point advantage over opposition parties in their capacity to improve basic health services. Among the policy areas studied, citizens saw the opposition as having most capacity to fight official corruption, but even here they trailed ruling parties by 45 points. Of course, these results may not reflect real inter-party differences in policy or institutional capacity, but rather the fact that rulers tend to monopolize (and oppositions are usually starved of) development resources.

Table 3: Differences in policy capacity, ruling and opposition parties
| 20 countries | 2014/2015



	Ruling party	Opposition parties	Don't know / Haven't heard enough / Neither
Improving basic health services	74	14	12
Creating jobs	71	16	13
Controlling prices	68	16	16
Fighting corruption in government	64	19	17

Respondents were asked: *Looking at the ruling and opposition parties in this country, which would you say is most able to address each of the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say? (%)*

Viabile opposition?

Given low levels of popular trust in opposition parties and widespread doubts about the out-group's policy capacity, it is not entirely surprising that citizens seldom regard opposition parties as being poised to form an alternative government. On average in 2015, only a minority (41%) of survey respondents in 20 African countries think that "the political opposition in this country presents a viable alternative vision and plan for the country" (Figure 9).

When average opinion about opposition viability is broken down to country level, three groups of African countries emerge:

- **Countries with viable oppositions:** In these places, a majority of citizens (51% or more) think that the opposition has a vision and plan for the country and, by implication, is therefore qualified to form a government. According to the latest Afrobarometer results (2014-2015), four countries currently fall into this category: Malawi, Madagascar, Namibia, and Ghana. Three of these four have experienced alternations (Ghana, Madagascar, and Malawi). The fourth, Namibia, resembles Tanzania in that both ruling and opposition parties seem to enjoy relatively high standing (see Figure 5).
- **Countries with semi-viable oppositions:** While these cases exceed the Afrobarometer mean (with 42% to 50%), they lack a majority of citizens who perceive opposition viability. In other words, opposition parties enjoy a measure of popular credibility but have yet to cross critical thresholds that would enable electoral victory or alternation of government. The five countries in this category are: Tanzania, Togo, Mali, Botswana, and Zambia. Of these, only Mali and Zambia have undergone alternations in the past decade.
- **Countries with non-viable oppositions:** In all remaining countries, citizens see the opposition as falling short (often well short) of being an electoral threat to incumbents or a realistic government-in-waiting. This group of 11 countries constitutes more than half of the country sample and may therefore be most representative of the continent as a whole. The countries in this category span a diverse mix of political contexts, from conflict-based fragility (e.g. Côte

d'Ivoire, Burundi) to stable democracy (e.g. Mauritius). Perhaps oddly, this group also includes five countries that have undergone recent electoral alternations.





Figure 9: Opposition as viable alternative government | 20 countries
| 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The political opposition in [your country] presents a viable alternative vision and plan for the country? (% "agree" or "strongly agree")

Explaining opposition viability?

The question remains as to how African citizens arrive at judgments about the viability of the political opposition. We are unable in this paper to arrive at a definitive – let alone causal – account of the motivations behind this aspect of public opinion. But by regressing some of the covariates described earlier in this paper on the Afrobarometer indicator of perceived opposition viability (Table 4), we can offer a few conjectures.

Our main inference is that, in accounting for viability, institutional trust is far more important than policy performance.

Recall that citizens claim to differentiate political parties according to the parties' avowed policy positions and perceived capacity for policy implementation. To be sure, we find that citizens attribute opposition viability partly to expectations that the opposition will perform better than incumbent parties in implementing key policies. In the regression model, all standardized coefficients for policy performance have predicted positive signs and are statistically significant. But substantively, the size of all associations is small (ranging from $r=.047$ to $.076$).



Table 4: Covariates of perceived opposition viability (OLS regression)
 | 20 African countries | c. 2015


	See opposition as viable alternative government
See opposition performance as better at: controlling prices	.047***
See opposition performance as better at: creating jobs	.049***
See opposition performance as better at: improving basic health services	.049***
See opposition performance as better at: fighting corruption	.076***
See no difference in policies of ruling and opposition parties	-.095***
Countries with electoral alternation , 2005-2014	-.001 (not sig.)
Trust ruling party	-.181***
Trust opposition parties	.206***

DV = five-point ordinal scale, "strongly disagree" = 1 to "strongly agree" = 5. N=22,907. Cell entries are standardized beta coefficients, ***p<.001, adj. r2 = .140.

True, people's hopes that the opposition will effectively fight corruption have a greater effect on perceptions of opposition viability than does its expected role in controlling prices. Indeed, among the four policy issues considered here, the opposition's expected performance at combatting corruption (relative to that of the incumbent party) has the biggest impact on whether people come to see the political opposition as viable.

On a related point, citizens who perceive an absence of policy difference between ruling and opposition parties are significantly less likely to regard the opposition as politically viable ($r=-.095$, $p<.000$). This suggests that, even if many Africans want opposition parties to work in concert with the incumbent government (rather than against it), they would still like to see a wider range of available policy options.

That being said, we confirm an emerging impression that electoral alternation is unrelated to popular perceptions of opposition viability ($r=-.001$, not significant). This unexpected result implies that former ruling parties that are now in opposition are no longer imagined by the general public as a viable alternative government. It may also be the case that a country's experience of electoral alternation is no guarantee that future turnovers of government will take place. Further research is required on this important subject.



For the moment, however, we note the importance of institutional trust. As Table 4 shows, nothing in the explanatory model has nearly as much impact as this factor. If citizens lack trust in the ruling party, then they are more likely to perceive the political opposition as a viable option for their country. The negative sign on the regression coefficient ($r = -.181$, $p < .001$) runs strongly and significantly in the predicted direction. More importantly, if citizens express trust in opposition parties, then they are most likely to perceive opposition viability ($r = .206$, $p < .001$). Indeed, trust in opposition parties is the strongest covariate in the model.


Of course, it is always possible that institutional trust and perceptions of party viability are not independent sentiments. The relationship between the two opinions could be endogenous (with viability shaping trust rather than vice versa). Or the indicators could even be interchangeable proxies (that is, they both measure the same or similar things).

But, at minimum, the regression analysis helps to put to rest an important misconception. Although African citizens claim to base their judgments about political parties primarily on policy considerations, they are, in fact, driven by the stronger sentiment of institutional trust. In other words, citizens judge the viability of political opposition in Africa in the first instance on whether they think they can trust these institutions. We therefore think that public judgments of policy differences between parties are likely to be a product of underlying relationships of trust, rather than vice versa. And since trust is likely to be shaped in good part by what citizens feel about the patrons who lead Africa's political parties, we remain on the side of those who argue that patronage continues to trump policy in the formation of public attitudes toward parties in Africa.

To further explore this data, please visit Afrobarometer's online data analysis facility at www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.

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AFRO BAROMETER

LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY



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