

Zimbabwe's presidential race tightens one month ahead of July 30 voting

Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 223 | Michael Bratton and Eldred V. Masunungure

Summary

For the first time in a generation, Zimbabweans will vote in presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections on July 30, 2018 without the name of Robert Mugabe at the top of the ballot. Instead, the race for the presidency – the top prize in Zimbabwean politics – will pit Mugabe's long-time collaborator, Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), against newcomer Nelson Chamisa, who, with the death of Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018, inherited the leadership of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T Chamisa and MDC Alliance).



At least on the surface, the 2018 election is unfolding in a somewhat more open political atmosphere than the country's previous contests, which were often marred by violent intimidation and disputed results. The opposition has been permitted to campaign throughout the country, and access to the election proceedings has been granted to a wide spectrum of international observers. But undercurrents of concern remain about the independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the illicit distribution of public largesse by the ruling party, and the unknown intentions of the security forces, which in the past have repeatedly shored up ZANU-PF against any loss of political power.

Against this backdrop, Zimbabwean voters wonder whether 2018 will break the mold of past elections by ushering in the country's first-ever alternation of presidential leadership. Certainly the electorate longs for a leader who can bring an end to four decades of economic mismanagement and rising poverty. In response, both Mnangagwa and Chamisa are campaigning on messages of economic reform and job creation. But a skeptical citizenry has every reason to question the sincerity and feasibility of politicians' easy promises and, in the absence of unbiased information from a polarized and partisan press, to wonder which political party is actually ahead in the quest to occupy the top offices of state.

This dispatch reports results from a survey of public opinion on the status of the electoral race conducted one month before the day of voting with a representative sample of 2,400 voting-age adults drawn from all 10 provinces of Zimbabwe. The survey was commissioned by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Afrobarometer's core partner in Southern Africa, and implemented by the Mass Public Opinion Institute, Afrobarometer's national partner in Zimbabwe.¹

¹ Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in African countries. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples. Previous surveys were conducted in Zimbabwe in 1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2017. For details, please visit www.afrobarometer.org.

This pre-election survey reflects the public mood at the time of fieldwork between June 25 and July 6, 2018 (henceforth “early July”). In order to capture the changing nature of the electoral landscape, the latest results are compared with results from a baseline survey conducted some two months earlier, between April 28 and May 12, 2018 (“early May”). The baseline (“early May”) survey occurred before party primary elections, the release of party manifestos, and the June 14 nomination of candidates. The final (“early July”) survey was different in this sense: Voters knew their candidates and where they purportedly stood in policy terms; as possible participants in primary elections, voters may even have had a hand in selecting candidates.

The margin of sampling error in both surveys was +/-2 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.


Key findings

- As of early July 2018, Zimbabweans were ready for elections: 86% of eligible voters (and 97% of registered voters) said they were “probably” or “definitely” going to vote.
- At this time, Zimbabweans saw a somewhat more open political atmosphere than for previous campaigns. Fears of free expression and electoral violence had declined slightly, though both remained high (76% and 43%, respectively).
- More people reported attending ruling-party election rallies than opposition-party rallies, especially in rural areas. But more people, especially in urban areas, thought that the opposition’s presidential candidate would perform better at “creating jobs for the people.”
- Compared to the early May survey, by early July **the race for the presidency had tightened**. Among citizens who were both registered to vote and likely to vote, **40% said they would vote for the ZANU-PF and 37% said they would vote for the MDC** (combined party and Alliance).
- Depending on how undeclared voters (20%) ultimately decide to vote, either party had a chance to win the presidential election on the first round.
- Zimbabweans continued to worry that the election would not end well: More than four in 10 expressed concerns that incorrect election results would be announced, that the armed forces would not respect the election result, and that post-election violence would occur.
- Perhaps reflecting these concerns, Zimbabweans as a whole – regardless of whether they planned to vote or which candidate they preferred to vote for – still considered the ZANU-PF the more likely winner in the race for the presidency.

Will voters vote?

From a vantage point one month before the election, the survey results hint at the possibility of high voter turnout (Figure 1). As of early July, some 88% of eligible voters (that is, adults 18 years or older) said they had registered to vote, up from 85% in early May. Apparently some would-be voters registered late. Moreover, 86% of all survey respondents (and 97% of registered voters) asserted that they were “probably” or “definitely” going to vote. While self-reported registration rates and stated turnout intentions undoubtedly exceed actual rates, citizens nonetheless signaled a great deal of popular interest in a high-stakes election.

Figure 1: Registered (self-reported) and likely to vote | Zimbabwe | May-July 2018



Note: Survey question texts for all figures are listed in the Appendix.


Whether citizens report being registered to vote depends to a degree on demographic and political factors. For example, registration rates are highest in Masvingo and Midlands provinces, where the ZANU-PF presidential candidate is expected to make a strong run, and lowest in Harare, Bulawayo, and the Matabeleland provinces, where the opposition candidate is projected to do well (Figure 2). These patterns may well reflect the relative effectiveness of ruling and opposition parties to organize and control voter-registration drives in their respective areas of strength.

Figure 2: Registered to vote (self-reported) | by province | Zimbabwe | July 2018



While ready to vote, citizens expressed concerns about aspects of a newly introduced biometric voter registration (BVR) system, which records detailed personal information including photographs and fingerprints. In early July, one in four registered voters (25%) reported that an unauthorized person had demanded to see the serial number on their BVR slips. And almost two-thirds (64%) of all respondents – including 77% and 72%, respectively, in Mashonaland East and Midlands – incorrectly thought that they must display this slip at the polling station in order to cast a vote. Although these qualms dropped slightly from higher levels in early May, more than one-quarter of all Zimbabwean adults continued to worry about the secrecy of the ballot; 28% thought that “powerful people” could somehow “find out how you voted” (Figure 3). Such concerns could well keep some people away from the polls.


Figure 3: Apprehensions about the election | Zimbabwe | May-July 2018



Partisan identities


As political space has recently expanded, citizens have gradually increased their open identification with political parties. Whereas in early May 65% said they “felt close” to a political party, by early July some 68% said so. A shift of this sort, even if small, was to be expected as the campaign entered full swing and party identification became more salient to citizens. Importantly, popular identification with the MDC-T (party plus Alliance) was up by 5 percentage points, whereas identification with the ZANU-PF may have dropped slightly (Figure 4). In sum, the election campaign seems to have attracted new opposition adherents or lured some reticent supporters out into the open.

Figure 4: Party identification | Zimbabwe | May-July 2018



In a high-turnout election, success depends on the ability of a political party to mobilize its support base. One indicator of this capacity is citizens' reported attendance at party meetings or rallies. Throughout the campaign, more citizens reported attending ruling-party than opposition events. In early July, for example, twice as many people said they had attended a ZANU-PF meeting or rally (34%) than an MDC-T party or MDC Alliance gathering (18%), a 2-to-1 gap that had held steady from early May onward (Figure 5). The gap was especially wide in rural areas (by 4 to 1), notably in Mashonaland Central (6 to 1). Whether these figures reflect voluntary or coerced attendance is unknown. But in all likelihood and despite a countryside campaign blitz by Chamisa, the opposition continued to face a persistent organizational and resource disadvantage against a state-funded ruling party.²

Figure 5: Attended party meetings or rallies | Zimbabwe | May-July 2018




² The MDC's deficit was especially marked in the Mashonaland, Midlands, and Masvingo.

To Chamisa's credit, however, his vigorous efforts to introduce himself to the electorate have apparently begun to pay off. Nor does he seem to have been badly hurt by naïve gaffes or over-enthusiastic campaign promises. Instead, on the core issue in the campaign – job creation³ – he has established a more favourable public reputation than his chief rival (Figure 6). Asked about “who will do a better job in creating jobs for the people,” respondents said that Chamisa outranks Mnangagwa by 10 percentage points (42% vs. 32%).⁴ The remainder either “didn't know” or refused to answer (18% combined) or said “neither of them” (8%). It is therefore possible that perceptions of Chamisa as a more capable job creator – correct or not – probably help explain the MDC's recent gains in party identification.

Not surprisingly, opinions on the subject of a leader's ability to create jobs are starkly divided along partisan lines and between urban (mainly pro-MDC) and rural (mainly pro-ZANU-PF) areas. At the same time, popular trust in the opposition leader and his party and alliance seemed to be on the rise – from 40% of all citizens interviewed in early May to 48% in early July.⁵

Figure 6: Who would be better at job creation? | Zimbabwe | July 2018



Voting intentions: Presidential election

So where did the presidential race stand about one month before the July 30 elections?⁶ The final pre-election survey captured a snapshot of citizens' intended voting behaviour at this time. The survey question asked, “*If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party's or alliance's candidate would you vote for?*” Among citizens who were both registered to vote and likely to vote, **40% said they would vote for the ZANU-PF and 37% said they would vote for the MDC** (party and Alliance) (Figure 7).


³ See Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 47 at www.afrobarometer.org.

⁴ More than half (53%) of urban dwellers held this view of Chamisa.

⁵ Caution is warranted in interpreting this change, since the May survey asked about the MDC-T party and alliance and the July survey asked about the MDC-T leader.

⁶ The median date for fieldwork was June 30.

Figure 7: Voting intentions in the presidential election | Zimbabwe | July 2018



It is important to remember that an increment of uncertainty surrounds all figures in any survey. In this case, the confidence interval is ± 2 percentage points, which is the survey's margin of sampling error. Thus, based on the results reported in the previous paragraph, the distribution of intended votes for Mnangagwa lay in the range of 38%-42% and the distribution of intended votes for Chamisa lay in the range of 35%-39%. Thus, as of early July, it was probable that Mnangagwa was ahead, though it is impossible to rule out the possibility that Chamisa had taken the lead.


In other words, **the presidential race tightened significantly** between early May and early July. At the prior date, we reported that the ZANU-PF enjoyed a clear double-digit lead of 11 percentage points (42% to the MDC's 31%). Just two months later, the gap had closed to 3 percentage points.

By any measure, this is a **considerable swing in favour of the challenger**. Any further projection of this momentum into the final weeks of the campaign would reduce the gap between the contenders within the survey's margin of error (± 2 percentage points), rendering the election too close to call.

In one important respect, elections in Zimbabwe are a tale of two contests. Voting patterns diverge dramatically depending on where voters live, principally in rural or urban areas. As of early July, the ZANU-PF commanded a healthy 18-point lead in citizens' stated voting intentions across Zimbabwe's rural areas (48% vs. the MDC's 30%). The tables were turned in urban areas, where the MDC (party plus Alliance) was ahead by the considerable margin of 23 percentage points (49% vs. 26%) (Figure 8).


But the harsh reality of Zimbabwe's demography must be borne in mind in evaluating these results: Almost twice as many people reside in areas classified as rural as live in areas deemed urban (63% vs. 37%). As urban elites too often forget, this demographic imbalance endows the ZANU-PF with a built-in electoral advantage.

Figure 8: Voting intentions in the presidential election | by urban-rural location
| Zimbabwe | July 2018



That said, a breakdown of voting intentions by province reveals the closeness of the presidential race. In early July, the ZANU-PF was ahead in five (mostly rural) provinces: the three Mashonaland plus Midlands and Masvingo. By contrast, the MDC-T (party and Alliance) enjoyed a lead in the two Matabeleland provinces, Manicaland, and (urban) Harare and Bulawayo (Figure 9). Note, however, that in terms of the population of registered voters, the three Matabeleland provinces are low-yield sources of votes.⁷

Figure 9: Voting intentions in the presidential election | by province | Zimbabwe
| July 2018



⁷ Given smaller sample sizes at the provincial level, the margin of sampling error is +/-7.5 percentage points. But with the exception of Matabeleland South, province-level gaps in expressed support between the parties exceeded this margin.

What about undeclared voters?

Important, too, are the 20% of citizens who did not declare a voting intention. This group is made up of the 15% who refused to answer the voting-intentions question and the 5% who said they did not know whom they would vote for.⁸ Yet the choices of undeclared voters at the ballot box could have a decisive effect on the outcome of the presidential election. So how might they vote? Some speculative estimates are possible, as follows:

If undeclared voters split their votes in the same proportions as declared voters (i.e. 40% for the ZANU-PF and 37% for the MDC), then we estimate that the incumbent candidate could win on the first round.

But what if, as seems more likely, undeclared voters lean toward the opposition? What proportion of these reticent citizens would have to vote for the MDC to ensure the opposition a majority of votes (50% plus one) on the first round? According to our calculation (see Box 1), the MDC would have to obtain about two-thirds (66%) of undeclared votes in order to secure a first-round victory in the presidential election. In our opinion, this prospect lies within the realm of reasonable possibility.

Box 1: How many undeclared voters would swing the election?

To win on the first round of the presidential election, any party needs a minimum of 50% of the votes plus one. Out of the July 2018 survey sample of 2,400 citizens, 2,044 reported that they were both registered to vote and likely to vote. Within this subsample, any party would therefore require the votes of at least 1,023 respondents (50% of 2,044 plus one).


The combined number of respondents who declared that they intended to vote for the MDC (party plus Alliance) was 750 (36.7%, or 37% when rounded). To achieve a total of 1,023, the MDC would need to attract an additional 273 vote commitments from among the population of undeclared voters. The total number of undeclared voters in the survey sample was 413 (304 “refused” + 109 “don’t know”). Therefore, in order to win the presidential election on the first round, the opposition MDC-T/A would need 273 out of 411 additional votes, or 66.1% (rounded to 66%) of all undeclared voters in the sample.

Voting intentions: Parliamentary election

How about the race for the House of Assembly? Again only the stated voting intentions of registered and likely voters were considered. In this race, a slightly wider gap separated the parties at the national level. As of early July, ZANU-PF candidates attracted the votes of 41% of survey respondents, and MDC-T (party and Alliance) candidates drew 36% (Figure 10). Since this 5-percentage-point margin lies outside the survey’s confidence interval, it seems likely that the ZANU-PF was on course to maintain a parliamentary majority. The distribution of intended votes by province was roughly the same for the House of Assembly as for the presidency, with one exception: In Matabeleland South, the ZANU-PF, rather than the MDC, appeared ahead in the parliamentary race.

⁸ Going forward, we exclude the 1% of registered voters who said that, after all, they would not vote.


Figure 10: Voting intentions in the parliamentary election | Zimbabwe
| May-July 2018



In what is proving to be a volatile contest, further swings are possible in the final weeks of the campaign. For example, even over two short months between early May and early July, the MDC made gains in support for parliamentary candidates whereas the ZANU-PF's support stalled (or perhaps even dropped).

Nevertheless, the MDC's upward trajectory was not helped by a contentious party primary season in May 2018. In the opinion of ordinary citizens, the primary elections of both parties fell short of "free and fair" standards; only minorities felt that primaries conducted by the ZANU-PF (44%) and the MDC-T Chamisa (33%) passed muster in this regard (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Assessment of primary elections | Zimbabwe | July 2018




In these primary elections, both parties tried to impose candidates on the locality or, in the MDC's case, allowed multiple candidates to run from different wings of the Alliance. As might have been expected, disputes arising from these anomalies generated a profusion of disgruntled losers who went on to mount independent candidacies for seats in Parliament. But the proportion of citizens intending to vote for independent candidates barely budged between May and July and never exceeded 1% of the electorate.

Will the election end well?

Perhaps reflecting a somewhat more open political environment, the proportion of Zimbabweans who thought that "people must be careful of what they say about politics" dipped by 6 percentage points between May (82%) and July (76%) (Figure 12). But Zimbabweans continued to display high levels of self-censorship, especially when compared with an average of 70% across other African countries.⁹ Note, however, that Zimbabwe no longer leads the continent on this indicator; at least eight other countries now register higher levels of fear of open expression.


Figure 12: Careful about what one says | Zimbabwe | May-July 2018



As expected, opposition sympathizers were more likely than ruling-party supporters to express a need to be careful about what they say (84% vs. 71%) (Figure 13). But the fact that seven out of 10 ZANU-PF backers nevertheless felt cautious about political speech indicates that the ruling party continues to use heavy-handed methods to discipline its own political base.


⁹ Afrobarometer Round 7, 24 countries circa 2017

Figure 13: Careful about what one says | by political party affiliation | Zimbabwe | July 2018



Fear of election-driven political violence remains widespread even if improvements are visible at the margins. In early May, a slim majority (51%) said they personally feared becoming a victim of electoral intimidation or violence; by early July, a large minority (43%) expressed this concern, an 8-percentage-point drop¹⁰ (Figure 14). This positive shift in the public mood occurred even in the face of a bomb blast at a ZANU-PF election rally at White City Stadium in Bulawayo on June 23. It is reinforced by a growing majority (68%) who thought the current government was performing well at “preventing electoral violence” (up 5 points from 63% in May). This judgment was perhaps enhanced by President Mnangagwa’s restrained public response to the Bulawayo bombing.

Figure 14: Fear of electoral intimidation or violence | Zimbabwe | May-July 2018



¹⁰ But fear of campaign violence is location-specific, being particularly high in Mashonaland East (71% in July 2018).

But by comparative African standards, fear of election violence remained on the high side in Zimbabwe (43%); for 24 countries covered by Afrobarometer in and around 2017, the continental average stood at 30%.


Most importantly, Zimbabweans expressed concerns about the final stages of the election and especially the role therein of the military. Perhaps people remember earlier elections, when some security chiefs threatened to block any transfer of power to the political opposition. And they surely recall the heavy military presence in the “coup that was not a coup” of November 2017. In an effort to counteract popular concerns, a spokesman for the Zimbabwe Defence Forces denied on June 4 that soldiers were supervising the ruling party’s campaign in the countryside and tried to assure the public that the military would limit itself to an impartial role in the election.

These appeals apparently fell on deaf ears. In both the May and July surveys (Figure 15), significant minorities of citizens reported that they expected that:

- **incorrect election results would be announced:** 44% in May, 45% in July
- **the armed forces would not respect the election result:** 41% in May, 44% in July
- **post-election violence would occur:** 40% in May, 44% in July

Majorities expressed these concerns in the cities and towns. In sum, as the day of the vote approached, citizen apprehensions about yet another disputed election with a violent aftermath were on the rise.

Figure 15: Popular concerns about election’s final stages | Zimbabwe
| May-July 2018



The wisdom of the crowd


The results of this pre-election survey conducted one month before the July 30 election in Zimbabwe point toward a paradox.

On one hand, when citizens were asked whom they intended to vote for in the presidential election, the result looked close. To repeat: If the election had been held in early July 2018, Chamisa would have secured 37% of the vote compared to 40% for Mnangagwa. Moreover, momentum was with the challenger, who transformed an 11-point disadvantage in early May into a 3-point gap by early July. The MDC's electoral momentum could even be building further during the last few weeks of the campaign. Furthermore, if the votes of undeclared voters are included in the calculation, then scenarios exist for a prospective MDC victory even on the first round of presidential voting.

On the other hand, scenarios also exist for the ZANU-PF to retain the presidency. If undeclared voters split in the same proportions as declared voters did in early July, then Mnangagwa could ride a 3-point edge to victory in the first round of the presidential vote on July 30. Alternatively, the ruling party might take further advantage of an unbalanced playing field by accelerating the distribution of patronage goods, stepping up its strong-arm tactics, or adding measures to manipulate the counting, collation, or announcement of results. After all, it is difficult to imagine that the civilian-military coalition that executed "the coup that was not a coup" in November 2017 would have taken such a high-risk action only to go on to lose an election.

This latter scenario is apparently what Zimbabweans fear most. It is on full display in a key survey indicator that we call "the wisdom of the crowd." Pollsters are discovering that, rather than trying to measure the behaviour of individual voters as we have done here, a more accurate prediction of election outcomes can be gleaned from estimates provided by the electorate as a whole. To this end, the survey asked all respondents, "Regardless of whether you will vote, or who you will vote for, which party's or alliance's candidate do you think will ultimately win the presidential election?" This alternative indicator produces a result **much more favourable to the ZANU-PF; it shows the incumbent party ahead by 9 percentage points** (ZANU-PF 43% vs. MDC 34%) (Figure 16).

Figure 16: 'Wisdom of the crowd': Expected winner of presidential election
| Zimbabwe | May-July 2018




Of course, the wisdom of the crowd may be wrong. In early July, Zimbabweans may not have taken full account of the last-minute surge by the opposition. Or, based on hard-won experience, the wisdom of the crowd may be correct. People have justifiable reasons to believe that the ZANU-PF will never allow itself to be defeated in a free and fair election. Indeed, the wisdom of the crowd would seem to embody the well-founded popular apprehension that, once again, the only ruling party Zimbabwe has ever known will find a way – by hook or by crook – to return itself to power.

An alternate outcome?

Because the presidential race has tightened considerably, there is a very good chance that no party or alliance will be able to achieve a landslide win or to declare a broad electoral mandate. Anticipating these circumstances, the survey asked, “If no presidential candidate achieves a clear victory, would you want Zimbabwe to have a Government of National Unity (GNU)?”

A power-sharing option has long been favoured by the Zimbabwean citizenry.¹¹ Responses in July 2018 were no exception: Fully 60% wanted a GNU (Figure 17). Moreover, the proportion of Zimbabweans who thought that a GNU was the *likely* outcome of the 2018 election was also on the rise (from 33% in early May to 41% in early July). While this alternative outcome was far from guaranteed, its popularity surely reflected the tightening of the race.

Figure 17: Prospects for a Government of National Unity | Zimbabwe | July 2018



¹¹ In October 2010, 72% agreed that “creating an inclusive government was the best way to resolve the recent (2008) post-election crisis.” See *Zimbabwe: The evolving public mood*, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 97, December 2010, at www.afrobarometer.org.

Appendix

Survey question texts for figures

Figure 1

- Are you registered to vote in the upcoming 2018 elections?
- How likely are you to vote in the 2018 elections?

Figure 2

- Are you registered to vote in the upcoming 2018 elections?

Figure 3

- To your knowledge, will a citizen have to show a biometric voter registration (BVR) slip in order to vote? (Analysis includes all respondents.)
- Has anyone demanded to see the serial number of your voter registration slip? (Analysis includes only registered voters.)
- In your opinion, how likely will the following things happen in the 2018 elections: Even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country, powerful people will find out how you have voted?

Figure 4

- Do you feel close to any particular political party? (If yes:) Which party is that?

Figure 5

- Have you attended any party meetings or rallies organized by the following parties or political party alliances during the campaign for the 2018 elections?

Figure 6

- Most people in Zimbabwe think that the present election campaign is mainly about job creation. Of the following presidential candidates, who do you think will do a better job in creating jobs for the people?

Figure 7

- If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? (Analysis includes registered likely voters only.)

Figure 8 and Figure 9

- If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? (Analysis includes registered likely voters only.)

Figure 10

- If elections were held tomorrow, which party's or alliance's candidate would you vote for as member of Parliament? (Analysis includes registered likely voters only.)

Figure 11

- What about the recently concluded political party primaries? How free and fair would you say they were for each of the following parties?

Figure 12 and Figure 13

- In your opinion, how often, in this country, do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?

Figure 14

- During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?

Figure 15

- In your view, how likely is it that:
 - Even after all ballots are counted, an incorrect result will be announced?
 - Security agencies will not accept the result of the presidential election?
 - There will be violence after the announcement of election results?

Figure 16

- Regardless of whether or not you will vote, or who you will vote for, which party's or alliance's candidate do you expect, ultimately, will win the 2018 presidential election? (Analysis includes all respondents.)

Figure 17

- If no presidential candidate achieves a clear victory, would you want Zimbabwe to have a Government of National Unity (GNU)?
- In your view, how likely is it that the main political parties will agree to share power in a second GNU?




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